Cicero's governorship of Cilicia by Wilkinson, James K.
CICERO'S 
GOVERNORSHIP 
O F 
OILICIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Birmingham Research Archive 
 
e-theses repository 
 
 
This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third 
parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect 
of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or 
as modified by any successor legislation.   
 
Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in 
accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged.  Further 
distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission 
of the copyright holder.  
 
 
 
INDEX 
Synopsis 
THE PROVINCE OF CILICIA 
The First :Provinces 
The Historical Growth of Cilicia 
Geograpey and People of Cilioia 
THE FROVINCIAL GOVERNOR 
Appointment and Powers 
The Governor's Staff 
Finance 
CICERO AND THE PROVINCES 
Cicero's Appointment 
Cicero's Professed Aims and Ideals in 
Provincial Govermrent 
1) The Speeches 
2) Advice to Quintus 
Cicero's Reaction to the Appointment 
CICERO' S YEAR GP OFFICE 
The Journey to Oi1ioia 
August to December 51 B.C. 
January to July 50 B.c. 
Return to Rome 
CICERO'S P.RACTICE IN CILICIA 
The Governor's Edict 
Taxation 
Treatment of Provincials 1l General Conduct 
2 Administration of Law 
3 Relations with the Provincial Towns 
Client Kings 
Romans in Cilioia 
Appius Claudius 
I 
1 
4 
10 
14 
17 
18 
20 
21 
22 
26 
29 
32 
38 
46 
56 
62 
64 
69 
72 
73 
75 
82 
89 
PROVINCIAL IEFENCE 
EPn.OGUE 
The Governor's Position 
The Parthians 
Amanus 
Faults Inherent in the Provincial System 
Cicero's GovernorShip 
Bibliography 
96 
100 
106 
110 
112 
U9 
SYNOPSIS 
The thesis opens with an account of the early provinces, 
and then, following upon the acquisition of Asia, deals with the 
historical growth of Cilicia from the time it was a mere outpost 
against piracy until its full development as an area stretching 
from Asia to Syria. There then follows a brief discussion of 
the provincial governor's powera and the normal method of his 
selection. 
This in turn leads to the special case of Cicero 1 s 
appointment to Cilioia in 51 B.C. His criticisms of bad governors 
and his expressed opinions on provincial good order are outlined, 
showing his desire for moderation and respect for legality. After 
a chronological account of Cicero's year of office and absence f rom 
Rome, the highlights of his governorship are selected, and such 
topics as finance, taxation, treatment of individuals and mi.li tary 
concerns are considered in detail. 
The conclusion seeks to point out the main faults of the 
Republican provincial system and illustrates them with reference 
to Cicero's governorship. It also tries to show how far Cicero 
lived up to his earlier theoretical views in the face of the 
difficulties he experienced in practice. In the final reckoning 
he is shown to have attained fair success within the confining 
limits of the syste~ 
CICERO' 3 GOVERNORSHll' OF OlLICIA 
THE PROVINCE OF CJLICIA 
The First Provinces. 
During the long and often hesitant growth of Roman power under 
the Republic, the Senate was loath to accept responsibility for 
administering overseas territory and preferred, whenever possible, 
to spread Roman influence and oheok enexqy forces by alliance and treaty 
rather than by occupation. Frequently there had to be a political 
crisis or a pressing mdlitar.y danger before this general polio.y was 
disregarded. The Senate of course had good reason for its 
disinclination to take too active an interest in foreign states. 
Firstly there was no standing B.rll\Y to maintain good order, and secondly 
the diffioult.y of checking over-ambitious magistrates in Italy would 
clearly be increased when a magistrate was in sole command abroad. 
Further it was feared that the administration of new provinces would 
be troublesome, i£ not impossible, and a growing empire would excite 
the envy and ~ear of foreign na tiona which would see in Rome's 
expansion an end to their own power. 
As time went on however the Senate was forced, despite its better 
judgement and natural inclinations, to acquire new lands outside Italy 
proper. This expansion of Roman power was not due in the first instance 
to any desire for aggrandisement or to any wish for empire. Military, 
not imperial, motives were the deciding factors, and can be clearly seen 
in the reasons for the acquisition of the early western provinces, which 
were taken over only because of Rome's fear of Carthage. 
The first province was constituted in Sicily, though the whole 
island was not included at first, in 240 B.c. It is interesting to 
note the situation whiCh led Rome into the first Funio War in 264 B.C. 
---~------------
1 
and ultimately to the acquisition of Sicily. Among Rome's allies was 
the oity of Rhegium, and when in 264 B.C. the Carthaginia.ns put a 
garrison into Messana on the Sicilian side of the Straits of Messina 
it seemed that mainland Italy was threatened. Commercial interests 
also influenced the decision, far it was likely that if Rome's Italian 
allies were prevented from trading with Sicily they would think they 
had entered into a poor bargain by joining the Roman alliance. The 
Senate 's hesitation was f'inally overcome by the popular clamour, which 
could consider itself well-justified when, by the terms of the peace 
krv..( treaty, the Carthaginians surrendr Sicily to Rome. 
This is hardly the place to discuss in detail the organisation of 
Sicily, but several points are worthy of notice. Firstly the people 
and the communi ties in the province occupied a subordinate position; 
they were not, as Rome's previous allies, taken into treaty arrangements 
as equals, nor were they rewarded to any large extent with the grant of 
Roman citizenship until the time of Caesar. They were also 
distinguished from the allies of Rome by the fact that as provincials 
they paid tribute, and to this rule there were ver.y few exceptions. 
The communities did however retain a good measure of autonom,, except 
where Roman citizens were concerned. They were not of course allowed 
to go to war, but they were free from any necessit.y to provide troops 
for Rome • s armies which were made up almost entirely of Italians. 
Sicily too provides an example of how, even :from the outset, Rome was 
willing to tolerate independent kingdoms. Hiero, the king o:f Syracuse, 
had been Rome's ally in the war and was therefore allowed to retain his 
kingdom when the Romans took over the rest o:f the island. Unfortunately 
Hiero's successors chose to side with Carthage in the second Punic War, 
and by the peace of 210 B.c. the independent ld.ngdom came to an end.2 
The next provinces were those o:f Sardinia and Corsioa, annexed in 
238 B.C.; like Sicily, they were considered possible assault points and 
as such essential to Rome's safety. Further military considerations in 
the continued struggle against Carthage induced Rome to interfere in 
Spain, and in 197 B.C. there began the organisation of the two 
provinces of Hither and Further Spain.3 
--------------~-----
1. Livy : Epit XVI : "Contra quos (the Carthaginia.ns} et Hieronem, regem 
Syraousanorum, auxilium Mamertinis ferendum sena tus censui. t • • •• •. ; 
transgress is tunc primum mare equi tibu.s ( • exerci tibus' emendavi t 
Weissenborn) Romania adversus Hieronem saepius bene pugna tum." 
2. Livy XXVI.55.6 : " •• in relioum ourae senatui fore rem Syracusanam •• " 
5. Livy XXXII.27.6 : "Sex praetores illo anno primum oreati orescentibus 
iam provinoiis • •• (28.2.) Hiapanias Semprordus oiteriorom, Helvius 
ulteriorem est sortitus." 
2. 
About this same time the Roman!l turned their attention eastwards 
to Illyricum, but, while they did extend their influence across the 
Adriatic in order to check the pirates there, no formal occupation of 
the district as a province took place for some while.1 A similar delay 
characterised the organisation of Macedonia which was not formally set 
up as a province until 146 B. c. , after which time its governor was 
responsible for Roman interests not only in Macedonia, but also in 
Illyriaum and Dalmatia, together with the general supervision over 
Greece. This same year of 146 B.c. saw the final overthrow of Carthage 
and the inauguration of the Roman province of Afrioa,2 though a great 
deal of Carthaginian territory was handed over to allied kings in that 
area. 
These, briefly, are the first provinces ·taken under Roman domination. 
Some historians see in their acquisition a compelling desire for empire 
which manifested itself early in Rome's .history and which resulted in the 
wide growth of Rome's overseas possessions. It is however more accurate 
to see in Rome's general approach to the early provinces a definite 
reluctance to accept terri toriea other than those which appeared, either 
rightly or wrongly, essential to the safety of Italy and her interests. 
Moreover parts of the terri tory gained in the wars fought to protect 
Rome's interests were often divided amongst friend~ and allied kings 
when onoe the original enell\1 bad been defeated. This hesitancy is 
nowhere bett er illustrated than in Macedonia, where it needed three wars 
to show the futility of the poliay of non-annexation before Macedonia 
was finally organised as a province. 
A rather different case arose in 133 B.c. when Attalua III of 
Pergamum died and left his kingdom in Asia Minor to the people of Rome. 3 
The gitt, which was as much a source of embarrassment as r:f jubilation, 
was aopepted as a result of the pressure brought to bear on a reluctant 
Senate by Tiberius GraoOhus. However,befare anything positive could be 
done,a revolt broke out under the leadership of Aristonious, a 
pretender to the throne, and it was three years before Rome, aided by 
the Greek oi ties of Asia, and by the kings of Bi thynia, Pontus and 
Cappadocia, restored peace. The commission sent out from Rome to 
organise the new province was generous in rewarding the kings for their 
---~~---------
1. Livy XXXII.33.3 : " •• restituenda Romania ea Illyrici loca, quae post 
pacem in Epiro factam ocoupasset." 
2. Li vy Epi t LI : "Carthago, in circui tu millia viginti tria passuwn 
patens, magno labore obses sa, et per partes oapta est; primum a 
Mancino legato, deinde a Scipione consule, cui extra sortem provincia 
Africa data erat." 
3. Livy Epi t LVIII : "Heredem autem populum Romanum reliquerat Attalus, 
rex Pergami, Eumenis filius." 
Pliny : N.H. XXXIII.148 : "At eadem Asia donata multo etiam gravius 
adflixit mores, inutiliorque victoria illa hereditas Attalo rege 
mortuo fuit." "" ,, , , , , 
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help whilst at the same time freeing Rome from the necessity of 
governing a too l oosely organised distriot. 1 For example, the 
district around Cybi stra was given to Cappadocia, whUe Phrygia was 
given t o Pontus. 2 The western districts of Asia were organised as 
that Roman province whioh from this time on was to supply Rome with 
suoh a steady income. 
There is one other item of Roman policy to be mentioned before 
commencing the history of Cilicia; this is the treatment of Rhodes . 
In 169 B. C., during the third Maeedonian War , the Romans had quarrelled 
with their allies in RhodesSand, in order to punish the rich merchant 
state for its temer ity in ordering Rome to end the war, had declared 
Rhodes • possessions on the mainland to be free , and had made Delos a 
f r ee por t . They had succeeded in their aim of punishing Rhodes, but 
with their once powerful ally thus weakened there was no longer ~ 
check maintained in the eastern Mediterranean over the pirates who from 
this t ime began to grow in number and finally became so adventurous that 
even Rome felt obliged to intervene . 
In accepting the inheritance of Attalus , and consequent upon its 
ill-advised treatment of Rhodes , Rome became heir to the wider expanse 
of Asia Minor and , in turn , had f orced upon her the responsibility f or 
the good order and future develop.IOOnt of the area west of the Euphrates. 
Consequently, by the end of the second centur.y B.C., the Romans were 
~ forced to turn their attention to the pirates of the southern coast of 
Asia Minor, and had to develop the responsibilities they inherited with 
Attalus ' kingdom in 133 B.c. 
The Historical Growth of Cilicia. 
Plutarch states that the power of the pirates was centred at f irst 
in Cilicia.' ~ 102 B.C. they had become so bold that they were 
attacking ships and cities along the whole coast-line of southern Asia 
Minor , and the Romans , al though not so oomrnDroially concerned at the r aids 
as were the merchants o:f Rhodes, Syria and Egypt, were at last forced to 
take action. Marcus Antonius ,5 a praetor, was given consular powers in 
-------------------
1. Stx;abo XIV .1. 58 :J\l"'~ S' 'RKu~~~  lwt\9~v tl,.,-_,.S fEr:t flfKfi TrpE.<r'~'uT;,v 
Sa, 'J"tA.lt ryv kmtPYf-.v tis T~ v uv lT&. tTUIJJ:I.l~ov ~ vo~ell:~ tr'i~tJ.t#.. 
2. Just~us .xxxvn':1.2.: "Post haec reg:I.bus, qm. adversus Affstonicum 
au.xil ia tulerant, praemia persoluta : :trd thrida ti Ponti co Phrygia maior, 
filiis Ariarathis regis Oappadociae , qui eodem bello ocoiderat, 
Lyoaonia et Cilioia datae . " c . f . Strabo XII.1.4. 
5 . Livy XLIV. 14. 11 : "Itaque cum id ultra pati non possent , legatos e.lios ad 
Persea in Macedoniam misisse qui ei denuntiarent Rhodiis placere pacem 
eum componere cum Romania; se Romam eadem nuntiatum missos." 
~ ' ' c' c 1 ' 1 4. Plut. 
1
Pomp\ XXIV_,: f.4 yep Tr£1fri.T II<? oUVail''5 Wff19? jJl.V £1( 
k·~"<'~S To vp r.,rov. 
5. Livy Epit LXVI!! : "M. Antonius praetor in Ciliciam ma.ri timos 
praedones per seoutus est." 
Cilioia and, with the aid of the Rhodians and Lycians, gathered a fleet 
together, scattered rather than defeated the pirates, and sent them 
hurrying back to their strongholds on the coast and in the mountains 
until the danger was over. Antonius won a triwnph for his exploits, 
but just how meagre the real results were can be gathered from an 
inscription of about 100 B.c. which records a request that all allied 
cities and nations refuse the pirates admission to their harbours.1 
From this it is clear that the pirates were still very active. 
It is just possible that as a result of Antonius' campaigns the 
Romans may have left some kind of settlements or stations at points on 
the sea coast; certainly from this date there is repeated mention of a 
province in Cilicia.. In fact it seems unlikely that in 102 B. c. the 
'Province of Cilicia' meant a:ny clearly defined geographical unit, and 
indeed the name itself is not constant and the area is sometimes r eferred 
to as Pamphylia. 2 However, even though there was not always a governor, 
there was a steadily growing concern about Cilioia, and it appears that 
from 102 B.c. onwards Roman generals were given Cilicia (i.e. the pirates 
and other militar,y affairs in that area) as their 'provincia'. This 
'province• was a sphere of du~ rather than a geographical area, and is 
the older use of the word.3 A parallel oase of even later date is that 
of Caesar who in 59 B.c. was offered as his province the woods and drove-
roads of Italy - provinciae miniuri negotii, id est silvae callesque.4 
There is no information on the names of governors or of further 
conquests until, in 92 B.C., Sulla was governor of Cilicia/Pamphylia. 5 
~ now indeed Rome had probably strengthened her hold on the coastline, 
but, while Sulla clearly interfered in the affairs of neighbouring states, 
there is no good reason for supposing that he had ~ administrative 
function on the mainlan:l. Rome was still interested in Ciliaia only as 
a means of checking the pirates and controlling affairs in Cappadooia; 
it was as governor of Cilicia tba t Sulla restored Ariobarzanes to his 
throne in Cappadocia.s 
Of Oppius little is known except the fact of his proconsulship in 
Cilioia in 88 B.C. After Oppius the next lmown governor is Gnaeus 
Cornelius Dolabella who in 79 B.C. was sent out with a boey of troops 
~--------------
5. 
1. S.E.G. Ill.378 : &~.,s 1To~1~ cpr,',.,v rr[ufi~Jol) T' tiC T;'s )~~~~~s 
nctTIVOC. Td.. TLE. loLUit.l\1 0 (f"t,)V v E.lfA- r1 J l<ctlcL r•s ~ '"t«..S A "' ,\ (. ' "" t1 ' ~ 1 '1 \ \ ( I lTC:~te_s. JU..t Y2rOf.tS Trf •4-rt.)6'1V k1</v uVO&. ' l<cl.~ KftTd. 9)t!Xd&4"clV 
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2. App!a.n :'idth. 20 : uv'"'''.,..o 1\UI(Iaf.V Tl l<d.t. lld.fruluJ..V. 
o.f. Athen V.213. 
3. In this sense Italy itself was long described as a province for a 
consul. 
4. Suetonius : Jul. XIX.2. 
5. Auct. de Viris Illustr. 75 : " ••• praetor Ciliciam provinciam habuit." 
Liv.y Epit. LXX : "Ariobarzanes in regnum Cappadociae a L. Cornelio 
Sulla reductus est." 
'- \ K t ' ). "' I 6. Appian : }!ith. 57 : l5 JJE.V aL'n'lJ't«.OoK ICILV t.yw I(J..T?yd.yov ~p•opd.p)J"?" K•~••uts lfpXt.>v. 
in order to quell the pirates . If one can judge from the pirates ' 
activities thereafter, he met with little success. 
With the outbreak of the Mithridatic Wars in 88 B.c. the power of 
the pirates increased. Plutarch says they took on confidence because 
they gave themselves to the king ' s service, and Appian states that 
Mithridates sent out his own private pirates. 1 Certainly the pirates 
increased their activities and attacked not only shipping but also 
islands and cities; they built fortified roadsteads and signal 
stations; carried off and ransomed wealthy citizens; kept skilled 
artisans chained to their tasks; gathered large fleets with skilful 
pilots and crews. 2 They disliked the Romans especially and, true 
ancestors of more modern buccaneers, made them walk the plank by 
"climbing down a rope ladder into the sea and going on their w~ 
rejoicing". 3 Their numbers were increased notonly by the length and 
severity of the wars but also by recruiting from men of wealth, noble 
bi~th and superior intelligence who joined them "tog ain a certain 
reputation and disti nction. " 4 As if to prove how successful the 
pirates were, Plutarch adds that they had lavish equipment, gilded 
sails, purple awnings and silvered oars. 
From 78 to 74 B.c. P. Servilius Vatia Isauricus was governor of 
Cilicia.5 He was more active than his predecessor, Dolabella, and 
gathered a nav,y under his command. Soon he defeated the pirate fleet, 
and so gave Rome her first naval victory over the pira tea since 
Antonius' successes in 102 B. C. With the pirate ships scattered, 
Servilius turned his attentions to the mainland, and with what 
success can be seen from the map showing the growth of the province. 
In terms of posit~e land acquisitions he took Cor,ycus and Phaselis, 
and destroyed the realm of Zenictetes by annexing Olympus and Attaleia; 
he also took for Rome the eastern coast of Lycia.6 After his 
successful first campaign, Servilius next attacked the brigands who 
lived t o the north east of Pamphylia i n the wild and mountainous 
region of Isauria. B,y the end of his governorship the two districts 
of Isauria were, in name at least , part of the Roman province , and 
Servilius had won himself lasting fame as the first Roman general to 
lead his troops aoross the Taurus mountains. In 9rder to record this 
6. 
1. Plu~ . Pomp. !l_4 : f l'.tv;;;--;,.-.;-;'E.I"',v ~~t t~ nt N,9f' ~d.T11<if Tro'>.(JJ"'l 1 
XP?crd...~t:!. Tt~.•s ~«.~,}. . ~~.-.'.5 fJ.,.?P'r'd..'j tJ.UT7v . 
2o Plut. Pomp. 24. Appian l4ith.92. 
3. Plut . Pomp. 24. __ _ T~~os lv ~i.-'t TrEAJ.~t.'- KA:frA.Kd.. trpo~~\.6vT£S 
) ,, ) A .. I \ ) I v I 
£K£A£ uov l. I< r 'VI.I\1 I( d.' Gl "Jl'IGVd.t. /a d. I povT,J. - .. -
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5o Livy Epit XC : "Praeterea res a P. Bervilio proconsule adver sus Cilicas 
gestas oontinet. " 
6. Cioero : De Leg. Agr. I , 5. : " Iubent venire agros Attalenaium atque 
Olympenorum. Hos populo Romano Servilii, forti ssimi viri , vi ctoria 
adiunxit • • •• " c.f. II In Verrem IV.X. 21. 
success he took the title of Isaurious.l 
The consul of 75 B.C., Lucius Octavius, became the next governor 
of Cilicia in 74 B.c., but died shortly after reaching his province. 
More important regions than Cilicia and its wild inhabitants were 
again forced upon the Romans ' notice when Mithridates re-opened the war 
in Asia in 74 B.C. Lucullus, the consul of 74 B.C., finally managed 
to avoid Cis-Alpine Gaul, the province given to him by lot, and took 
instead Cilicia and with it the supreme command against Mithridates. 
Cilicia was however only a name, and Mi thrida tes was Lucullus' real 
'provincia'. As a result Lucullus never entered Cilicia once during 
his six year governorship, and contented himself with ordering the two 
legions left there by Servilius to join him in Asia. 
In 68 B.C. Cilicia was taken from Lucullus and given to the consul 
Quintus Marcius Rex, who, although he took three new legions to his 
province , seems to have attempted and achieved nothing. 
During this quiet period the pirates had grown stronger and even 
more adventurous, until it became apparent even to the Roman Senate that, 
while something could be achieved in isolated districts, as by Servilius, 
the danger from the pirates could only be ended by a combined attack on 
them by land and sea under the control of one man . This was first 
attempted in 74 B. C. when Marcus Antonius , the son of that Antonius who 
30 years before had first chastised the pirates, was given the naval 
command, but he had proved himself oorrupt and incompetent, and had 
died in disgrace in Crete. The need far effective action to be taken 
against the pirates became ~gent when f inally they closed the seas to 
all shipping.2 In 67 B.C. a tribune , Aulus Gabinius, proposed that a 
large fleet should be gathered together and placed under the supreme 
command of one man. 3 A general of consular rank was to be given 
command over the fleet in the Mediterranean for three years, and at the 
same time was to exercise concurrently with the respective governors of 
all maritime provinces supreme authority over the sea-coast for a 
distance of 50 miles inland. Money was provided on a sufficient scale 
to finance this project . These proposals amounted to a practical 
------------~-----~-
7. 
Q 
~b~it~on of the Senat~ by the institution of an office with all but 
tmlimited financiar and military powers . The measure was opposed by 
Catulus and Hortensius, but in vain, and Pompey was nominated by the 
Senate very much in accordance with the popular demand. 
On Pompey ' s appointment confidence at Rome was restored and the 
price of grain fell to its normal level.1 How amply justified were the 
Romans' expectations is shown by ensuing events. First Pompey cleared 
the Western Mediterranean of pir-ates in forty days and then turned to 
the east; he was soon to annex for Rome a 'large and defenceless empire'~ 
The pirates were thrown into a panic on hearing tm name of' tre general 
sent against them and fled back to Cilicia. Pompey hastened after them 
with all the weapons of war, but he scarce needed them, far the pirates, 
after defending Coracesium for a while, surrendered in the hope that he 
would be lenient . Oragus and Antioragus capitulated, and in turn 
all the pirate cities and forla were taken, together with many captives 
and much material . 3 
Pompey' s victory over the pirates was as complete as it was quiok; 
with his suc4ess organised piracy ended and was not to revive until the 
late Empire . As a result of his generous and political nature, he 
realised that poverty and poor land conditions had been one of the main 
causes of piracy. He took new land in Asia Minor under Roman control, 
extended the boundaries of Cilicia, and, in order to provide 
opportunities for men to live and work in peaoe·, and in an effort t o 
bring some increased measure of prosperity to this area, he settled the 
the ex- pirates in small numbers in half- deserted oi tie a. such as Mallus 
and Adana. 5 He restored and renamed Soli as Pompeiopolis. In this 
w~ he extended Roman control over Cilioia Tracheia, and also revived 
Cilioia Pedias and brought it under Rane . 6 Traoheia was of little 
consequence except as the old haunt of the pirates; Pedias on the 
other hand was important as a source of abundant crops, especially 
flax and grapes, and as a land route between Asia Minor and Syria by 
way of the Cilician and Syrian Gates • 
.. -----------
1 . Pro Lege Manilia 44 : "qui quo die a vobis mari timo bello praeposi tts 
est imperator, tanta repente vilitas (annonae) ex summa inopia et 
caritate rei frumentariae oonsecuta est •• • •••••• • •• " 
2. Appian : Syr.49 3. Appian : Mith. 96 Plut . : Pomp. 28. 
4 . Piracy of course continued t o be oommon in the natural haunts of 
pirates such as small islands and indented coasts, and at various 
t i mes has been a scourge in the Greek Islands, N.W. Coast of Africa, 
Norway and the West Indies . 
5 . Virgil Georgie IV.125 : Namque sub Oebaliae memini me turribus altis, 
qua niger umectat flaventia culta Galaesus, 
Coryoium vidisse senem, cui pauca relicti 
iugera ruris erant •••• 
Servius on the above passage states : "Pompeius enim victis piratis 
Cilicibus par tim ibidem in Graecia, par tim in Calabria agros dedit . " 
Livy Epit XCIX : "Pompeius •• aoceptis in deditionem piratis agros et 
urbes dedit ." 
6. Appian Mith. 96.115.;Plut. Pomp. 28.; Vell. Pat. II. 32 : ~eliquias 
a. 
eorum contr aotas in urbibus remotoque mari loco in certa sede constituit 
•• • data facultate sine rapto vivendi rapinis arcuit ." 
Pompey's success against the pirates was soon rewarded with an 
increase of his powers under the Lex Manilia of 66 B.C. which gave him 
full authority to end the war against Mi thrida tes and settle the 
affairs of the East. This he did, and as a result of Po~y's 
campaigns Pisidia and Lycaonia, which had previously been parts of 
Cilicia in name only, were eff ectively occupied and, together with the 
new districts of Cilicia Pedias and Tracheia, were added to the Roman 
province of' Cilicia. At last the Roman province included the real 
and smaller Cilicia to the east , and the province now stretched from 
Cape Chelidonia in the west to the Gulf of Issus in the east; its 
capital was at Tarsus in the fertile valley of the Cydnus. The 
northern mountain limits of the province were still rather ill-defined, 
and the wilder regions always required careful supervisiono The 
poorly organised and under-developed inland areas were left under the 
control of native princes, client kings, priests and local chiefs;1 
for example, Ta.rcondimotus got a small kingdom in Amanus in Eastern 
Cilicia, and the priests of Olba continued undisturbed in Cilicia.2 
In 58 B.C., when the famous rabble-rouser Clodius was Tribunus 
Plebis, he managed to stir up the people and had the island of Cyprus 
declared forfeit to the Roman people because of the support the 
Cypriots were alleged to have given to the pirates and because of the 
vicious and unsuitable character of its king. Marcus Cato was 
entrusted with the task of taking over the island, a task he completed 
without the aid of an ar~.3 He hardly needed one for the Cypriot 
king took poison, the islanders submitted, and the whole island was 
smoothly transferred to the control of the governor of Cilicia. 
Two years later, during the governorship of P. Cornelius 
Lentulus Spinther, Cilioia was again extended without any fighting 
by the addition of the three judioiar.y districts of Laodioea, 
Apameia and Synnada. It seems reasonable to presume that the 
district of Ioonium was added at the same time. Spi.nther was 
succeeded by Appius Claudius Pulcher duri.ng whose governorship Cilioia 
received no new additions in territor.y but rather lost weight as a result 
2. 
-----------~ 
.J ( I \ C.t ' ..., Q_, \ I -It . ~, \. Strabo XIV .5.6. : iool(tt. Trf.P! atlrd.V To To•ouro ~trtl\l.ut.oQ£l.. 1Jc4.Al'O'i 
' ' .,, ' ' ... ' I t , ~ r ~ TOU~ To'Tr'ou_s ? UlrO TOI~ ~toa~fOI~ ?YI.ft>lr/V £tV4~---
' ' ( ' ( I , I " T v. , ~ Strabo XIV .5.10 : 'CcU. o •tf!~ ~~~v-.a-~?S ly~vf.To T,?~ 'ftltl-1~7106~, S~abo XIV :5· ~8 ! !W-9, ?~.S St ~Tt~ J<«~peo~ -rr•vT,.,v, ~"1P l(~,o~oy05 
ICc&." fl-rr,'Atuj ovo fwfd..twv ~\lof,/trll'l--- · ~fKovb•foTo~- _-
3. Li.vy Epit CIV : "Lege lata de redigenda in provinoiae formam Cypro, 
et publicanda pecunia regia, M. Catoni administratio eius rei 
mandata est. " 
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GEOORAHIY OF CILICIA 
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of the ' doctor ' s treatment ' it received from its governor. 1 
~ 51 B.c. when Cicero suooeeded to the governorship of Cilicia, 
the province had reached the limits of its growth and had come to oooupy 
an important place in Rome's eastern territories. The memory of its 
origin as a small coastal district in Pamphylia, at first considered 
merely an outpost against the pirates, was beginning to slip into the 
past, though the names of the various districts survived as a reminder 
of its colourful and in some w~s haphazard development . There were 
still many areas in the moun'bins which contained fiery embers of 
resistance, but after the Pompeian settlement the province was no 
longer considered as being primarily a military command. Rome's 
representatives were now sent out to govern an established province, 
not to conquer it. 
Geograpgy and People of Cilioia. 
As can be seen from the sketch map (Map II), Cilicia in 51 B.C. 
was a large and scattered province. The governor was to control not 
only Cilicia proper, but also Pisidia, Pamphylia, Cyprus , Isauria, 
Lycaonia and the ncithern judiciary districts . Excluding Cyprus, which 
I the governor was seldom likely to visit in person, the province covered 
an area of nearly 4 , 000 squa.re miles. 
The province had proved itself a difficult one to conquer mainly 
because its geography was favourable to a guerilla type of warfare. The 
hills and mountains , which cover most of this area, formed a safe 
retreat for the pirates and brigands, but were a forbidding obstacle to 
the Romans who were long afraid of marching into the interior over the 
Taurus Range . There are only two reasonably large areas of low or 
level ground in the whole province . One is the narrow strip of land 
along the coast of Pamphylia from Phaselis to just beyond Sida and the 
River Melas, and it is significant that this level district was the 
first one to be taken over by the Romans as a base against the pirates.2 
1. Ad Att.VI. 1.2 : "Ut si medicus , oum aegrotus alii medico traditus 
sit, irasci velit ei medico qui sibi successerit si quae ips~ in 
curando constituerit mute~ ille! si~ Appi~s, <;um .Jtl _iJ.~•plr£1,)~. 
provinciam curarit, sangm.nem nu.ser~t , g~dquJ.d po~t d~traxer~t , 
mihi tradideri t eneotam, Tl'pO""d.~Tflfofi"'?" eam a me non libenter 
videt . 
2. Pliny Nat. Hist. V.XXII. 93 : "In continente oppida • • • • •• , finisque 
antiquus Ciliciae Melia amnis . " 
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The second area of level, agricultural l and is Cilioia Pedias which is 
wedged, as it were 1 between the Taurus and Amanus Mountains and the sea, 
with its plain well-watered by the rivers Cydnus, Sarus and Pyramus. It 
is again significant that this was the large area taken by Pompey and 
used for ~s settlements of ex-pirates once his campaign against them 
was over. With the plains securely held the Romans could hope to 
exercise some control over the tribes in the mountains . 
Except for these two areas the province of Cilicia/Pamphyli~ 
Lycaonia was a hilly or mountainous one . The mountain ranges covered 
the whole country, hindered comnnmications, and kept the province so 
completely divided into separate districts that Cicero could talk of 
not being able to cross his province in thirty days and ala~ plead 
travelling difficulties as the reason for his late arrival. The 
main mountain range is that of the Taurus which runs parallel to the 
southern coast and forms an effective block to regular traffic between 
north and south.3 In the east the Amanus Mountains, running north-
east to south- west, f ormed tl'e common boundary with Syria, and provided 
a natural defence to keep the Parthians out of the province . 
There were many cities and towns in Cilicia; Pliqy gives a list 
of them in his history. 4 The moat important places visited by Cicero, 
and marked on Map II, were Laodicea, Apameia, Synnada, Ioonium, Cybistra, 
Podandos, Tarsus, Is sus and Sida . Other important cities on the 
southern coast were Olympus, Phaselis, Attaleia, Corycus and Coracesium. 
The main road from Laodicea to Issus, and the roads going south from 
it are a lso marked on Map II. 
A land of hills and mountains, Cilicia was not, like Asia, a 
source of abundant corn and crops for Rome . The people of Cilioia 
Pedias were indeed famous for their flax and grapes 1 but just how 
meagre was the living that could be made from the land is apparent 
from the alacrity with which5men turned to piracy and, as Appian says, 
"harvested the sea" instead. The Cilioians were however well-known 
as expert gardeners, especially under adverse conditions,6 and Pliny 
credits them with the introduction of a new t,ype of cabbage lettuoe. 
1 . Tarsus, the oapi tal oi ty 1 was also in Cilicia Pedias. 
2 . Ad Fam.III . 6.3.: "• . s ed eo disoessisti quo ego te ne :persequi quidem 
· . " A F XV 2 1 " . . . possem tr~ginta diebus... d 1 am. • • • : • •• 1n prov1nc1am 
11. 
venissem neque maturius propter itinerum et navigationum difficultatem •• " 
5 . As far as can be seen from his letters, Cicero confined his marches 
and visits to northern Pisidia, Lycaonia, Cilicia Pedias and the Amanus. 
On~y once did he visit Pamphylia (at Sida), and that was as he left 
his province to return to Romeo It is reasonable to suppose that 
the Taurus Mountains were as important a reason as the Parthian scare 
for Cicero ' s failure to visit Pamphylia, the oldest :part of the 
Roman province . 
4. Pliny N.H. V.XXII.91-94o 
5 . Appian Mi th. 92 : ~Vi'~ T?~ Y'?~ Zl<d.flrOVVl"o T?v 9ct~d.~" 
G. Virgil Georgie IVo127. It was on deserted land that the old man 
was working such marvels o 
Cilioian saffron, which was grown under glass, was also renowned for 
its especial quality as a seasoning for food, medicine and scent sprays.1 
As in all mountainous districts, goats were common, and Cilicia was 
famous for a cloth ' Cilicium' , made from goats ' hair which was used as 
a coarse covering and tent cloth by soldiers and sailors. 2 
This was Cilicia. Its important cities were not unnaturally 
situated in the fertile plains and in less billy districts where 
evidence of Greek trade , influence and civilisation was to be found. 
In the mountains the inhabitants were wilder and less amenable to 
foreign control , consisting as they did of brigands and ex-pirates 
who had finally retreated into the interior before the compelling 
Roman advance . 
--------------------
1. Lucretius II.416 : "Et cum scaena croco Cilioi perfusa recens est." 
12. 
2. Virgil Georgie III.313 : "• .usum in oastrorum et miseris velamina nautis." 
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Appius Claudius Pulcher 
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Appendix A 
Gaius Cael ius Caldus . (quaestor pro praetore) 
13. 
TB3 PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR 
Appointment and Powers . 
It has alreaczy- been pointed out that the main reason for the 
Senate ' s reluctance to annex foreign lands was its realisation that 
the administration of such territories involved difficulties of 
control whioh the Senate could not overcome. A body which was 
admir ably suited to the control of cit,y magistrates was not competent 
to direct its chosen off icers when they were abroad and i n sole 
connm.nd of a province , either in its original meaning as a sphere of 
dut.y or in its later sense of an area of land. 
However, as a result of the causes already outlined, permanent 
provinces came into existence, and the Senate was obliged to devise 
a method of administering them. As so often happened in Rome ' s 
history, the Senate first empl~ed the existing machinery and then 
allowed a gradual and logical extension of it. The parts of the 
existing maahiner,y used in this oase were of course the consuls and 
praetors who were elected to publio office in Rome . On them fell 
the burden of state affairs, and as these increased the annual 
magistrates proved insufficient, until finally a method of augmenting 
the number of magi strates had to be found . 
Very early in its history Rome had been forced to swell the ranks 
of those magistrates who could be used for executive ~sitions by the 
device of extending the individual ' s time of service. Simply, this 
prorogatio imperii ensured that a magistrate who was considered to have 
carried out his duties well during his elected year could have his 
tenure of offiQe prolonged to take in duties outside Rome . The 
prorogatio imperii was first used as a militar,y measure , and as such 
can be directly compared t o the original use of the word ' provincia ' . 
As with the latter word, time brought changes and magistrates had their 
imperium prolonged in order that they might govern ' provinces ' in which 
there was but small likelihood of fighting; even so,the governor never 
----~---~--~-----
1. Livy VIII. 23 (526 B.C., in the Samnite Wars) : •• • • • actum cum 
tribunis est , ad populum ferrent , ut, quum Publilius Philo 
consulatu abieeet, pro consule rem gereret, quoad debellatum 
cum Graecis esset . " 
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lost h~s character as a commander of military forces. By the late 
Republ1o three years had become quite a normal length of time for this 
extension of office. 
When it oame to the aotual appointment of a new governor the Romans 
preferred to leave the final decision to ohanoe. For example, the 
Senate would decree whioh two provinoes were to be given to the two 
consuls, but would then leave the decision as to which consul should 
take which province to be resolved by lot. It is quite obvious that 
such a system could lead to unsatisfactory appointments, especially 
when magistrates oame to look upon a governorship as a perquisite of 
public office. Under normal circwnsta.nces the Senate , by careful 
nomination of which provinces were open to the lot, managed to ensure 
that moderately able men went out as Rome ' s representatives. With 
the natural fears of an aristocratic oligarchy, the Senate did not 
admire but rather feared outstanding ability in its governors. 
Therefore the special commands, such as the one already mentioned 
that was given to Pompey against the pirates, were bestowed only in 
an emergency, and were avoided whenever possible because the Senate 
feared the loss to its own prestige. 
No matter how the governor was appointed, either as magistrate 
or pro-magistrate , he was during the later Republic Rome ' s official 
representative, and as such was head of all civil, military and 
judicial affairs, and holder of a power that no-one in the province 
could overrule. He was, for good or evil , omnipotent. Cicero, 
writing from Rome to his brother Quintus in Asia, points out how in 
Rome a magistrate has his fellows to control him, but in a province, 
"there is no appeal, no means of complaint , no Senate , no public 
meetings. "1 Tba t rmny governors realised the wide nature of their 
powers and abused them, is obvious from the many surviving speeches 
of prosecution for provincial misgovernment. Some of these speeohes, 
and the wealmesses which they illustrate, will be discussed in the 
next section. 
Absolute though the governor's powers were, he did suff er some 
checks on his activities and few Romans were so foolish as to disregard 
------------
1. Ad Q.F. I.1.VII. 22 : "Ubi nullum auxilium est, nulla conquestio, 
nullus senatus , nulla contio?" 
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them completely.1 As has alreaqy been pointed out in the case of Asia, 
a commdssion was sent out from Rome whenever a new province was set up 
in order that Roman government and an efficient administration could be 
established. The commdssion ' s dut,y was to draw up a Lex Provinoiae 
which set out the general prinqples of administration, and included in 
its scope all matters of taxation and justice. It established a set 
of fundamental principles by which the governor had to govern; any 
violation of these principles laid the offending governor open to 
prosecution on his return to Italy. The Lex Provinciae for Cilicia 
has not survived, but it is fairly safe to assume that it would follow 
the general lines of the best documented provincial law, the Lex 
Rupilia of Sicily. Thi s was concerned with such details as the 
appointment of jur,ym~n, the composition of local senates , and 
qualifications for magistracies and citizenship. The details of 
16. 
course would not be the same for each province , but the general outline 
would be similar. After entering upon his duties, the governor issued 
his personal edict , which was largely made up of traditional parts 
contained in the edicts of his predecessors, and by its terms he 
amplified where necessary the details of the Lex Provinoiae . 2 
The provincial law and the governor ' s own edict were the two main 
legal cheoks to misgovernment . They could however be disregarded by 
the unscrupulous, f or as long as he was in his province the governor 
had little to fear from external interference. For its part the Senate , 
which would sometimes detail a specific task to a governor , 3 normally 
allowed the men it appointed to carry out their office as best they would. 
The governor's apparent omnipotence was in some measure held in check 
by the influence of patronage, and often the only possibility of 
redress for the provincials lay in the hope that an influential and 
benevol ent patron at Rome would prosecute the retiring governor for his 
too obvious mis-government. The fear of such prosecution by the patrons 
of the provincial cities no doubt prevented many governors from excesses 
even wilder than those they did in fact indulge . The majori~ of 
governors however were prepared to chance their luck in this matter and, 
provided they had not offended the tax- gatherers , eould hold quite 
sanguine hopes of an acquittal. 
1. Cicero speaks of the stern Lex Julia, passed by Caesar in 59 B.c., 
which had a hundred and one clauses listing offences for which a 
provincial governor could be prosecuted. Ad Atto VI. 7.2 : "Ego 
Laodioeae quaestorem Mescini.um exspecta.re iussi, ut conf'eotas 
rationes lege Iulia apud duas civitates possim relinquere." 
Ad Fam. VIII.8.3 (f rom Caelius) : " •• legisque unum et centesimum 
caput legit ••• " 
2. Cicero bad his ediot, based on that of Q. Mucius Soaevola, in three 
parts; c . t . Ad Att .VI.1.15. 
3. A case in point is the Senate ' s entrusting of Ariobarzanes of 
Cappadocia to Cicero. Ad Fam. XV . 2.4. : "C~ enim vestra 
auctor itas intercessisset." 
The Governor ' s Staff. 
The Roman Republic, unlike modern states, did not maintain a 
highly organised Oivil Service which was designed to keep affairs 
of state running smooth~ in its overseas territories . The 
administrative and executive staff in a province changed with each 
change of governor, and this of course resulted in inefficiencies 
and injustices as the new staff settledin. The governor,who was 
nominally in charge of all administration, could not possibly 
control everything and had to delegate his responsibilities . This 
staff comprised quite dif£erent officers,who often knew as little 
as the governor about the individual problems of the province , and 
is worth a brief consideration. 
Holding an official appointment there was the quaestor, who 
would be a young man filling his first magistracy and hoping for 
future advancement. Like the governor, the quaestor was appointed 
by lot,1 and he was expected to follow the paternal lead of his 
superior who would give him all necessary help and advice. The 
amount of work the quaestor was allowed depended on his ability. 
His main duty was to supervise the funds provided by the Senate 
for the maintenance of the governor, his staff, and the armed 
forces of the province. The drawing-up of the official accounts 
at the end of the governorship was also his concern, but a young 
man of special abili~ might well find himself in charge of other 
matters and even, as in Caelius Caldus' case, left to govern the 
province if the consular ~overnor departed for home before the 
arrival of his successor. 
In addition to the quaestor, a governor took with him a number 
of legati whose appointment was approved by the Senate on the 
governor's recommendation. They were normally older than the 
quaestor, and were frequently close friends of the governor for 
whom they filled the role of advisers and delegates . They could be 
entrusted with any of the duties normally carried out by the governor, 
and were regularly chosen because they were experiencedin provincial 
------------
1. Ad Q.F. I.1. III. 11. : "Quaestorem babes , non tuo iudicio delectum, 
sed eum quem sora dedit . " 
2. Ad Att.VI.6.3. : "Nos provinciae praefecimus Coeliu.m : puerum, 
inquies, et fortasse fatuum et non gravem et non continentem. " 
17. 
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life or experts in military and judicial matters . 1 A legatus could do 
considerable harm as well as good in the province, and might on 
oooasion be dismissed far misuse of his powers. 
The least important members of the governor' s suite were the 
oomites who filled only a minor role ; they were given no off icial 
duties, but were supported from public funds . These companions 
were again friends or young relatives who went along with the governor 
as a part of their education in order to stuey the province and its 
customs or, more frequently, to improve their own financial position 
at the provincials ' expense . The poet Catullus who accompanied 
Memmius to Bi tcynia displays the anger of at least one ' comes ' who 
was cheated of such spoils . 2 
Finally a governor could also allot the title of praefeotus to 
anyone, member of his suite or not, to whom he had given special 
duties or command over troops. The praefectus was of ten a man of 
little experience , and frequentl y was working not so much as an off icer 
of the governor as the representative of a Roman financier or 
tax-company. ~ 
Finance. 
The governor was able to support himself and his ataff from 
the allowance, vasarium, which he received from the treasury in Rome. 
The exact amoWlt of this allowance varied from province to province 
in accordance with the work and activities carried on there and with 
the size of the province itself. It seems clear however that in 
all oases the Senate was generous in fixing the total of the allowance. 
In theory any money outstanding at the end of the year had to be 
returned to the treasury, but in practice the governor nearly always 
shared out the surplus among his personal staff . 4 This vasarium was 
the only money belonging to the state that the governor controlled. 
-~--------------
1. It must be suspected that the legate Pompti nus was taken by Cicero 
to Cilicia because of his military experience , and for no other 
reason. This was a case of a specialist being given a specialist ' s 
job. 
2 . Catullus X. 5-1~ : "hue ut venimus, inoidere nobis 
sermones varii, in quibus, quid esset 
iam Bi thynia, quo modo se haberet, 
et quonam mihi profuisset aere . 
respondi id quod erat, nihil neque ipsis 
nee praetoribus esse neu cohorti, 
our quisquam caput unctius referret, 
praesertim quibus esset irrumator 
praetor, non faceret pili oohortem. 
3. On his arrival in Cilicia, Cicero deprived Scaptius of the rank. 
Ad Att.VI. 1. 6. :"Litteras misi ut equites ex insula statim decederent." 
4. Ad Att . VII . 1.6.: "Cum enim hoc rectum et glorioswn putarem, ex annuo 
sumptu, qui mihi decretus esset, me c. C~elio quaestori relinquere 
annuum, referre in aerarium ad H. S. CIO J.Dgemuit nostra oohors, omne 
illud putans distribui sibi oportere • •• " 
Cicero could hardly be expected to follow the general rule. 
The provincials paid tribute to Rome , but not to the governor who 
had but a small part to play in taxation. He was not responsible for 
the collection of the taxes, and interfered with the work of the tax-
collectors only when the Lex Provinciae or his own ediot on taxation 
seemed to be infringed. It was not his du~ to fix the amount to be 
paid, and he did not collect the monies due . Frequently there 
occurred some considerable friction between the governor and the 
publioa.ni as to ways and means, and it was one of the soandals of the 
late Republic that no governor could deal firmly with the publicani 
without incurring the wrath of the tax companies and influential 
private money lenders at Rome. 
----------------~~-~ 
19. 
CIC~O AND THE PROVINCES 
Cicero's ApPointment. 
It has already been stated that it was the practice by the em 
of the Republic to extend the year of off ice of most of the senior 
magistrates after they had carried out t heir duties at Rome in a 
satisfactory manner. This prorogatio imperii had become an 
accept ed part of holding a magistracy, and indeed was looked upon 
by many Romans as an essential reward, a period during which they 
could recoup the financial losses they had sustained in seeking 
election and in holding office. But not all magistrates, not even 
all consuls, took up t his extra duty. Sozoo were content to lay 
down their imperium and retire into private life when their elected 
term of office was over. 
Such a one was Cicero, who had been consul in 63 B.C. During 
his consulship he had acted at all times f or the good of the state 
and had so exerted himself that, as far as abilit.y and determination 
were considered, he was clearly suitable to be sent out to a province 
as its governor. It does however seem fairly clear that at that 
ti~ he had lit tle enthusiasm f or a provincial coiiJllaild, and he was 
very grateful for an opportunity of declining Gaul, the province he 
was off ered.1 This opportunity arose as a result of the major event 
in his consulship, the Catilinarian conspiracy. Catil ine had twice 
been unsuccessfUl in the consular elections, and becoming desperate 
aimed at overthrowing the state and causing f inancial upsets. Cicero 
had acted \?isely and promptly in putting down the conspirators, 
though nQt with a u."lanimous and wholehearted backing from those arormd 
him. His colleague in the consulship, Antonius, had been one of 
t hose who doubted Cicero's wis dom, and it was not until he was allowed 
to take the wealthy province of Macedonia that he was won over . 2 When 
the conspiracy was finally suppressed, Cicero was r ewarded with the 
title of Pater Patriae, 3 and he took much more delight in this than 
in aqy provincial command. Thus Cicero not only calmed his colleague's 
1. 
2 . 
-------------
In Pisonem II.5 : ''Ego provinoiam Galliam ••• in contione deposui 
reclamante populo Romano." 
· , " ,.. "' ' r Plut.: Life of Cicero XII . 4 : JU' TOUTC)V Trp~TOV C1~f-t11l'U~V1 0 
Ktt<iplA)V ZK£1~~ JJ.GV 't +?ftnTo ;/Jv 1-rr'•rX,l:,v n f!K£. itovlr!V I 
cl&rQ. &£ -r?v "'r~)ct.Tfci~ S. Soflv?" TnJ.p,?T1trO.To 
3. Juvenal VIII.244 : "Roma patrem patriae Ciceronem libera dixit." 
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scruples, bu~ also kept himself in Rome where, he believe~ he would be 
useful poli tl.cally to the state and contrived to keep away from a 
country where he might be of no use at all. Therefore, after 
declining to accept Gaul, he took no province for himself in 62 B.c., 
and became a private citizen of consular standing. 
In 52 B.C. Pompey carried a body of laws for the better regulation 
of government. Amongst these laws was a Lex de Provinciis which 
altered the rules concerning the provincial governors. No longer was 
the consul or praetor to proceed to a provi.noe as soon as his term of 
office in Rome was finished; he would in future have to wait five 
years before becoming eligible to take such a command. Some have 
alleged that this law was in fact a covert attack on Caesar, but its 
main purpose appears to have been to check financial and political 
excesses both in the provinces and in Rome.1 
Whatever the cause, Cicero was quickly caught up in the result. 
The initial five year gap from 52 B.c. onwards had to be filled, and 
it was decided that, as there was not a sufficient supply of 
ex-magistrates to govern all the provinces, consulars of older 
standing who had never taken a province should now do so. Cicero, 
much to his amazement and alarm was compelled to join in the drawing 
of lots and received as his province Cilicia. He had never even 
considered the possibility of having to govern a province so long 
after his consulship, and the sudden call to leave Rome and journey 
nearly to the eastern limits of the Raman world came as a devastating 
surprise. He was given no time to plead to be exempted, though 
later he wished he had tried.2 Events had moved too quickly, and 
Cicero was to be the next governor of Cilicia. 
Cicero' s Professed Aims and Ideals in Provincial Government. 
"Moreover, if any Roman governor restrains himself out of respect 
-~------~---------
1. Caesar, after his next proposed consulship in 49 B.C., would under 
the new law lose his armw for five years, and thus left open to 
prosecution would certainly lose much of his influence and power. 
Of the Lex Pompeia Dio Cass. says (XL.56.1) : T~ T£ ~~y,cl 7o fiK~>~" 
1/ h.. I Cl ' ~~ ) 0'\ 1\ \ I ) h 1/:..Trfo~oc. Y'Vofl.vov,~.r1l To~ 'Y~·v~~ lv T.? lt"ol\f.L 11 ~f,ov (j TaJ ~! ~ '''ro-.lt!~ vp>v 11'l:~ rT? 7rcA,v.e~~ M?f0"~' ' ~V£ K~pc,n:v. 
The main clauses of the law were (a) 5 year interval between office 
and governorship; (b) tribunes to have the right of veto; (c) a 
special decree in each case to decide the length of the governorship, 
which was to begin from the date of entr,y into the provinceo 
2. Ad Att.V.10.3. : ~eliqua sunt eius modi ut meum oonsilium saepe 
reprehendam, quod non aliqua ratione ex hoc negotio emerserim.tt 
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for principle or moderation, no-one oredi ts him w1 th it because of the 
orowd of self-seekers by whom he is surrounded. It is impossible, 
gentlemen, to say how we are hated by foreign peoples because of the 
greed and violence of those whom in recent years we have sent to govern 
them."1 
Cicero uttered these words in 66 B.C. when he was speaking in 
support of the Ma.nilian Law which was to extend Pompey 1 s eastern command. 
While it can hardly be described as Cicero's mature judgement on 
provincial affairs, it is true to s~ t hat the views expressed are 
substantially those he held on his appointment to Cilicia. His 
opinions on provincial concerns were formed mainly from conversations 
with those who had visited the provinces , though it is only fair to 
add that Cicero had alreaqy seen one year's dut.y at Lilybaeum as 
quaestor to Sextus Peducaeus in 75 B.C. Over the years first-hand 
reports from friends and a growing experience in the law courts 
combined to fashion and crystallise his theories on provincial 
government . 
As might be expected, Cicero considered that every governor 
should possess the essential qualities of self- restraint and respect 
for principle, and it was not in one province only that the supreme 
command must be given to one who, "is able t o keep his hands , his eyes 
and his thoughts off the money of our allies , their wives and children, 
and the treasures contained in their temples and cities." 2 Cicero, 
influenced by the moderate and mainly sound opinions of his friends in 
Rome, had formed decided opinions on how a governor should and should 
not conduct himself in the province. No doubt he hoped that these 
opinions , which have been preserved from the two main sources now to 
be discussed, would never have to be tested by his own practice . 
1. The Speeches. 
The first source for Cicero 1 s opinions on provincial 
good order lies in his speeches from the law courts . In considering 
the evidence provided by these speeches it is dangerously easy to adopt 
-~----~-----------
1. Pro Lege Manilia XXII. 64 : "Deinde, etiamsi qui aunt pudore ac 
temperantia moderatiores , tamen eos esse tales propter multitudinem 
cupidorum hominum nemo arbi tratur . Difficile est dictu, Quiri tea, 
quanto in odio simus apucl exteras nationes propter e:orum, quos ad 
eas per hos annos cum imperio misimus, libidines et iniurias. " 
2. Pro Lege Manilia lXIII.66 : " • • qui a pecuniis sociorum, qui ab 
eorum ooniugibus ac liberia, qui ab ornamentis fanorum atque 
oppidorum, qui ab auro gazaque regia manus, ooulos, animum 
oohibere possit •• •• " 
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a modern point of view and condemn practices, such as the tax-farming 
system, as morally wrong merely because modern states have found a 
more eff icient way of achieving the same end. Cicero does not attack L 
so much for moral reasons as on grounds of inefficiency and waste. 
It must also be remembered that in the speeches, which concentrate on 
the darker side of provincial affairs , Cicero is trying to prove a 
point in order to win his case. He is speaking with a personal bias 
and clearly exaggerates both when attacking an opponent and defending 
a friend. However , when due allowance is made , it is useful to 
consider several speeches and discover tiE main lines on which Cicero 
thought the governor of a province could be attacked far mis-government. 
Whilst ~ speeches could be quoted, the range has been 
deliberately limited and the main ones used for reference are these:-
In Verrem, delivered in 70 B.C.; this was an at tack on the scandalous 
conduct of Gaius Verres who, whilst governor , had plundered the 
Sicilians in a particularly thorough manner . Pro Fonteio, circa 69 B. C. J 
this was a speech delivered in defence of Fonteius who, as governor of 
Gaul, had squeezed from his province all that he could, until finally 
Indutiomarus, chief of the Allobroges , complained and Ponteius was 
prosecuted for res repetundae . De Provinciis Consularibus, 56 B.C.; 
this was an eloquent appeal delivered in the Senate in support of 
Caesar's continued governorship of Gaul. In Pisonem, 55 B. C. ; a / . 
scurrilous and in some w~s exaggerated attack on Piso who had late ~~ 
been recalled from his governorship of Macedonia . 1 
The moral whioh Cicero tries to draw is that excess, which shows 
itself under the three broad headings of ' Extortion', ' Treatment of 
Provincials', and 'Military Matters ', should always be avoided. 
(a) Extortion. ~~ny governors considered their tour of duty 
in a province as a just reward for service in Rome; it was an opportunity 
for regaining, with interest, the money they had spent whilst gaining 
office. In his province the governor was the head of the administration, 
and as suoh was exposed to many easy and tempting ways of making money. 
A rogue like Piso in his governorship of Macedonia was able to 
-------------~---
extort large sums of money from D.yrrhachium, ruin the Thessalians, 
and impose fixed annual contributions on the Achaeans; he was able 
to sell peace to the people of Thrace who in turn were given a free 
hand to overrun the Roman province as they wished. 1 Gabinius in 
Syria i s said to have been more interested in money than in his 
province; when he held out his hand in battle it was not to urge 
on his troops, but to proclaim that he had bought or was r eady to 
bqy everything for money. 2 The tax-farmers , who were normally 
well able to fend for themselves, were reduced to ruin by Gabinius ' 
avarice and cruelt,y; they were handed over to Jews and Syrians; 
they had their agreements , in which there was no unfairness , revoked; 
they could not gain a hearing f rom the governor, and indeed could not 
be in any town which Gabinius was visiting. 3 
(b) Treatment of Provincials . No doubt many governors left 
f or their provinces with but vague ideas on the people who lived 
there; probably most of them went o~t with the traditional view 
that no foreigner was to be trusted. It was therefore very easy 
to disregard the provincials and their interests i f they clashed, 
as they frequently would, with those of the governor . 
Piso, for example , had taken upon himself greater powers than 
those allowed by the Senate; he had acted as judge and administered 
justice in a free state contrary to the laws and decrees of the 
Senate . 5 In other cases he had been a corrupt judge , had sold 
justice, savagely condemned and capriciously acquitted.6 Not content 
1. Pro Sestio 94. : "Al terum Thracibus ac Dardanis primum pacem maxima 
pecunia vendidisse? Deinde, ut illi pecuniam confioere possent, 
vexandam his Macedoniam et spoliandam tradidisse?" 
2. De Prov. Cons. IV.9. :"Imperator instructo exercitu dexteram tendens 
non ad laudem milites hortaretur, sed omnia sibi et e.mpta et emenda 
esse olamaret." 
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3. De Prov Cons.IV.10.: "Iam vero publicanos miseros •• tradidit in servitutem 
Iudaeis et Syris •• custodias sustulit •• vectigales multos ac stipendiarios 
liberavit." IV. 11 :"Itaque, patres conscripti , videtis non temeritate 
redemptionis aut negotii gerendi inscitia, sed avaritia, superbia, 
crudelitate Gabini paene ad.flictos iam atque eversos publicanos." o. f . 
Pro Fon. VI.13; VIII. 17. II. In Verrem II. L.123 : " Iste, qui omnia 
iura pretio exaequasset omniumque rerum dilectu:m atque discrimen 
pecunia sustulisset, ••••• " 
4 . Pro Fon. XII.26 : n •• vos Volcarum atque Allobrogum testimoniis non 
credere timetis?" 
5 . De Prov. Cons. III. 6. : "Omitto iuris dictionem in libera civitate ••• " 
6. In Pis . XXXVI . 87 : "Quid ego rerum capitali um quaestiones , reorum 
pactiones, redemptiones, acerbissimas damnationes, libidinosissimas 
liberationes proferam?" 
with this , he had give~ o~t.licences , requisitioned ships , levied 
corn, robbed not only ~div1duals but whole communities of their 
liberties - all in defiance of the Lex Julia. 1 Verres in Sicily had 
ignored local privil eges in the same way; he had made demands for 
statues, bad stayed in Syracuse to hold his court and had altered his 
edict as he wished. ? inally the people lost a1i hope and ceased 
t o cultivate their fields . 2 
(c) ~lilitary Matters. ~ae harm a governor could do extended 
to his ar~ also. 1 ilitary incompetence was not all, for a governor 
could debase and disunite his forces by the very way he emplqyed 
them. 
Cicero asserts that it is lamentable how Raman soldiers have 
been neglected, defeated and allowed to dwindle aw~ because of the 
governor's lack of attention. 5 Piso is accused of illegally 
disbanding his army without any kind of authority or decree from the 
Senate.4 Even worse, Gabinius , after squandering the money he 
had extorted from the tax-farmers, had to sell himself, the 
representative of Rome , to be the hired servant of the King of Egypt.5 
And it is one of the accusations against Verres tha t he allowed his 
army to disintegrate, and gave the chief command in his navy to an 
unqualified and incompetent Sicilian.6 
These , briefly, are the lines on which Cicero criticised bad 
governors : they extorted money and hindered the tax- collectors; they 
neglected the provincials; they were incompetent in militar,y matters . 
It must however be remembered that this is the negative side of his 
views on provincial adminstra tion. In his speeches he is being 
destructive, critical and uncompromising. But no matter bow critical 
Cicero is being, the result for Rome and for those she governed was 
obvious for all to see. 
1. 
2. 
"Because of Roman greed and Roman injustice, all the provinces 
------------
In Pis. XX:XVII.90 : "Mitto diplomata tota in provincia passim data; 
mi tto numerum na.vium summamque praedae; mi tto ra tionem exaoti 
imperatique frumenti • • •• " 
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3. 
II. In Verrem III. XCVIII. 228 : "Arationes omnes tota Sicilia desertas 
atque a dominis relictas esse cognoscitis." I . In Verrem V. 13.: nNulla 
res per triennium nisi ad nutum istius iudica ta est." 
De Prov. Cons. III.5 : "Miserandum in modum mili tea populi Romani oapti, L 
necati , deserti, dissipati sunt , incuria, fame , morbo, va~itate ~ D 
consumpti." 
In Pis. XX.47 : "Dimi ttendi vero exerci tus quam potes adferrecausam? 
Quam potestatem habuisti? Quam legem? Quod senatus consultum?" 4. 
5. 
6. 
In Pis . XXI. 49 : "Exerci tum eduxi t ex Syria. Qui licui t extra 
provinciam? Praebui t se mercennarium comi tem regi Alexandrino." 
II. ·In Verrem V. XXXI. 82 : " ••• naves quibus legatus praefuerat 
Cleomeni tradi t, classi populi Romani Cleomenem Syracusanum 
praeesse iubet atque imperare ." 
are in mourning, all the ~ree peoples are complaining, and even all 
the kingdoms are protesting. As far as the bounds of Ocean there 
is no place so distnnt or so hidden away that during recent times 
the wicked and oppressive actions of our representatives have not 
penetrated there. The Roman people can no longer hold out , not 
against the armies of the nations of the world in war, but against 
their groans, tears and lamentations."1 
2. Advice to Quintus. 
In 62 B.C. Cicero's younger brother, Quintus, had been 
praetor in Rome , and when his year of office there was over he was 
appointed to the governorship of Asia where he remained for three years 
as pro-praetor. During this time he seems to have been a moderately 
eff icient and f irm governor who i mproved with experience. His 
governorship is of interest because it caused his brother 111B.rcus t o 
produce a letter full o~ advice and rules of procedure f or the 
provincial governor, and is the second main source for Ci cero's views 
on provincial administration. This letter i s the most comple te 
statement of positive advice and theory of government as laid down 
by Marcus Cicero. 
That it came only in the last of his brother's three years of 
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office i s not altoge ther surprising. :Marcus had had no experience of 
provincial command,and, while modesty was never one of his characteristics, 
he had presumably refrained f rom advising his brother without care~ul 
thought . 2 The advice given in the l etter, like the points raised in 
the speeches , can hardly be called mature judgement, for only direct 
experience could bring that. Indeed the whole letter may be 
consi der ed as simply a 'tour de f orce', in which Cicero displays, not 
for Quintus' benefit but for the information of the world, his views 
on provincial government . Certainly he was speaking t o a wider 
audience than his brother when giving these views, and was again 
counselling moderation and caution. Asia was a most important and 
lucrative province for Rome , yet nowhere had the exactions of governors 
____________ ... 
1 . II. In Verrem III.89. 207 : t'Lugent omnes provinoiae, queruntur omnes 
liberi populi , regna denique etiam omnia de nostris cupidi tatibus et 
iniuriia ex:postulant; locus intra Oceanum iam nullus est neque tam 
longinquus neque tam reconditus quo non per haec tempera nostrorum 
hominum libido iniquitasque pervaserit; sustinere iam populus Romanus 
omnium nationum non vim, non arma, non bel lum, sed luctu.s, la.crimas, 
querimonias non potest." 
2. Ad Q.F .I.1.VI.18 : "Quid enim ei praecl.pl.am, quell ego i n hoc praesertim 
genere intellegam prudentia non esse inferiorem quam me , usu vero etia.m 
superiorem?" 
and publicani been worse and the people became more alienated. In 
his i ntroduction to the letter, however , he claims that the only reason 
for his final unburdening of this advice is because he feels he has 
failed Quintus in not preventing the extension of his stay in Asia. 1 
Cicero is conscious of the supreme importance of the governor as 
a man who must control not only others , but himself also : ~et these 
be the foundations of your public rank - firstly , your own integrity 
and self- restraint; secondly, your careful treatment of all those 
about you. "2 A governorship thus established holds out good promise 
of success. 
Quintus has been governing a province which consists of a mixture 
of the very best tY]e of ally, 3 and of Roman citizens, mainly publicani, 
who are attached to both the Cicero brothers by the very closest ties. 
It is indeed a noteworthy and commendable fact that in his three years 
of office Quintus has not been tempted by offers of statues, slaves, or 
financial rewards . He has not drained his province of its wealth, and 
is therefore welcomed wherever he goes . 
In watching those around him the governor has to be careful not 
to allow his legati too much freedom, but yet he must not appear over-
bearing and harsh. It is not enough that the governor should exercise 
restraint in himself; he must see that all members of his staff , for 
whom he is ultimately responsible , restrain themselves also. 4 The 
governor's signet ring should be' a mark of his very self, e. witness of 
the governor ' s will and intention, not that of his staff. He should 
make it clear to all that he will not tolerate the giving or receiving 
of bribes : "Briefly then , let it be recognised by the whole province 
t hat the welfare, children, good name and fortunes of all wham you 
govern are most preci ous to you. "6 
The governor must beware of new friends; pr,inoials may very 
well be honest, but it is dangerous to assuxoo this . Many men are 
attracted by the governor ' s positi on, not the governor, and are only 
Ad Q.F. I . 1. I.3 :"Quod quoniam peooatum meum esse confiteor •• • " 
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:s. 
Ad Q.F. I . 1.VI. 18 : "Quare sint haec fundaments. dignitatis tuae , tua 
primum integritas et continentia; deinde omnium, qui t eoum sunt , pudar • • " 
Ad Q.F . I.1. I.6 : "Constat enim ea provincia primum ex eo genere 
sociorum, quod est ex hominum omni genere humanissimum." 
4 . 
5. 
6 . 
Ad Q.F . I . 1. III. 10 - IVo13. 
Ad Q.F . I . 1. IV. 13. : "Toti denique sit provinciae cognitum, tibi 
omnium, quibus praesis , salutem, liberos, famam, fortunas esse 
oarissima.s . " 
Ad Q.F . 1. 1. V. 15 : " ••• non quin possint multi esse provinciales 
viri boni, sed hoc sperare licet , iudioare periculosum est." 
too eager to use his authority to :further their own :financial ends. 
Greeks are to be regarded as especially shifty and untrustworthy, 
for they have had a long training in sycophanqy, and a close relation-
ship should be ~intained only with those, if any, who are worthy of 
ancient Greece . The governor's slaves too, who are to be closely 
-watdled anywhere, should be particularly supervised in the provinces; 
even slaves of outstanding abili~ or trustworthiness should not be 
employed in matters relating to the governor 's official work and 
position. 
In administering justice, the governor can be as severe as he 
likes, but he must always be impartial , just and oonsistent.2 Those 
who are allowed to play any part in the administration of justice must 
follow this example and remember how important this matter is because 
of its effect on all other matters : "I think tha t there is no great 
variety in the business of government in Asia, but that the entire 
government mainly depends on the adminis tration of justice. "3 A 
governor should be civil in hearing a case , clement in deciding it. 
In Asia (and therefore by i mplication in aey province) a pro- praetor 
to whom everyone looks, and in whose hands lies supreme power , should 
be courteous and considerate, and ao auoh he will be especially 
welcomed. 
Even so, the goverpor, no matter how devoted to his province and 
how careful in his administration, will find a serious obstacle in the 
publicani. If he shoulcl alienate the publicani, he would be turning 
against himself and the republic a group of men who not only deserve 
well of the state but who are bound to it by olose ties. Yet by 
yielding to the demands of the publicani, the governor will be 
acquiescing in the ruin of those provincials it is his duty to protect. 
The question of striking the right balance is a hard one and has caused 
great bitterness amongst the allies : "This is the one difficulty (if we 
are willing to think honestly about it) in your whole sphere of command."4 
But even so Asia, and the other provinces, should remember with 
gratitude that Rome has saved her from foreign wars and internal strife; 
this peaceful government cannot be maintained without taxes, and the 
-~----~----------
1. Ad Q.F.I . 1.V. 16 : "Atque etiam e Graecis ipsis diligenter cavendae 
aunt quaedam f~liaritates, praeter hominum perpaucorum, si qui aunt 
vetere Graeoia digni." 
2. Ad Q.F.!. 1.VII.20. 
3. Ad Q.F.I.1.VII.20 : "Ao mihi quidem videtur non sane magna varietas 
esse negotiorum in administranda Asia, sed ea tota iurisdiotione 
maxime sustineri." 
4. Ad Q.F. I o1.XI.32 : ''Haec est una (si vere cogitare volumus) in toto 
imperio tuo difficultas." 
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province shotiB not resent paying some portion of her produce to maintain 
the peace. 
Finally there is one test,a surp~i$in~modern one, by which 
Rome ' s representative must govern : "Indeed I think that those who 
govern others should measure all their actions by this rule : That 
there should be the greatest possible happiness for those who are 
governed. "1 
Cicero's Reaction to the Appointment . 
It requires little skill to imagine what Cicero's reactions must 
have been when he heard of the Senate decree which gave him imperium 
over the people and province of Cilicia. First there must have been 
a shocked silence, perhaps even a moment~ idea that this unexpected 
and unwanted call to office was a mistake. Then would come concern 
at all he was leaving behind in Rome , 3 followed by worr.y and even 
fear for what he was to meet in his province. 4 If, as he had said 
in 62 B.c.,5 he had been delighted to avoid this type of command when 
his consulship was over, then he was surely horrified in 51 B.C. when 
he was thus summarily allotted a province. 
In his letters to his friends , Cicero shows clearly his 
unwillingness to face the year ahead, and seems almost desperate at 
the thought of the future dangers and troubles in the East. His 
first move was to write to his predecessor in th~ governorship, Appius 
Claudius , giving him the news of the appointment and asking that the 
province be handed over i~ the best possible order. The strange task 
has come as a shock and contrary to all expectations; however 'the 
raoe of office' 7 will be na de much easier i:f Appius looks ahead and 
smoothes awa:y any diffioul ties . 
When writing to Atticus , Cicero reveals his feelings even more than 
before. Many people will judge Cicero by others and will not believe 
29. 
1. Ad Q.F., I.1.VIII.24 : "Ac mihi quidem videntur hue omnia esse referenda 
iis, qui praesunt allis, ut ii, qui erunt eorum in imperio, sint quam 
beatissimi." 
2. Ad Fam.III. 2.1.: ''Cum et contra voluntatem meam et praeter opinionem 
accidisset ut mihi oum imperio in provinciam profioisoi necesse esset •• " 
3. Ad Att . V .11. 
4. e . g . Fear of losing his legions, if Appius dismissed them : Ad Fam.III.3.2. 
5. Ad Fam.V.2.3o :~go, si hoc dicam, me tua causa praetermisisse 
provinciam, tibi ipse levior videar esse; meae enim rationes ita 
tulerunt atque eius mei oonsili maiorem in dies singulos fruotum 
voluptatemque capio." 
6. Ad Fam. III. 2. 2 . : "Videa ex senatusconsulto provinciam esse habendam." 
7. Ad Fam.III. 2.2 . : "Deoursus mei temporis . " 
his.protestati~ns about.being an unwilling governor, yet Attious must 
bel~eve his fr1end is s1ncere in this. His only consolation for the 
tremendous nuisance of his governorship is the hope that the office 
w~l be for one year only~ Even though he considers himself ill-
su1ted to the task, he will at least take oare to fulfil his unusual 
offioe (munus hoc extraordinarium : Ad Att.V.9.1.) with all decency 
and honesty. But it is obviously quite ridiculous that a man of 
Cicero' s calibre should hold his court in such an out of the way place 
as Laodioaa, while a nonentity like A. Plotius holds his court in Rome; 
the whole business is sickening.2 Throughout most of the letters 
there is once recurring theme; no rna tter to whom Cicero is writing he 
nearly always adds an order, a request, a d.espera te plea tm t the term 
of office be for one year only. To Atticus it is : "In the name of 
heaven, see to it that my provincial command is not extended. "3 To 
M. Caelius Rufus the plea is : "There is nothing that I desire more 
than that there should be no extension of m.y term of office in the 
province."4 
However once the appointment had been made by deoree of the 
Senate, there was little Cicero could do, and he was forced to take 
up his duties. The provincial decree restored to Cicero the imperium 
he had laid aside in 62 B.C. Funds from the public treasury were 
voted for his vasarium, and July 1st was fixed as the beginning of his 
governorship. As was his duty, he drew up his provinoial edict, and 
set about the task of gathering together a staff. Firstly he had 
L.Mescinius Rufus allotted as his quaestor. Then as legati he chose 
his brother Quintus , who had already governed Asia, and c. Pomptinus, 
who had served in Gaul and had received a triumph for his victory over 
the Allobroges in 61 B.C., together with M. Anneius and L.Tullius, 
who was probably taken on Atticus' recommendation.5 His son and 
nephew accompanied Cicero as comites. 
Cicero had given others advice on how to carry out these duties; 
it was now time to see if he could obey his own rules. He realised 
the situation himself, and,although he believed he was ill-suited to 
------~-----..--
1. Ad Att. v.10.3. : "O rem minime aptam meis moribus! 0 illud 
JU ( 
verum S.p oo&. TIS ! " 
2. Ad Att .V.15.1. : "Sed est incredibile quam me negoti taedeat •••• 
Quippe; ius Laodioeae me dicere, cum Romae A. Plotius dioat?" 
3. Ad Att.V .11.1. : "Ne provincia nobis proro$etur, per fortunas ••• 
provide ." 
4. Ad Fam.II.8.5. : " •••• cupio tum nihil magis quam ne tempus nobis 
provinciae prorogetur." 
For the period May to 31st July , there are 15 extant letters, some 
only short notes, written by Cicero to ~riends in.Rome. Of these 
8 contain a direct request that the per1od of off1ce be kept down 
to one year. and most of the others hint at Cicero's weariness or 
apprehension as he journeys to Cilioia. 
5. AdAtt.V.11.4.: "tuus unus Tullius aberat." 
the task, he admitted to Atticus : Now are the professions of a lifetime 
put to the test.1 And what would be his guide for the months ahead? 
"I hope I shall use those rules I learned at your AcadeD\Y 1 and I shall 
satisfy everyone. "2 It was tilre for Cicero himself, and by his own 
governorship, to answer the very questions he had put to the jurors 
when prosecuting Verrea in 70 B.c. "Are you satisfied with the present 
moral standards? Satisfied that our governors shall govern as they do? 
Satisfied that our allies should for the future be treated as you see 
that in recent times they have been treated? "3 
The final judgement on Cicero's governorship must take into account 
his practice in the light of these questions. 
+ + +. + + + + + + + + + + 
At this point it seems necessary to explain the sequence of the 
three following chapters. Firstly there come the details of Cicero's 
activities during his year of office; his journeys to and from the 
province, and the variety of his concerns within it, are considered in 
chronological order, together with such discussion of the material as 
could be contained within suitable limits. In the ensuing chapter 
there follows a more careful enquiry into those topics raised during 
the governorship which are too outstanding to be passed over in a 
summar,y fashion; Cicero's legal and admjnistrative duties, and a 
consideration of such otaer matters as taxation, are reserved until this 
point. The third chapter is devoted entire~ to provincial defence 
and Cicero's military activities which need a rather fuller historical 
setting; the Parthian scare and the campaigns against the brigands 
are therefore treated in a separate chapter at the end. 
---~-~-------------~-
1. Ad Att. V.13.1. : "Ex quo te intellegere certo soio multorum annorum 
ostentationes meas nunc in discrimen esse adduotas." 
2. Ad Att.V .13.1. : "Sed, ut spero, utemur ea palaestra quam a te 
didicimus omnibusque satis faoiemuso••" 
3. II. In Verrem III.89.208 : "Piacent vobis hominum mores? Fiaoet ita 
geri magistratus ut geruntur? Placet sooios sic tractari quod 
restat ut per haec tempora tractatos videtis?" 
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CICERO' S YEAR OF OFFICE 
The Journey to Cilioia . 
It was towards the end of April 51 B.C. that Cicero,who wes 
probably accompanied by his son, left Rome prior to taking up his 
provincial command. It seems fairly clear tha. t he travelled along 
the Via Latina until he came to Tusoulum, where he stayed for a short 
while in order to visit his friend Atticus and bid him farewell for 
at least a year . The length of this stay at Tusculum is neither 
known nor important, though no doubt the talk was of politics and all 
the various tasks and concerns Cicero was leaving under Atticus' care. 
This final meeting was a poignant one, for the two friends realised 
how much they would miss each others co~, if not advice, during 
the months ahead. 1 
Once the good-byes had been said, Cicero journeyed on during the 
first days of May to his next halt in his villa at Arpinum where he was 
shortly joined by the first of his four legati, his own brother Quintus . 
The two brothers went on together to Quintus' estate at Arcanum, and it 
was here that Quintus ' wife , Pomponia, displayed her petty nature by a 
show of temper over a small lunch part,y suggested by Quintus.2 There 
was a festival in progress at Arcanum, and Quintus therefore stayed on 
for the rest of the day, presumably in order to show an interest in the 
country festival and the part his own estate labourers were to play in 
it. Next morning he rejoined Marcus at Aquinum, and together they 
continued their journey to Minturnae, from where , on about~ 5th, 
Cicero wrote the first of his series of letters back to Atticus in 
Rome. 
The journey went forward in easy stages since Cicero disliked 
travelling at great speed, and indeed he believed he had time , and 
to spare , to reach Cilioia by July 1st, the proposed date for the 
taking of the province. He also f ound cause for delay in one other 
weighty consideration. His second l egatus, Pomptinus, who was like 
__ .,.. ______ ..._ ___ _ 
1. Ad Att.V. 1. 1. : "Ego vero et tuum in discessu vidi animum et meo sum 
ipse testis. Quo magis erit tibi videndum ne quid novi decernatur, 
ut hoo nostrum desiderium ne plus sit annuum. " 
2. Ad Att. V.1.3. : "'Pomponia', inquit, 'tu invita mulieres, ego 
asoivero pueros ' "· 
Who are the pueri? o. E. Schmidt thinks they are the sons of Marcus 
and Quintus. ~ell (Correspondence of Cicero : Vol . III; page 9) , 
whilst thinking the pueri are free labourers on Quintus' estate, 
supposes that the two Cicero boys are in faot alreaqy accompanying 
their elders at this stage of the journey. This seems a reasonable 
supposition as we know that they had joined the party by Athena, if 
not before . 
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Quintus well versed in militar.y matters,1 had not yet arrived and 
Cicero was understandably reluctant to enter a province which was 
threatened by war without having an expert's knowledge as a 
compensation for his own lack of military experience. 
When Oioero s topped ~or the day in his villa at Cumae, the place 
became a · miniature Roma for there were so many friends about; 2 
Hort ensius, although be was ill, came to say good-bye , but Sempronius 
Rufus, who was involved in soxm financial troubles, did not . From 
Cumae they went on through Puteoli to Cicero's villa at Pompeii, and 
then on to spend the day at Pontius ' villa at Trebula . In all these 
country towns Cicero noted a good deal of panic in political matters , 
but also a good deal of nonsense.3 At this point even Cicero realised 
that he was taking too long over his journey, and so he resolved to 
carry out a full day ' s march in future a.nd not to make such frequent 
halts as of late. 4 Thus it oame about that in the next few days 
he hurried on; he was at Beneventum on May 11th, Venusia on May 15th, 
and at Tarentum on May 18th. 
As a result of this recent burst of speed, Cicero felt that he 
might have outpaced Pomptinus, whose presence was all-important, and 
so decided to await his arrival. Once this decision had been taken 
it seemed most advantageous and sensible to spend those days of waiting 
in political talks with Pompey, who in turn seemed pleased with the 
arrangement.5 Thereafter there followed a further delay of several 
days, probably until May 22nd, in discussions with Pompey , who had 
apparently decided to appoint new praefecti for Spain. As for Cicero's 
own staff, there was still no need for the two remaining legati, 
M. Anneius and L. Tullius , to hurry out from Rome provided Pomptinus 
reached Brundisium before June. 
Quintus and Marcus arrived at Brundisium late on May 22nd, and were 
destined, by reason of Marcus ' sudden indisposition (which seems to have 
been nothing serious) and a further wait for the still tarrying 
Pomptinus, to remain there until June 10th. During this stay Cicero 
occupied himself in part by writing to his predecessor in Cilioia, Appius 
-~----------~---
1. Sallust : Cat : XLV . 1 & 2. : "Cicero •• • L. Valerio Flacco et c. 
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Pomptino praetoribus imperat •• Illi, homines militares, •• pontem obsidunt." 
2. Ad Att .v.2.2 . : "Habuimus in Cumano quasi pusillam Romam; tanta erat 
in his locis multitudo. " 
3 . Ad Att .V.3.1. : "In oppidis enim summum video timorem, sed multa 
inania . " 
4. Ad Att . V. 2. 1. : "Deinde cogitabam sine ulla mora iusta itinera facere . " 
5. At Att . V.6 . 1. : " •• • commodissimum duxi dies eos, quoad ille veniret, 
cum Pompeio consumere , eoque magis quod ei gratum esse id videbam •• • • " 
Claudius 1 and by spending some while in conferring with one of Appius ' 
legati, Quintus Fabius Vergilianus . This man had come to meet Cicero 
with advice and to offer various suggestions for the easy change- over 
of authorit.y in the province . Cicero, who had alr eaqy written to 
Atticus saying that he and Bibulus in Syria ought to receive a grant 
of money from the Senate , 1 now wrote to Appius stating that if it had 
not been the Senate ' s wish that he should leave for the province with 
all speed, 2 he would have enrolled reinforcements for his Cilioian 
legions. As this is the case, will Appius please see to it that the 
legions at present in Cilicia are not depleted any further? Cicero 
was also gratified to learn that Appius was staying on i n the province 
for the express purpose of meeting him. 
The party sailed from Brundisium - and still without Pomptinus -
on June 10th. Despite his long delay Cicero did not find that sailing 
conditions were altogether to his l iking, and he reports that after 
having bad such a rough sea passage3 he preferred to a void the dangers 
of sailing around the island of Leucas and the indignity of landing 
' sine impedimentis ' in small rowing boats at Patrae. Therefore , 
after dining like aldermen at Coroyra and ~bota,4 he resolved to 
disembark at Actium on June 14th and travel on overland to Athens , which 
he reached on June 24th. 
He was to stay in Athens nearly a fortnight , and during that time 
he had an opportunity to consider the manners of his staff and the 
impression they were making on the districts through which they were 
travelling. So far no public body, no private person ha s had to expend 
money for the support of Cicero or any of his staff, and this has 
resulted in a good deal of praise gnd comment from the Greeks who were 
amazed at this un- Roman restraint . The staff have fol owed Cicero ' s 
example , and so far have been beyond reproach. 6 Yet the suocess of 
the early part of his journey and the praise for his c onduct could not 
soften Cicero ' s regret s at leaving Rome ; already he is ' ablaze with 
longing for the city', for ' this dull , tasteless life is unbearable'. 7 
-------.. 
1. Ad Att . V. 4.2 . : "Igitur senatus consult um si erit faotum, scribes ad 
me : si minus, rem tamen confioies . Mihi enim attribui oportebit, item 
Bibulo. " 
2. Ad Fam. III. 3 . 1 . : "Id cum Sulpioius consul passurum se negaret, multa 
nos quidem questi sumus , sed tantus consensus senatus fui t ut mature 
profioisceremur, parendum ut fueri t : i taque fecimus." 
3. Ad Att . Vo9. 1. : "Actio maluimus iter facere pedibus , qui incommodissime 
navigassemus , et Leucaten flectere molestum videbatur." 
4 . Ad Att. V. 9. 1.: "Aotium venimus a.d. XVII Kal. Quinct. , own quidem et 
Corcyrae et Sybotis mleribus tuis , quae et Areus et meus amicus 
Eutyohides opipare et • ~olrpocr?v'~~Tcl nobis congesserant, epulati 
essemus Saliarem in mo um." 
5 . Ad A tt. V . 10 . 2 . : " • • adhuc sumptus neo in me aut publioe aut privatim 
nee in quemquam comi tum : ••• • Belle adhuo . " 
6. Ad Att.V. 11.5. 
7 . Ad Att . V. 11.1. : "Non dici potest quam flagrem desiderio urbis, quam 
vix harum rerum insulsitatem feram." 
He found Athens in its material embellishments an admittedly 
pleasing cit,y, but its philosophy was all topsy-turvy. During this 
halt, which was of neoessi ty a lengthy one for Pomptinus was still 
absent, Patro, the Epicurean leader, asked far Cicero's help in a 
certain difficulty he was experiencing. Memmi.us , to whom Lucretius 
had dedi ca. ted his poem ' De Rerum Natura ' 1 was now an exile from Rome 
and living in Athens . Despite the dedication of the :poem hm.>ever 
be appears to have had little sympat hy for Epicurean feelings , and 
after gaining possession of Epiourus ' old home , now a derelict 
building, he i ntended to pull it down. This of course alarmed 
Pa tro who turned to Cicero for aid. Cicero canplied with Pa tro' s 
request, and wrote an adroit lett er t o Memmius aald.ng that the 
building be returned to the safe keeping of the faithful Epicureans . 1 
It was also at Athens that Cicero ' s staff came up to what was 
very nearly its f ull strength. The tar~ Pomptinus finally arrived, 
bringing Volusius with him. 2 The quaestor Mescinius was there , and, 
as L. Tullius is stated to be the only absentee , it must be presumed 
that M. Anneius bad j oined Cicero either at Brundisium or in Athens 
itself. Thus on July 6th, already six days after t~ date he 
originally intended to enter upon his pro-consular duties, Cicero 
sailed from Piraeus far Asia. 
From Athens they ran into contrary winds and rough seas once 
more . Their first landfall was at Zoster, where they rema~d for 
a full day, s o rough was the weather. Ceos was reached in good 
conditions on July 8th and then, when the wind swung round but 
remained strong, they made Gyaros, Syros and finally , on the 12th, 
Delos with great er speed than Cicero could have wished, ' for the 
open Rhodian boats give scant protection in a rough sea•.3 After 
such a crossing Cicero resolved not to move across the stretch of 
open sea from Delos t o Icaria until he could see all the peaks of 
Gyrae , a promontor,y on Tenos to the north, standing out in a clear ~.4 
He did in fact wait so long and gain such calm oondi tiona that i n his 
next let ter to Atti ous he found cause far complaint i n the slowness and 
-----~-----
1 . Ad Fam. xni.1 . 
2 . Ad Atto V.11. 4 . : ''Venerat Pomptinus , una Cn. Volusius , aderat 
quaestor : tuus unus Tullius aber at." It is quite possible that 
thi s Volusius was later appointed praefectus by Cicer o and sent 
to Cyprus to supervise some legal cases there . 
3 . Ad Att .v.12.1. : "Iam nosti aphracta Rhodiorum : nihil quod minus 
fluotum ferre possit." 
4. Ad Att . v.12. 1.: "Itaque erat in animo nihil festina.re nec me Delo 
mover e , nisi omnia :i.J<pfL f:p/t.Jv pura vidissem. " 
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frailty of the Rhodian ships. Clearly the voyage must have been 
uneventful for Cicero was not sea- sick. 1 
At Samos, and even more so at Ephesos, which he reached on 
July 22nd, Cicero was met by crowds of people : official reception 
co~ttees, private individuals, provincials, Roman tax-gatherers 
and Greeks came to greet him. One would have thought Cicero was 
to govern Asia itgelf. 2 Mainland Asia continued to give Cicero 
a warm reception, whioh may well have been due largely to the 
continuing good name of Quintus in the province he had recently 
governed. The prospect of a province had so appalled Marcus that 
he had had no time to consider what the views of the provincials 
might be , and he was therefore both surprised and pl eased by the 
enthusiasm displayed at his arrival, and in more auspici ous 
circumstances his head would have been completely turned. The staff 
too were behaving well, and their coming did not cost anyone a 
farthing. All these facts gave Cicero some feeling of pleasure, 
for it now see~d that the impending duties might not be so 
impossibly difficult as they had see~d at first. 
His last halt in Asia was at Tralles and then, on Jul,y 31st 
51 B. C., Cicero finally reached the western edge of his province 
and entered upon his year as governor of Cilicia. His arrival 
has been longed for by the province , but not by Cicero, who is 
eager that the fact that he arrived one day sooner than he expected 
should be re.corded. "Count that day as the beginning of ll\Y year 
of office ." 4 
----~~-~----------~ 
1. Ad Att.V. 15. 1. : "Navigavimus sine timore et sine nausea • • •• " 
2 . Ad Att . V. 15.1 . : "Verumtamen decumani quasi venissem cum imperio, 
Graeci quasi Ephesio praetori se alacres obtulerunt." 
3 . Ad Att.V. 14. 2.: ••Nos Asia accepit admirabi liter. " 
4. Ad Att . V . 15. 1.: •trJaodiceam veni pridie Kal . Sext . Ex hoc die 
clavum anni movebis . " 
There is a common view, more often implied than expressed, that 
Cicero dawdled on his journey out to Cilicia in order to avoid 
some of his duties as governor. Yet in accordanoe with the terms 
of the Lex Pompeia de Frovinciis , and as shown by Cicero' s own 
conduct , the year of office began only when the governor entered 
his province. Therefore Cicero gained nothing by del~, unless 
it was the assurance of Pomptinus • presence. Moreover his 
outward journey, whilst admittedly slow, was quicker than his 
return a year later when it might have been presumed he was in 
a greater hurryo 
36. 
Appendix B. 
ROUTE AND DATE CHART FOR CICERO'S JOURNEY TO CJLICIA.. 
Approx. 
Miles 
Rome • End of April • 
15 Tusoulum • Early May (Att.v.l.} • 
55 Arpinum • Early May (Att.V.1. • 
15 Aquinum . Early May (Att.V.1. • 
20 Minturnae • 5th May Att.v.1 • • 
35 Cumae • ~Att.v.2.~ • 5 Puteoli • Att.v.2 • • 
25 Pompeii • lOth May Att.v.2. • 
Trebula • lOth May Att.v.3 • • 
40 Beneventum : 11th May Att.V.4. 
60 Venusia • 15th May Att.v.s • • 
85 Tarentum • 18thMay - 22nd May Att.v.6 • : Att v.7. • 
40 Brundiaium : 22nd May - circa lOth June Fam.III.3. : Att.v.s. 
125 Corcyra • ~Att.v.9.) • 
Sybota • Att.v.9) • 
45 Aotium 14th JWle Att. V .9. 
175 Athens 24th JWle - 6th July Att.V.10. : Att Vo11. 
15 Zoster 7th July Att.V.12.) 
35 Ceos 8th July Att .v . 12) 
20 Gyaros • Att.V.l.2.i • 
15 Syros • Atto V .12o • 
30 Delos • 12th July Att.v .12. • 
85 Samoa . Att.v .1~. • 
28 Ephesus • 22nd July - 26th July Att.V.13. • 
30 Tralles • 27th July Att Vo14. • 
70 Laodioea . 31st July Att Vo15o • 
Att.v.1. : References without brackets denote the letter was written 
at this place. 
(Att .V.l.) : References with brackets denote that this place is 
mentioned. 
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August to December 51 B.C. 
Laodicea was reached and the year of office begun on July 51st. 
Cicero found this a f avourable moment to condense those feelings which 
he had expressed in many letters written on his outward journey. To 
Attious he wrote that , though his arrival had clearly been a source of 
joy to the province, it has given him no pleasure for he found his wide 
interests were too confined; how he misses Rome's brilliance and 
activity! His province, which had suffered many patent wounds at 
Appius ' hands, was but poorly protected by two skeleton legions, and 
this fact gave cause for alarm : " I can endure , provided it is only 
for a year ."1 
He stayed in Laodicea for three days . 2 Here as elsewhere the new 
-------~----------------
1. Ad Att .V.15.1. : •• •• • lucem, forum, urbem, domum, vos desidero. Sed 
feram ut potero, sit modo annuum." 
2. Any attempt to fix precise dates for Ciero ' s movements in August is 
beset by difficulties of Cicero ' s own contriving. He refers to the 
events occurring at this time in three separate letters and, somewhat 
misleadingly, gives three separate versions. The discrepancies are 
best listed in tabular form. He states that he stayed in each place 
for the following number of days: -
Att .V.16o2e Att .Vo20 o1e Fam.XVo4o2e 
Written: - August 11th December January 
Laodioea 5 2 2 
Colossae ? 
Apamea 5 5 4 
Synnada 3 3 3 
PhUomelium 5 3 
Iooniwn 10 
Entered camp on 24th August. 
The main difficult.Y lies in the fact that when giving dates in his 
l etters, Cicero sometimes ignores travelling time, sometimes counts 
the day of arrival or departure , sometimes botho It seems best in 
the undoubted confusion to accept the dating supplied by Att .V.16., 
as this is ~~e nearest in time to the events described, and explain 
the differences in Att .V.20. and Fam. XV.4. as the result of a slip 
of the memory after a four month gap. Further , ~or lack of acy 
other information, it seems best to accept Att.V.20. for the number 
of days stayed in Philomelium and !conium. Taking into consideration 
Cicero's statement that they spent most nights under canvas, it seems 
probable that a reasonable dating scheme for August, travelling time 
included, is as follows: -
Laodicea 
A~a 
• 
• 
• 
• Synnada 
Philomelium : 
I conium 
Camp at !conium 
31st July - 2nd August 
3rd August - 5th August 
6th August - 8th August 
9th August - 15th August 
14th August - 23rd August 
24th August - 29th August 
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governor r eceived a rousing reception. The fame of so important a 
visitor from Rome had gone before him, and expressions such as, "Is 
this the man who (checked Catiline)? For whom the Senate (decreed a 
supplicatio)? ", were no doubt as common in Laodicea as they were 
near the Amanus NJ.Ountains .1 Many people came into the town from 
the surrounding districts to help swell the welcomdng crowds, to cheer, 
or just to stare at the great man; many came to head official public 
deputations or to make personal requests for tax relief or assistance. 
In the matte~ of personal requests no doubt the tax-gatherers were well 
to the fore. The law courts and the administration of justice also 
oooupied some of his time , and the nett result must have been that, 
while Cicero may well have been irked by provincial behaviour and 
concerns, he found that he had little time spare in which to be 
melancholy. 
After this crowded introduction to his governorship, he set out 
through the northern circuit of his province, staying for two or three 
days in each important town, where he was no doubt occupied in much the 
same way as he had been at Laodioea.3 His aim was to join his ariey", 
part of which had lately mutinied,4 and then he intended to go on to 
the Taurus to deal with some brigand chief. 5 The northern journey 
led the governor's party through Colossae , which was a very brief halt, 
on to Apamea, where he received a deputation from a town in Phr,ygia, 
then to Synnada and Philomelium. Whilst at Synnada, or thereabouts, 
he was visited by Deiotarus, King of Galatia, who took the Cicero 
boys back to his court with him for the summer months.6 
The states were all insolvent and everywhere the story was the 
same : the provincials were weary of life, but so exemplary had been 
the restraint of Cicero • s party that unbelievable crowds kept coming 
to meet him from the farms and hamlets. The people, who came to 
him with tears and complaints that they could not pay the poll-tax, 
could also bring stories of Appius' savag~ conduct, which was more 
the behaviour of a wild beast than a man. During this tour Cicero 
1. Ad Fam.II.10.2. : "MUltum est enim in his locis : 'Hicine est ille, 
qui Urbem ••• ? quem sena tus •••• ? ' ". 
2. Ad Att.V.13.1. : " ••• decuma.ni ••• se alacres obtulerunt." 
3. Ad Att.V.20.1. : "Ibi morati biduum ~rilluetres fuimus honorifioisque 
verbis omnia iniurias revellimus superiores; quod idem Colossis, dein 
Apa.meae quinque dies morati et Synnadis triduum, Philomeli quinque 
dies, Ieoni decem feoimus. Nihil ea iuris dictione aequa~ilius, 
nihil leni us, nihil gravius." 
4. Ad Att.V.14.1. : " •• seditio militum sedata ab Appio." 
5. Ad Att.V.15.3. 
6. Ad Att.V.18.4. : "Cicerones nostri aunt apud Deiotarum ••• " 
7. Ad Fam.III.8.2. : "Apameae cum essem, multarum civitatum principes ad 
me detulerunt sumptus decerni legatis nimis magnos, cum solvendo 
civitates non essent." , 1 
Ad Att.V.16.2. : "Audivimus nihil aliud nisi imperata f.Trlt<L#}.•tJ.. 
solvere non posse ~~~S omnium venditas; civitatum gemitus, ploratus; 
monstra quaedam non hominis, sed ferae nesoio cuius immanis." 
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freed many towns from exorbitant taxes and fraudulent claims to debts , 1 
and all along his way he noted further signs of Appius ' cruel behaviour 
i n the province . This beginning of the governorship was a very 
satisfactory one, and Cicero hoped that his own justice and restraint· 
would be come famous , especially if, like Soaevola the model governor of 
Asia, he not only gained a good reputation in his province, but also 
left it early. 
On the journe1 from Synnada to Philomelium Cicero wrote two le t ters 
(Ad A tt . V . 16 and 17) , in the second of which he makes no mention of the 
first . In V. 16 he says that he is two (the readin~ of the manuscripts) 
or three (Sohiche ' s emendation, adopted by Tyrrell2) days ' journey from 
camp. In V. 17 he is two days' journey aw~. Now the problem arises 
of which camp this is, and whether and when Cicero did in fact enter 
it. 0. E. Schmidt, :fol lowed by Tyrrell, suggested that the camp is the 
one at Philomelium, where the :five cohorts which had mutinied under 
Appius had settled themselves . 3 But it should be remembered that these 
cohorts were without officers of any kind, and if one may judge from 
Cicero' s letters the recent muti~ was sti ll fresh in their mind. In 
these circumstances was it likely tha t a man such as Cicero, who was 
without real military experience, would actually hurry (nos in oastra 
properabamus : Ad Att .V. 16. 4o) to a camp of ill- disciplined, probably 
disgruntled, and even violent soldiers? Was he the man to quell a 
mutiny? Surely what was needed was a man capable of acting rather 
than talking. It does therefore seem both reasonable and likely that 
Cicero, after a rapid journey, halted in the town of Philomelium and 
sent off one of his legati , M. Anneius, with orders to round up the 
defecting cohorts , lead them back to the rest of the troops, and then 
make camp wit~ the remainder of the arD\Y as a combined force once more 
near Iconium. So, even if Cicero meant the camp near Philomelium, 
it seems almost certain that he did not enter it. 
There is one further point, The distance from Synnada to 
Fhilomelium is given by Tyrrell as 55 miles . 5 This journey should have 
taken only two days at the most for a man who was hastening on to camp. 
---------------~ 
1. Ad Fam. XV. 4 . 2. : "Quibus in oppidis cum ma.gni conventus fuissent, 
multas civitates acerbissd mis tributis et gravissimis usuris et 
falso aere alieno liberavi. " 
2. Tyrrell and Purser : Correspondence of Cicero : Vol.III; Page 70. 
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3. Ad Fam. XV. 4. 2. : "Cumque ante adventum meum seditione quadam exeroitus 
esset dissipatus , quinque cohortes sine legato, sine tribune militum, 
denique etiam sine oenturione ullo apud Philomelium consedissent, 
reliquus exercitus esset in Lycaonia •• o." 
4. Ad Fam. XV. 4.2 . : " • • • M. Anneio legato imperavi , ut eas quinque 
cohortis ad reliquum exerci tum duoeret coactoque in unum locum 
exeroitu castra in Lyoaonia apud !conium faceret." 
5. Tyrrell and Purser : Correspondence of Ci cero : Vol . III; Page 150. 
Tyrrell states that Att .V. 17 was most l ikely written tie day af'ter 
V. 16; i.e . much nearer to Philomelium than to Synnada. Yet even in 
V. 17 camp is still two days awa.y . It does therefore seem probable 
that Cicero in fact meant that he was moving towar ds the regular camp 
at Iconium, and in that case the distance of 70 mil es which separates 
Philomelium and !conium represents a reasonable two day journey carried 
out at speed. Moreover, it was at !conium that Cicero would meet 
l oyal soldi ers , not a mutinous bivouac . 
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Whichever camp Cicero meant he did not enter it in either two or 
three days, for a~ter his halt at the town, not the camp, of2Philamelium , where he held assizes ,1 he stopped for ten days in !conium. For what 
purpose? Apparently he held yet more assizes , despite the fact that he 
had come to Ioonium expressly to join his arrqyo Why then did he wait 
for ten days in the town before entering the ~litar.y camp outside 
!conium? The clue to the probable solution of this problem lies in 
the despatch of M. Anneius to bring the five cohorts from Philomelium 
to !conium. By this action Cicero had already acknowledged that he 
was not the man to discipline soldiers, and at !conium he probably 
acknowledged the fact once more by sending on ahead one of his military 
experts, Quintus or l?omptinus, perhaps both, to take collliiiB.nd of the 
loyal troops , prepare the camp for the arrival of Anneius and the five 
cohorts , and then by discipline and training prepare for the arrival of 
their general, Cicero himself. It was only when the troops were 
obedient once more that their commander would inspect them. During this 
period while his military experts bestirred themselves in military 
matters, what was more natural than that the legal expert should hold 
assizes? And what was more in keeping with Cicero ' s vainglorious 
nature than his oompl ete silence on the matter? However that may 
be, Cicero finall y entered camp at Ioonium (the camp he was three days 
away from on August 12th) for the first time on August 24th, and 
reviewed his a.rnrr, which was then reduoed to order, on August 28th. 3 
When his judicial busi ness in !conium was over, Cicero held a 
levy of troops and gathered together a resol ute boqy of reserve infantr.y 
----------~-~---
1. Ad Fam. XV. 4. 2; Ad Att . V. 20.1. 
2. Ad Att.V. 20. 1. : "• • • • Iconi decem (days) fecimus . Nihil ea iuris 
dictione aequabilius , nihil lenius, nihil gravi ua." 
3. Ad Att .V. 20. 2. : "Inde in castr a veni a . d. VII. Kal. Septembr. A. d. 
III e:x:erci tum lustra vi apud Iconiumo" 
and cavalry, together with volunteers from the free peoples and from the 
allied kings.1 He was soon to need this force and the help of 
L. Tullius who at last caught up with Cicero, possibly at Iconium, for 
on the very day of the review of the ar~ ambassadors came from 
Antioohus of Commagene with reports of a Parthian invasion across the 
Euphrates and rumoura of an intended attack by the Armenian King, 
Artavasdes, on Cappadocia.2 This news must have caused Cicero 
considerable concern, but whatever his private feelings he acted 
very shrewdly. It seems that several possible courses of action 
were considered,3 but finally it was decided, probably because the 
forces available were so small numerically, that after leaving 
!conium the ar~ would move cautiously along the borders of 
Cappadocia in order to offer a show of force and yet be gradually 
easing towards Cilicia proper to face ~ possible invasion from 
that quarter. 
Ciceio, the general , and his arm,y left camp at !conium on 
August 29th and began to march south-east, but not before 
D. Antonius, the officer in charge of the reservists, had been 
despatched to reclaim from Appius those cohorts which the previous 
governor still had with him, either in Tarsus or at some point west 
of there.5 In the midst of all his concern at the threatening 
war-crisis Cicero had again written, somewhat acrimoniously, to 
Appius giving details of his plans and asking where and when they 
could meet. Hardly had this letter been sent off than Appius 
arrived, seemingly from nowhere , swept by, and was lost once more in 
the early dawn before Cicero had any opportunit.y of greeting him.s 
In pursuance of his cautious policy of making a lengthy tour 
through those districts of his province bordering on Cappadocia, and 
even inside Cappadocia itself, in order to show Roman strength and 
deter both the Armenian Artavasdes and the Parthians from entering 
this area, Cicero marched his ar~ through Lyoaonia, south t~ough 
Isauria and into those parts of Cappadocia adjoining Cilicia. He 
finally pitched camp at Cybistra on September 19th or 20th. 
-------------------~ 
1. Ad Fam.XV. 4.3. : " ••• cum interea superioribus diebus ex senatus 
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consul to et evoca torum firmam manum et equi tatum sane idoneum et 
populorum liberorum regumque sociorum auxilia voluntaria comparavissem." 
2. Ad Fam. XV.3.1.: " •• iique mihi nuntiassent regis Parthorum filium ••• 
ad Euphratem cum maximis Parthorum copiis •• venisseo.dicique Armenium 
regem in Cappadociam impetum esse facturum ••• " 
3. Ad Fam. xv. 1. 2. ,: "Quo nuntio adlato cum essent nonnulli qui ei regi 
minorem fidem habendam putarent, statui exspectandum esse si quid 
certius afferretur." 
4. Ad Fam. III. 6. 6. 5. Ad Fam. III.6.5. 6. Ad Fam. III.7.4. 
7. Ad Att . v . 20. 2. : ~x his castris, cum graves de Parthis nuntii 
venirent , perrexi in Ciliciam per Cappadociae partem eam quae 
Cilioiam attingit •••• " 
From Cybistra he wrote to Rome gJ.vJ.ng news of the critical state 
of affairs. He states that his present intention is to march up t o 
the Taurus Mountains , and asks for a powerful army to be sent out to 
the east as the local auxiliaries are feeble and often estranged, 
while Cappadocia is useless; "The situation is now s uch that unless 
you quickly send out to these provinces an ~ of the size you 
normally send out t o a full scale war, there is a danger of losing all 
those territories on which the revenues of Rorre depend."1 Most 
strangely Cicero did not send this despatch straight to the Senate, 
but routed it via At~icus who is asked to read it and decide if it 
should be delivered. This is an amazing request , and calls into 
quest ion the role Attious played in Cicero ' s affairs during the whole 
yearo Atticus was not only a man of wealth but also of good 
connections with all the political groupings , and this request 
possibly means that Cicero was relying on him to gauge the political 
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mood and to judge whether more could be achieved by private representations 
to individual leaders at Rome rather than by an eloquent appeal to the 
whole Senate. It is in such a case as this that the one- sided nature 
of the correspondence between Cicero and Atticus is most to be regretted, 
for it is not known for certain what action Atticus took. Probably 
the despatch was delivered, but even so it proved ineffective for no 
reinforcements were sent to Cicero ' s aid. 
The next step was to send on the cavalry in advance to bring news 
of the armf ' s speeqy arrival, to strengthen moraJein the Cilician towns, 
and to gain advance reports of the situation in Syria. But then, 
before Cicero could ~ave Cybistra, he was visited on two separate 
occasions by King Ariobarzanes of Cappadooia, ~o had been placed under 
Cicero ' s protection by a decree of the Senate. On the first day · 
Ariobarzanes assured Cicero that all was well in his kingdom, but on 
the second he returned in a state of great distress and informed the 
governor of a plot against his life. Cicero, who believed he had 
far more important matters to contend with in a Parthian war, 
satisfied himself with counselling the king and his relatives to 
exercise oare, to punish those most deeply involved in the plot, and to 
-~---------~--~---
1. Ad Famo XV.1.5. : "Hoc autem tempore res sese sic habet ut , nisi 
exercitum tantum quantum ad maximum bellum mittere soletis mature 
in has provincias miseritis , summum periculum sit ne amittendae 
sint omnes bae provinciae quibus vect igalia populi Romani 
c ontinen tur . " 
2 . Ad Att. V. t8.1. : "His de rebus scripsi ad senatuJn : quas litteras, 
si Romae es , videbis putesne reddendas •• • " 
3 . Ad FamoXV.2.4. - 8. 
pardon the rest . 
Because of the serious situation he could leave none of his 
troops behind, as the king requested, and straightway struck camp 
on September 25th or 26th.1 As the threat of invasion was now 
directed against Cilioia rather than Cappadocia, 2 he moved quickly 
eastwards by forced marches to the Cilioian Gates . The last part 
of this journey through the mountains would be di£ficul t and tiring 
going, and Cic ero after making one of his customary halts near a 
town, probably Podandos , rested his troops there and gathered the 
latest information. Reports no doubt flooded in1 and more especially 
so when he reached Tarsus on October 5th. 3 
The reports themselves and Cicero ' s actions after rece~V1ng 
them belong rather to the story of the military campaigns which are 
to be considered in a later section. It is suff icient for now to 
say that after early October Cicero ' s governorship became almost 
entirely a military affair, which led him across Cilicia Pedias to 
Mopsuhestia , to Issus and finally into the Amanus . Here Cicero 
discovered to his relief that the Parthians had not orossed into 
Cilicia, and so he was able to turn from what would have been a 
serious invasion to the suppression of a minor trouble on the eastern 
borders of the province . There was some rebellious brigand 
opposition to be eradicated, and October, November and the greater 
part of December were spent in toil, and ultimately in victory 1 in 
these mormtainso 
By the time that Pindenissus, the main point of resistance, 
capitulated, the wi nter season was already setting in, and Cicero and 
his staff had been away from the centre of the province for far too 
long. In consequence Cicero hastily gave the command over the ar~ 
to his brother Quintus whil e he , no doubt glad to be free of brigands 
and mountain fighting, intended to return to Laodicea. 4 
_________ ... ...,. ______________ _ 
l o Ad Att.V. 20. 2.; Ad Fam, XV.4.6o 
2. Ad Att.v.20.2. : " •• • certior sum factus Parthos ab illo aditu 
Cappadociae longe abesse , Ciliciae magis inmi.nere. 
3. Ad Att .V. 20 . 3. : "Tarsum veni a . d. III Non. Octobr. " 
4 . Ad AttoVo20. 5. : "Ipse me Laodiceam recipiebam. " 
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Appendix C. 
ROUTE AND DATE CF.ART : AUGUST - DECEMBER 51 B. C. 
Approx. 
Miles . 
Laodioea 
20 Colossae 
50 Apamea 
45 Synnada 
55 Philomelium 
70 !conium 
Camp at !conium 
Lycaonia 
I sa uri a 
Cappadooia 
Cybistra 
55 Podandos 
35 Tarsus 
35 Mopsuhestia 
30 Is sus 
8 Epiphanea 
Amanus 
Arae Alexandri 
Pindenissus 
120 Tarsus 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
31st July - 2nd Aug. (Att.V. 16. ) 
3rd Aug. (Att .Vo20. 
3rd Aug. - 5th Aug • (Att .v . 16 . 
6th Aug. - 8th Aug • (Att.V.16. 
9th Aug. - 13th Aug. (Att . v .20. 
14th Aug. - 25rd Aug. (Att. v . 20. 
24th Aug. - 29th Aug. Fam. xv.s • (Att . V . 20. ) 
Early September (Att.v .20~ 
Early September ~Att .V.20 
Mid September Att.V. 20 
20th Sept. - 25th Sept. Att .V.18. • (Fam.xv .4. ) • 
Early October 
5th Oct. - 7th Oct . (Att .V. 20) • (Fam. III.8) • 
8th Oct. Fam. III. 8 
9th Oct. - 11th Oct. tam, II. lO) 
12th Oct . Fam. XV. 4 • 
13th Oot • Att.v . 20.~ 
14th Oct.- 16th Oot. (Att .V. 20. 
21st Oct.- 19th Dec. Fam.II.l O" • Att . V. 20o • 
Late Dec. - early Jan. Fam. xv.4. 
Att .V.18 : References without brackets denote the letter was written 
at this place . 
(Att .V. 16. ) : References with brackets denote that this place is 
mentioned. 
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January to July 50 B.c. 
After the fall of Pindenissus and the distribution of the boot,y, 
Cicero gave the command over his ar~ in eastern Cilicia to Quintus 
who was entrusted with the task of quartering the troops in those 
vill ages that were but lately captured or only partly pacified. 1 Then 
Cicero himself, together with his three remaining legati, returned 
across Cilicia Pedias to the capital at Tarsus . He made this place 
his headquarters for a few days and sent off at least three private 
letters to Rome , 2 together probably with an official despatch t o the 
Senate in which he gave a full account of his campaigns in the Amanus 
14ountains . 3 This news was so important , he admits, that he sent two 
copies of the despatch, one by land and one by sea, in order to ensure 
its safe arrival .4 At the same time that Cicero wrote his despatch, 
in which he seems to have asked for an official honour, he also sent 
off various letters to influential men in Rome asking for their 
support in his ' supplicatio'. In Cicero ' s view this had been a 
famous victory at Amanus and was wor thy of being recognised as such. 
There was one outstanding matter that demanded Cicero ' s 
immediate attention on his return to Tarsus. This concerned a 
certain M. Scaptius, a t ax- gatherer, who had visited Cicero in camp 
on some occasion during the final months of 51 B. C. and had requested 
a praefecture for himself such as he had held under Appius Claudius . 
Cicero refused the praefecture, far such an appointment was opposed 
to the whole spirit of his administration, and because of his pressing 
military concerns at that time postponed any further enquiry until a 
later date. As he had suspected, the business affairs of Soapt ius 
were not altogether honest ones, indeed were not all that they seemed, 
and it was at Tarsus in early January tha. t so~ a t tempt was made to 
settle the clai ms that Scaptius brought against the people of 
Salamis i n Cyprus . However 1 as the af':fair is t o be discus sed 
fully in a l ater section, no more need be said here . 
From Tarsus several members of Cicero' s staff went their own way. 
----~--~~-----------~ 
1. Ad Fam. XV.4. 10. : tt • • • exercitum in hiberna dimisi. Quintum fratrem 
negotio praeposui ut in vicis aut captis aut male pacatis exercitus 
collocaretur. " 
2 . Ad Fam. XV. 4; 10; 16. 
3. Ad Fam. II. 7.3. : " • • • paucis enim diebus er am ~ssurus domesticos 
tabellari os, ut •• unis litteris totius aestatia res gestas ad senatum 
perscriberem. " 
4. The news of the vict ory at !manus was evidently more important than 
t he plea for reinforcements had been a few mont hs previously, for on 
that occasi on Ci cero sent only one despatch. 
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As already stated, Quintus was left behind in eastern Cilioia to 
supervise the troops . The next to leave were M. Anneius and 
Volusius . Annei us had some private business affairs, possibly 
of a questionable nature , which he wished to settle with the people 
of Sardis and so he gained Cicero ' s permission to go in person to 
that city.1 In consequence he left for Asia post haste , and was not 
to be seen in Cilioia again for some months . At about this time 
Quintus Volusius, who is probably that same Volusius who arrived at 
Athens together with Pomptinus, 2 seems to have been appointed as 
praefeotus and was sent to Cyprus. This appointment was a necessary 
one for Cicero states that the Cypriots oould not be compelled to 
oome to the mainland to appear before the courts, and in consequence 
a deputy had to be sent to the island by the governor. 2 Volusius 
was the man chosen for this duty, and he left for Cyprus some time 
in early January. 
Pomptinus too was in a hurry to be moving westwards again for 
he clearly had his eyes fixed on Rome. Cicero, who hints at some 
love aff'air,3 had only persuaded Pomptinus to come with him by the 
promise of allowing his early departure . He now had to stand by this 
promise and allowed the man who was probably his chief military 
adviser to return to Italy with the year of office only half over. 
Pomptinus returned with Cicero as far as Laodioea, but then with little, 
if any, further delay carried on his journey to tm coast. Certainly 
he was gone by February 20th.4 
For his part Cicero left Tarsus on January 5th and, presumably 
travelling by the route he followed the previous year~ arrived baok 
in Laodicea on February 11th~ thus completing his return journey 
from the east in half the time he took to go out there. However, he 
had had many important problems to worry and delay him on the outward 
journey, whilst on his return in January his major concern seems to 
have been the alleviation of famine by persuading those Greeks and 
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1. Ad Fam.XIII. 55.1. : "Eum (M.Anneium) cum Sardianis habere controversiam 
sois; oausa.m tibi exposuimus Ephesi : quam tu tamen coram facilius 
meliusque oognosces . " 
2. Ad Att. V.21. 6 . : "Q. Volusium •• misi in Cyprum ut ibi pauoulos dies 
esset, ne cives Romani pauci qui illic negotiantur ius sibi dictum 
negarent : nam evooari ex insula C~ios non lioet." The Volusius in 
Att. v.11. 4 . bas Cnaeus as his praenomen. This seems to be an error, 
but it is impossible to say so with oertaint.y. 
3. Ad Att . V.21. 9. : "Rapit enim hominem Post~us Romam, fortasse etiam 
Postumia . " 
4. AdAtt . V. 21. 9. 
5. Ad AttoV. 21. 7. : 11 Ipse in Asiam profectus sum Tarso Nonis Ianuariis, 
non meheroule dioi potest qua admiratione Cilioiae civitatum maximeque 
Tarsensium. Postea vero quam Taurum transgressus sum, mirifioa 
exspeotatio Asiae nostrarum dioecesium, quae sex mensibus imperi mei 
nullas me as accepera t li tteras, nUJIXluam hospi tem videra t . " 
6 . Ad AttoV. 21 . 4 . : "Eas Laodiceae denique, cum eo venissem, III Id.Febr. 
Laenius mihi reddidi t , datas a . d. X. Kal. Octobris. " 
Romans who had stored corn to share it out amongst their local 
oommunit ieao Persuasion, not force , was the method he used, and 
the provincials continued to be amazed at this restraint, far this 
was the season of the year when the governor normally enriched 
himself . 1 But this year no money had been spent by the provincials 
in entertaining the governor and in buying off his staff. The only 
man who let Cicero down was L. Tullius, who on one occasion did in 
fact take something from the people; even this something, no matter 
how distasteful to Cicero, was legal in the eyes of the Julian 
Law. 2 
Once back in Laodicea Cicero devoted himself to a task for whioh 
he was well qualified. In writing to Atticus he outlines his plans 
for the next few months ; he has decided to hear the legal oases from 
the various towns in his province and has drawn up ~ r ota, as it were, 
of the sessions for each district . From ncwon, even if he finds 
that he has little leisure t ime, he will at least have wor k more 
sui ted and more congenial to his nature . It is all arranged; he will 
begin on Februar.y 13th by tr,ying ogses from Cibyra and Apamea, and 
hopes to be finished by early May. 
The law, however, was not the only thing to exercise Cicero' s 
wits and patience during this time. Clearly he received many 
deputations from the various towns and from individual Romans and 
Cilioians ali ke who oaroe with pleas for financial help or requests 
for official status. On one of these deputations there is some 
fairly cltar information as it concerns the previous governor, Appius 
Claudius . It would appear that Appius had s~cticned, perhaps 
instigated, some building work at Appia, a town in Phrygia, whioh, 
if it is safe to be guided by a name , may have been especi ally indebted 
to Appius who was perhaps its patron. This building was proving an 
intolerably expensive burden on the town. Cicero had forbidden the 
exaction of a local rate or tax to help speed on the work until suoh 
a time as he could investigate the matter himself 1 something he found 
1 . Ad At t .V. 21.7. : "lllud a.utem tempus quotannis ante me fuerat in hoc 
quaest u. " 
2. Ad Att.V. 21. 5. : "Is , oeter oquii abstinens, sed Iulia lege in 
transitu (Tyrrell ' s emendation o£ m. s . ' transitam' ) semel tamen 
in diem •• facit ut mihi excipiendus sit, cum terruncium nego 
sumptus factum." 
3. Ad Att.V. 21o9o 
4. Ad Fam. I II.7.2 & 3o 
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no opportunity to do whilst fighting in Cilioia. As a result the 
building work had ceased. At this, those who wished the building 
to go on sent news to Appius in Rome, and he in turn wrote to Cicero 
asking for the work to continue and complaining at the delay. The 
party which wished to complete the building, thus supported by the 
previous governor, then sent a deputation to Ciceroo One of their, 
and Appius' 1 main complaints was that unless Cicero revoked his 
earlier decision, the building could not be finished before winter 
set ino "And yet" 1 says Cicero, "it was after mid winter before the 
second deputation arrived"f However, Cicero is bus.y and will hear 
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no more of Appia, its deputations and its petty building; even though 
the objectors are still in t.he majority 1 he will allow the building 
to go on. 
During this same month Cicero found time to interest himself 
in a problem whioh was giving anxiety to a friend of his 1 M. Fadius 
Gallus. It seems that Fadius, who had come to visit Cicero in 
Laodioea1 was profoundly shocked to learn tha t his brother was tr,ying 
to sell an estate at Herculaneum which was owned jointly by them both. 
Doubtless Fadius left in haste for Italy, and Cicero did his best to 
hel p his friend by writing to people in Rome asking for their 
assistance; would Caelius drop everything else to help Fadius; 2 
would Paetus undertake the whole business;3 would the praetor 
Curti us Peduoaeanus, while acting in accordance with the law, allow 
easy access to Fadius and grant him all proper requests.4 
Clearly, whilst still very much occupied with provinoial 
concerns, Cicero now found tine to interest himself in the aotivi ties 
of his friends 1 and it would seem that letters 1 perhaps even visitors, 
continued to arrive at Cioero• s residence far he wrote further letters 
of commendation, the equivalent of modern testimonials, to such men as 
Co Ti tius Rufus, P. Silius, and Q. Minuoius Thermus. 5 Though averse 
to being pestered by Caeliua with his repeated demands for Cilioian 
panthers, Cicero was not above pestering others in order to achieve 
his own ends. 
-------------------
1. Ad Famoiii.7o3• : "Quas enim litteras afferebant, ut opus aestate 
faoere possent , eas mihi post brumam reddiderunt. Sed scito, et 
multo plures esse, qui de tributis recuaent, quam qui exigi velint; 
et me tamen, quo~ te velle exist~m, esse facturum." 
2. Ad Fam. II.14.1. : "Onmia. relinques, si me amabis, cum tua opera 
Fadius uti volet." 
3. Ad Fam. IX.25. 
4o Ad Fam.XIII . 59 
5. Ad Fam.XIII. 54; 58; 63. 
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Rumours of war were still strong in Febr uary and forced Cicero t o 
warn Atticus that a war wi th the Parthians was threatening, 1 though in 
fact he had no first- hand news from Syria as Bibulus had not written t o 
him a. t all. Cicero took some hope from the 'fact that when Deiotarus 
of Galatia brought up his forces, Cil ioia would be reaqy to meet a~ 
invasion. June and July were the months he really feared, yet he 
considered the situation was alreaqy serious. The war scare became 
such that in March Ci cero wrote to Q. Minucius Thermus, the governor of 
Asia, requesting that M. Anneius be hast~ned on his way back to Cilicia, 
1 for there is a great war on in Syria • • Anneius , who had proved 
himself a man of military ability and distinction, could be of great 
use to the Republic in a crisis and it was therefore essential that he 
was back by May 1st, when Cicero intended to set out for Cilicia again. 
Finally the winter closed in and broke the tenuous chai n of 
messengers and tax- coll ectors ' runners that j oined Cicero to Italy : "I 
am longing to hear of events at Rome - it is ages since we had any news, 
so severe is the winter."3 Yet the winter which hindered communications 
also prevented any immediate military activity, and no doubt Cicero was 
grateful for thato 
Cicero continued at Laodioea and from March 15th heard legal oases 
:r.rom Synnada, Pamphyl ia, Lycaonia and Isauria. 4 Real details of his 
activity during this period are lackingo It is !mown that he continued 
to administer the law, and seems by early April to have become weary of 
so doing; he has had enough of the province, perhaps because he fears 
a diminution of his fame, perhaps because the whole business is unworthy 
of his powers , perhaps because there is the horror of a war banging 
over the province . 5 
The assizes oame to an end on May 1st. During this period from 
February 13th Cicero had heard eases from every district in his 
province except Cilicia itself, and had seen many states freed from 
debt, many had had their burdens lightened, and all had revived on 
being allowed to use their own laws . S The majority of the cities were _____________ .. 
1. Ad AttoVI. 1. 14• : "Parthioum bellum impendet." 
2. Ad Fam.XIII. 57ol. : "Quo magis ooti die ex litteris nuntiisque bellum 
magnum esse in Syria cognosco, eo vehementius a te pro nostra 
neoessitudine oontendo ut mihi M. Anneium legatum primo quoque tempore 
3. 
4. 
remittas." 
Ad Fam.II. 14. 1. :'~go res Romanas vehementer exspecto et desidero ••• 
nam iam.diu propter hiemis magni tudinem nihil novi ad nos adferebatur." 
Ad Att. V . 21. 9. 
5o Ad Fam. II.11. 1. 1 1 
e. Ad Att.VI. 2.4. : "· • • omnes suis legibus et iudiciis usae ,d.fiTovofld.V 
adeptae , revixerunt . " 
? 
now able to pay their taxes, together with the arrears for the previous 
five years, and the credit for this hapP.Y state of affairs must go to 
Ci aero' s s taft' who were behaving in an exemplary manner. The 
characteristic of the administration continued to be the open conduct 
and the easy accessibility of the governor himself1 l a fact which many 
provincials no doubt found to be a great blessing. 4:l 
There was still the threat of a Parthian war, and Cicero who had 
hear d no recent news of Rome was afraid that his year of office would 
be extended, especially when he heard that Curio was determined that 
the provinces would be the last thing to be discussed in the Senate.:l 
Then among all the discordant news of a politioal criais in Rome came 
one cheering piece of information. Some time towards the end of April 
or in early May Cicero received official information that a new quaestor, 
Caeliua Caldus , had been appointed to Cilicia.4 If necessary, this 
new man could be left behind to govern the province. 
00 May 7th Cicero left Laodicea once more, intending to spend 
June in Cilioia and July in an easy return preparatory to his voyage 
back to Rome.5 Little is known of this journey back from Laodicea 
to Tarsus . Cicero and his party presumably travelled along the same 
route that they had used during the late sUTllDJ!r of the previous year. 
Certainly they called at Apamea, for in oamp at this plaoe Cicero had 
to stand for a certain amount of impudent behaviour from a man 
Gaviua (Gavius est quidam . .. .. P. Clodi canis : Ad Att .VI.3.6.) whom 
he had appointed praefeotus at Brutus ' request . Gavius was openly 
hostile to Cicero, and declined to escort him as the governor left 
Apamea, and finally had enquired : "And out of what do I get xrw 
ration money? " 6 Cicero replied with considerable moderation 
that it was not his practice to pay men whose services he did not 
use, and at this Gavi us went off in a temper. This incident , while 
seeming such a trifle, was so novel and disturbing to Cicero that he 
devoted a substantial part of a letter to Attious in describing it. 
--~-----------~----
1. Ad Att.VI.2o5• : "Aditus autem ad me minime provinoiales • •• • " 
2 . The case of the deouriones of Ameria is sufficient proof of the 
necessity of presenting a petition to the governor or head of state 
in person. In this instance the deouriones, who bad been sent to 
Sulla, allowed themselves to be fobbed off by an interview with 
Chrysogonus, the dictator' s freedman , who later worked quite oontrar.y 
to their wishes. Pro Roscio Amerino IX.26 : ttAmeriam re inorata 
reverterunt." 
3 . Ad Att.VI.2. 6. 
4 . Ad Att. VI. 2.10. : "C. Coelium quaestorem hue venire audisti ." 
5. Ad Att.VI. 2. 6. : "Nonis Maiis in Ciliciam cogitabam : ibi cum Iunium 
mens em consumpsissem - a tque utinam in pace 1 magnum enim bellum 
impendet a Parthis - Quinotilem in redi tu ponere." 
s. Ad Att-VI.3.6. : ttis igi tur Gavius, cum Apameae me nuper vidisset 
Romam prof'ioisoens, me ita appellavit ut Culleolum vix auderem : 
' Unde', inquit, 'me iubes petere oibaria praefeoti?' "· ~'). _. 8 4;: 
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The governor and his pirty reached Tarsus on June 5th,1 and 
immediately Cicero found himself faced with still more urgent and 
unexpected problems. He had hoped for a quiet month in Cilicia, 
but at Tarsus he learned of a war in Syria, a good deal of brigandage 
in Oilioia itself, together with all the problems of fulfilling and 
concluding his policy of administration now that so little time was 
left for his year of office. Time was indeed running out, and 
Cicero had not yet decided who was to be left in charge of t~ province 
when he returned to Rome . The original quaestor, Mesoinius, was 
clearly unsuitable,for he was an unsteady and light-fingered character.2 
Poroptinus, who might have been appointed, bad already gone. Quintus, 
who was still to be approached on the subject, hated the province . 3 
Lucius Tullius and Marcus Anneiua, worthy men as they were, were not 
even considered, and of Caelius Oaldus nothing had been heard. The 
whole worrying problem was so utterly confusing that it seemed to 
de~ reason, and fortun~ was left to work it out.4 
It seems that fortune , in the shape of Quintus Cicero, shortly 
did work it out. Marcus 1 who had presumably spent a few days in 
Tarsus settling the most urgent of his problems, would join Quintus 
and the ar~ in the summer camp on the river Pyramus some time between 
June 10th e.nd 20th. When Marcus and Quintus ~t for the first tie 
since the end of the successful siege of Pindenissus, they would have 
many topios to discuss e.nd a great deal of' news to exchange. One of 
the matters they certainly talked of was the appointment of a temporary 
governor for Cilicia after :tlarcus' departure 1 but when it was suggested 
that Quintus might care tg succeed his brother, the reaction was quite 
plain. Quintus refused. As a result Marcus' plans had to be 
changed yet again and on June 21st, almost immediately after Quintus' 
refusal to take over as governor, he must have been considerably 
relieved to receive a letter from Caelius Caldus, who presumably 
indulged in the normal polite compliments of a newly appointed junior 
officer to his superior . Cicero replied promptly and warmly, asking 
Caldus to hasten to Cilicia, and in order to6ensure his speeey arrival sent out lictors and attendants to meet him. The f'uture governor, all 
---~------------~~ 
1. Ad Att. VI.4.1. : "Tarsum venimus Nonis Iuniis. '' 
2. Aa Att.VI.3.1. : "Quaestorem nemo dignum putat; etenim est levis, 
libidinosus, tagax." 
Ad Att .VI.4. 1. : "Nihil minus probari poterat quam quaestor Mescinius." 
3. Ad Att. VI.3.2. : "(Quintus) odi t enim provinciam. " 
4. Ad Att . VI. 4.1. : "Nam de Ooelio nihil audiebamus ••• Sed haec fortuna 
viderit, quoniam consilio non multum uti licet." 
5. Ad F~II.15.4o : "•••• a Quinto fratre impetrari non poterat." 
6. Ad Fam.II. 19. 2. : "Quae cum essent incerta, existimavi tamen 
raciundum esse ut ad te statores meos et lictores cum litteris 
mitterem." 
unknowing, had been ohosen. 
It is not known how long Cicero stayed in camp, but, whether 
i t was early or mid July that he left Pyramu.s for Tarsus,he had 
delayed sufficiently long to necessitate an alteration to his 
proposed route for leaving the province . He was still determined to 
leave Cilicia at the end of July, come what may , and the overland 
journey to Laodicea1 which would take a month, was too longo There 
had moreover been a slight delay at I ssus for Tiro, Cicero's secretary, 
had been taken ill, and it can be imagined with what reluctance Cicero 
finally left so faithful a servant behind him. l The new and final 
plan for departure was formed at last . Cicero determined to return 
to Tarsus so that after the term of office was over he could sail back 
to Italy via Rhodes, an island which he wished his son and nephew to 
visit.2 Accordingly he wrote to his first quaestor who was still in 
Laodioea, instructing him to wait there so that the copies of the 
official accounts , which were drawn up without Cicero's actual 
supervision, could be left in two separate cities in accordance with 
the Lex Julia. 3 
Whilst staying at Tarsus during the final days of July, Cicero 
received a letter from Sallustius, the proquaestor of Syria, and it 
is from Cicero' s reply that there emerges a possible explanation of 
much of the uncertainty and wrong infor m'i tion on the Parthians and 
affairs in Syria. Bibulus, who disliked Cicero intensely, had 
refused to have him informed of events in his provinoeo 4 Not 
unnaturally Cicero was angry at such treatment and in his reply to 
Sallustius he is curt, decisive and only just short of rude. He makes 
it quite clear that he intends to leave his province on time and so 
oannot meet Sallustius or his successor; and he will most certainly 
leave copies of his accounts in accordance with the Lex Julia, and 
advises Sallustius to do the same. 5 In short,Sallustius is the only 
man who still believes that the Parthians are a danger . 6 
-~----~-~~---------
1. Ad Att. VI.7. 2. : "Tiro ad te dedisset litteras, nisi eum graviter 
aegrum Issi reliquissem. " 
2. Ad Att . VI . 7.2. : ~odum volo puerorum causa •••• • " 
3. Ad Att .VI. 7. 2. : "Ego Laodiceae quaestorem Mescinium exspectare 
iussi, ut confeotas rationes lege Iulia apud duas civitates passim 
relinquere ." 
Ad Fam. V. 20. 2. : '~ationes confectae me absente aunt tecum, ad quas 
ego nihil adhibui praeter lectionem. " 
4 . Ad Fam. I I.17. 6. 
5. Bibulus of course considered the Lex Julia , passed in his joint 
consulship with Caesar in 59 B.C. 1 illegal because it had been 
carried in defiance of his 'obnuntiatio'. 
6. Ad Fam.II. 17.3, : "Parthi transierint necne praeter te video 
dubitare neminem." 
Before leaving Tarsus, Cicero sent his final instructions to 
Mescinius in Laodioea. Once the accounts were completed, copies 
of them were to be left at Laodicea and Apa.mea, and sureties for the 
surplus monies were to be reoeived.1 B,y this foresight he ensured 
that there would be no danger of loss on the long journey home.2 
As July came to its close Cicero slipped away from Tarsus, 
leaving the newly arrived Caldus in charge, and journeyed down to 
some port on the south coast , perhaps Aegeae or Soli. Fran there, 
no doubt on the muoh longed- far and muoh publicised July 31st, he 
sailed for Italy, Rome, and the splendour and spotlight of the 
forum. 3 
1. Ad Fam.V. 20.2. : "Illud quidem certe :factum est, quod lex iubebat, 
ut apud duas civitates, Laodioensem et Apameensem, quae nobis 
maximae videbantur, quoniam ita necesse erat, rationes oonfeotas 
consolidatas deponeremus.fl 
2. Ad Fam. II. 17o4. : "Laodiceae me praedes aocepturum arbitror amnis 
peouniae publicae, ut et mihi et populo oautum sit sine veoturae 
periculo." 
3. Ad Fam.II.12.2. 
ROUTE AND Dt\TE CHART : JANUARY - JULY 50 B.C. 
Approx. 
Miles. 
35 
70 
Tarsus 
Taurus 
Asia 
Laodioea 
Apamea 
Tarsus 
40 . Camp at Pyramus 
Tarsus 
25 Soli (?) 
• 
• Early January 
• Left - 5th January • 
• Mid January • 
Late January 
• Arrived - 11th February. • 
• Left - 7th May • 
. May • 
Arrived - 5th June 
• Left - c. 10th June . 
• Ar.rived - before 20th June • 
Left - Early July 
• Arrived - Early July • 
Left - after 18th July 
31st July (?) 
Appendix D. 
Fam XV. 4o 
(Att.V.21.~ ~Att.v .21. 
Att.V.21. 
Att V.21 • 
Att VI.2 • 
Att.VI.3 • 
(Att. VI. 4.) 
Att .VI.4 • 
Att . VI.5 • 
Att .VI.7. 
Fam.II.17. 
Fam XV .4. : References wi tbout brackets denote the letter was written 
at this place. 
(Att.V.21.) References with brackets denote that this place is 
mentioned. 
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RETURN TO ROME SKETCH MAP VI 
RHO 
.c::;::7' 
CICERo'S RouTE 
Return to Rone . 
The hated year of exile from Rome was over at last and it must have_s:e~ed to _Cicero as he sailed westwards along the s~uthern coast 
of C~l~c1a dur~ early August that, even though stor~ political 
clo~d~ were ha~g~ng over Italy, all wfuld be well for him and for his 
poll. t1.cal r e- b1.rth :from this time on. He could look forward to new 
exploits and the retelling of old ones in the Forum he had so longed 
f or. 
The first of many future shocks however was soon to be dealt him. 
As he came sailing into Sida i n Pamphylia~ he received several letters 
f rom fri ends in Rome i nforming hi m that his dealy loved daughter, 
Tulli a , had recently married the profligate Dolabella who , in turn, 
had just fai led to prove hi s charge of maiestas against Appius Claudius . 
The news came as a double shook and embarrassment, and at Sida Cicero 
was obliged to write to Appius , firstly congratulating him on his 
acquittal and secondly tha.nking him for his good wishes for the marriage 
of the man by whom he had recently been prosecuted. The position of 
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father- in-law to Dolabella was not a very dignified one at such a moment, 
and, judging from Dolabella ' s character, not likely to prove a 
permanent one . That Cicero was not overjoyed at the marriage is 
clear f r om his note to Caelius : ~I am glad you speak well of Dolabella, 
and even like him." 3 To Appius it was : "I can find no easy ending 
to this speech I have begun. I ought not to speak with too much gloom 
about this marriage which you bless with your best wishes . "4 Such 
was the unfortunate beginning of what Cicero had hoped would be a 
joyous and triumphant progress. 
B,y August 10th he was at Rhodes, and in a letter to Atticus shows 
clearly that he was sti l l worried about Tulli a's marriage and the fact 
that he had had to leave Caelius Caldus in charge of the province. After 
all Caldus was a mer e boy and perhaps not able to support the weight of 
-----------------~---~-
1. Ad A tt . VI . 6 . 4. : "Amioorum li tterae me ad triumphum vocant, rem a 
nobis , ut ego arbi tror, propter hanc .,.fl.'i..•y1tVL6•d.v nos tram non 
neglegendam. " 
2. Ad Fam. III.12. 4 . 
3. Ad Fam. I I.15. 2. : "Dolabellam a te gaudeo primum laudari, deinde 
etiam amari." 
4 . Ad Fam. III. 12 . 2 . ; •• ••••• neque enim trietius dicere quidquam 
debeo ea de re quam tu 1pse ominibus optimis prosequeri s •• • • " 
duties l atel y thrust upon him. Indeed had the Parthians continued 
to threaten war, Cicero claims that he would have defied the Senate's 
order s and remained in his province beyond ~uly 51st . 1 But once all 
was qui et i t would not have seemed well to put Quintus in charge 
rather t han leave the province under the command of the man sent out 
by the Senate; it would moreover have been illegal. 2 
He also sent off a restrained letter to Cato to thank him far 
his complimentary r emarks on Cicero's sup~licatio, which Cato had in 
fact opposed : 'What triumphal chariot, or what wreath of laurel could 
I compare with praise from Cato?" 5 And if it should happen that 
Cicero does gain a triumph, will Cato at least feel pleased that Cicero 
has gained what he wiShed. This topic also was clearly on Cicero' s 
mind for i n a letter to Atticus he asked his friend' s opinion on the 
possibility of a triumph, an achievement he would have some hope of, 
if Bibulus were not also trying for one . 4 
Cicero had previously expressed his intention of making his return 
via F~odes in order that his son and nephew might visit that island. It 
is therefore likely that a short halt of several days was made there , and 
then in late August the par~ moved on towards Ephesus. During this 
stage of his journey Cicero , never a good sea-traveller, was considerably 
delayed by the Etesian winds , and he further lays at the door of the open 
Rhodian boats the blame for a total delay of 20 days . 5 It was October 
1st before he f inally embarked to sail from Ephesus and, even though 
in a hurry, he was not inclined to travel as quickly as he might. 
On October 14th he arrived back in Athens after a slow and 
uncomfortable voyage against strong headwinds , and lodged some while 
at the Acropolis.6 As Cicer o came nearer to Rome ,he wanted more and 
more news of the political situat ion whioh he feared was going to be 
a troublesome one. Throughout his year of absence, Cicero had in 
fact been kept well-informed, thought he often fails to realise it , of 
1 . 
2. 
3 . 
4 . 
5. 
6 . 
---------------~-------
Ad Att . Vlo6o 5 & 4o : 
Ad Att .VI. 6 . 3. : ~idebam aermones : ' Hui 1 fratrem reliquit! num 
est hoc non plus annum obtinere provinciam? Quid quod senatua eos 
voluit praeesse provinciis qui non pra.efuissent?" 
Ad Pam. XV . 6.1. : " • • • quem ego currum, aut quam lauream cum tua 
laudatione conferrem?" In Att .VII.2 . 7. Cicero says that Cato was ) 
in fact : " • • in me turpiter fuit malevolus . " 
Ad Att . VI. 8 . 5. : "Ego, nisi Bibulus ••••• adniteretur de triumpho, 
aequo animo essem." 
At Att .VI. 8 . 4. : "Detraxit :xx ipsos dies eti am aphractus Rhodiorum." 
Ad Fam. XIV. 5 . 1. : "Pridie Idus Octobris Athenas venimus, cum sane 
adversis ventis usi essemus tardeque et incommode navigassemus . " 
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political manoeuvres in Italy. Caelius and Atticus had been faithful 
and carefUl correspondents, and as a result Cicero was well aware of 
haw events were shaping. The course of these events has no part in 
the present purpose beyond revealing how Cicero in his return to Rome 
was influenced by the growing struggle for :power which he was in no way 
able to controlo 
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From Athens Cicero wrote to Terentia and Tullia, the only letter to 
his wife whioh has survived from this year in Cilicia, and in this note 
he assured them that he was hastening on so that on his arrival in Italy 
he might have more time to consider the political situation which seemed 
to threaten war . In such a crisis he felt he would not be able to 
conceal his real feelings.1 When writing to Attious, Cicero forecast 
a terrifi c struggle in which Rome would need all that divine help whiah 
Cicero himself had received so plentifully in the Parthian war.2 
Indeed if there was going to be a war, he wished he had stayed in his 
province : At ticus may well laugh, yet Cicero ought to have stayed on 
if such a calamity was threatening. 
Next, after a fairly short halt in Athens, Cicero moved on once 
more, and while be nowhere mentions his mode of transport it seems 
fairly clear that he must have made the overland journey to the west 
coast of Greece, such was his loathing of sea travel. Certainly he 
was in western Greece by early November and made brief stops at Patrae, 
where Tiro was taken ill again, Alyzia~ Leuoas, Actium, and Corcyra. 
Here he was delayed for thi rteen days. During this time he wrote 
frequent letters to Tiro,4 assuring him of his own and everyone else's 
concern for the invalid' s speeqy recovery. In this series of letters 
Cicero reveals himself as a man concerned at the ill-health of a frien~ 
rather than an employer vexed at the inconvenience o~ being without his 
secretary. That this concern is genuine is obvious from all these short 
notes (on one day he wrote three times) and~s _a resEit o~ it · he can be 
forgiven many of his other faults . The delay at Coroyra was caused by 
a series of storms, and,even after the weather had seemed to in~rove and 
1. Ad Fam. XIV. 5 . 1. : "Cognovi enim ex multorum amicorum litteris quas 
attulit Acastus ad arma rem speotare, ut m:i.hi, cum venero, 
dissi mulare non l iceat quid sentiam." 
2 . Ad Att.VI I . 1.2. : ''Videre enim mihi videor tantam dimicationem - nisi 
deus qui nos mel ius quam optare auderemus Pa tbico bello liberavi t, 
J f'uit It respezerit rem publicam - sed tantam quanta numquam • 
3. Ad Fam.XVI. 9.1. 
4. Ad Fam. XVIo1 - 9 (except 8) 
the par ty had gone down to the harbour at Cassiope , the contrary 
winda continued t o bl ow and prevent ed sailing until the 22nd 
November. l 
After cr ossing the sea at night , Cicero and his party made 
their first landfall in Italy at Hydruntum on the 23rd November . 
On the :following day they sailed into the harbour at Brundisium 
just as Terentia her self was entering the town on her way to meet 
her husband . 2 Wi th her arrival came further news of politics in 
Rome and of Caesar ' s movement of troops in the north. The situation 
was daily growing wor se; "I fear there may be serious disturbances 
at Rome after January 1st. I shal l act with moderation in all things . "3 
But that was no longer sufficient. For while the man of moderation, 
the man who had hoped to bring into being and maintain a concordia 
ordinum, while the man of doubts and hesitations came slowly northwards 
to receive, as he hoped, the acclaim of the people and a triumph from 
the Senate, the man of action, Caesar, was preparing to decide his own 
and Rome ' s fate i n Gaul. 
As far as his tri umph i s concerned, Cicero is pleased to hear 
that Pompey has spoken well of hi s character and his hope of such an 
honour : "I shall make ever y effor t , and I hope I shall suooeed. "4 
With Pompey's support it will not matter that Cato has behaved most 
spitefully in trying to prevent full recognition of the victory at 
A:manus . 
Cicer o left Brundisium after only a short stay, reached Aeculanum 
by December 6th, and was at Pomtius • villa at Trebula on December 9th. 
He met Pompey, either at Cume.e or Pompeii 1 on December 10th, and after 
their two hour n~eting he felt a warm glow of hope for his triumph, 
though he was very apprehensive at Pompey ' s suggestions of a war. The 
difficulties of playing the double role of triumph-seeker and libe5al 
politician in suoh circumstances were daily becoming more obvious. 
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1. On this occasion Cicero ' s fear of the sea appears to have been well-
justified. c . f . Ad Fam. XVI. 9. 1. : "Interea , qui cupide profecti aunt, 
multi naufragia fecer unt." 
2o Ad Fam. XVI. 9 . 2 o 
3 . Ad Fam. XVI.9.3. : "Romae vereor ne ex Kalend. Ian . magni tumultus 
sint. Nos agemus omnia modice." 
4. Ad Att. VII.2. 6. : "Itaque omnia experiar et, ut spero , adsequar. " 
5 . Ad Att . VII. 3. 2. : "Utrumque vero simul agi non potest , et de 
tri umpho ambitiose et de re publica l i ber e . " 
Cicero carried out his planned return to Rome. By mid December 
he was at Formi.ae, where he intended staying until the end of the montho 
Here he was able t o meet people and gather views and facts on the 
dif f icult situati on in Rome which was rapidly worseni ng from storzqy to 
electric. He left Formiae at the end of December, and was at 
Tarracina on the 31st. Then, travelling via the Pomptine marshes, he 
came to Pompey's Alban villa on January 3rd, 49 B.C. The date was 
Cicero' s 57th birthday. On the 4th he approached the city and was 
most gratified at being met by a procession which came out especially 
to greet him. 1 
His arr ival however coincided with the flare up of the long- awaited 
str uggle , 2 and i n the midst of such momentous events there was scarcely 
time to discuss a triumph for Cicero. And yet, at a full meeting of 
the Senate there was a demand that he should receive his triumph, a 
demand that was unsuccessful only because the consul, Lentulus, wished 
to fulfil all the necessary public business before turning to this 
private matter . 3 As the crisis grew, Italy was divided into districts 
and Cicero, forgetful of his empt,y threat to cross the pomoerium,4 took 
the town of Capua as his sphere of command. Thus it came about that he 
turned aw~ from Rome on January 17th and, still accompanied by his 
lictors and their laurelled wreathe, went south again into Campania. 
The triumph was not to be . Parthians, Amanus, and Cilicia were 
far awa:y, and palled into insignificance before Caesar's crossing or 
the Rubicon on January 11th. While Cicero had hoped and waited, the 
die had been cast. 
--------~-------
1. Ad Fam. XVI.11 . 2. :"Ego ad Urbem aocessi pridie Nonas Ianuar. 
Obviam mihi sio est prodi tum ut nihil potueri t fieri ornatius . '' 
2. Ad Fam XVI.11. 2. : " Sed incidi in ipsam fla.mmam civilis discordiae 
vel potius belli • • ••• " 
3. Ad Fam. XVI.11.3. 
4. Ad At t . VII . 7.4-5o Pompey had previously suggested that, if any 
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disturbance did occur, Cicero might care to go to Sicily as governor 
and control the senatorial forces stationed there . In Cicero's eyes 
this was illegal because his imperium had been voted for Cilicia o~y. 
He had therefore replied that he would rather enter Rome, thus lay1ng 
down his imperium together with any claim to a triumph. 
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A p;pendix E. 
ROUTE AND DATE CHART FOR CICERO'S JOURNEY BACK TO RO:lt3. 
Approx. 
Idles 
50 B.c. 
Sid a • 3rd August Fam. III.12 • • 
200 Rhodes • 10th Aug. - Late August . Att .VI. 6 • • 
155 :Ephesus • Early Sept. - 1st Oct . Att . vr.a • • 
215 Athens • 14th Oct. - Late Oct. Att.VI. 9 • • 
115 Patrae 31st October (Fam. XVI. 1.) 
60 Alyzia 3rd - 6th November Fa.m XVI.1. 
15 Leu cas • 7th November ~"'am.XVI.4 • • 
10 Actium • 7th November Fam. XVI.6 • • 
45 Corcyra 9th - 16th November ];'am. XVI. 7. : (~·am.XVI.9.) 
Cassiope • 16th - 22nd November (Fam. XVI. 9. ) • 
Hydruntum • 25rd November (~,am. XVI. 9.) • 
45 Brundisium • 24th November Fam. XVI. 9 • • 
165 Aeoulanum • 6th December (Att.VII. 3.) • 
Trebula • 9th December Att .VII . 5 • • 
55 Cumae • 10th December Att. VII.4. • 
40 For miae • 17th- 28th December Att.VII.5. • Att.VII . 9. • • 
18 Tarracina • 31st December (Att .VII.5.) • 
49 B.c. 
42 Alba . 3rd January (Att. VII.5 . ) • 
Before Rome • 4th - 17th January Pam. XVI.11. • 
Fam. III.12. : References without brackets denote that the letter was 
written at this place. 
(Fam. XVI.1.) : References with brackets denote that this place is 
mentioned. 
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CICT!llO'S PRACTI CE IN C:ffiiCIA. 
The Governor's Edict . 
The legal basis for the provincial governor ' s method of administration 
in hi s province rested on the twin foundations of the Lex Provinciae and 
the governor's own personal edict . The Lex Provinciae was formulated 
when the province was first constituted and was concer ned with the broader 
and more general matters relating t o the province. It was the governors 
edict which dealt with detailed points of an immediate and practical 
nature . The edict, issued when the governor took up his duties, set 
the tone for };li s time of office, and by i te terms showed the provincials 
what kind of government they might expect . 
Cicero, who drew up his edict in Rome,1 followed that model edict 
of Scaevola, the governor of Asia in 94 B. C. , in many de tails, and 
clearly aimed at moderate and just government. 2 He states thi t his 
edict was a short one, and divided into two main seotions. 5 
The first of these was concerned with basically provincial matters, 
and included in i t s scope the accounts of the provincial towns, debts , 
rates of interest, civil contracts and, most important, all matters 
to do with the tax-collectors. Clearly this first section dealt with 
the practical details of all monetary affairs, especially the vexatious 
taxes . 4 It is important at this stage to note that Cicero showed 
great concern in the rates of interest charged on loans and debts, and 
proved himself an exception to the general run of governors by fixing 
on what was considered a low rate. The legal rate allowed by the 
edict was 12.%, an amount which at that time and place was considered 
ridiculously l ow. The only alteration made to this section was the 
addition crf a clause at the request of the publicani,who persuaded 
Cicero to adopt part of Appi us ' edict and insert a paragraph concerning 
the reduction of the towns' expenses and including certain innovations 
1 . Ad Fam. I II.8. 4. : ''Roma.e composui edictum." 
2. Ad Att.VI.1.15. " • •• multaque s~ secutus Scaevolae • •• • n C' 1 3. Ad Att. VI. 1 . 15. : "Breve autem edictum est propter hanc mearn o•«•pt.~IV 1 
quod duobus generibus edicendum putavi . n 
4. Ad Att. VI.1.15. : "Quorum unum est provinoiale in quo est de 
rationibus oivitatum, de aere alieno, de uaura , de syngraphis, in 
eodem omnia de publicanis. 
to the advantage of the states. This is a completely unexpected 
episode, and one which shows that not only Appius but also the tax-
gatherers sometimes acted for the g ood of the towns.1 
The second section of the edict was devoted to legal matters, 
and dealt with private affairs, civil oases and such things as 
inheritance, private ownership and sale, appointment of officials, 
and other ma. tters which,' are normally raised and settled under the 
terms of the edict' • 2 In this section came one of the clauses in 
which Cicero followed Soaevola's lead, and r eversed the practice of 
Appius Claudius. He laid d~m that civil oases in which Greeks only 
were concerned should be tried in accordance with Greek Laws. The 
Greeks were3delighted at this and believed they had gained self-government. Cicero ' s enlightened policy extended this privilege 
to all the provincial towns likewise, and he was pleased to see that 
everywhere the provincials revived on recovering such unwonted 
freedom in their own law-courts.4 Cicero, like Bibulus in Syria, 
felt obliged to check the excesses of the publioani and money-lenders, 
but, unlike his fellow governor, was somewhat circumspect in the terms 
used in his edi~t. He included a clause as to the legality of 
contracts, and decreed that they should be binding in their terms, 
"provided the agreement is not such that it off ends equity and fair 
dealing."5 Cicero felt that such a clause, whilst just and necessary, 
was a sad reflection on the order to which he belonged. 
There remained one other section of the edict . This was an 
unwritten part and had to do with the r est of the legal procedure . 6 
Since suCh a section, to be comprehensive, would no doubt have been 
lengthy, Cicero was content to announce that in fixing his own 
provincial decrees and decisions he would follow the edicts proclaimed 
at Rome. This seemed to please the provincials, and doubtless gave 
Cicero a certain amount of room for manoeuvre in deciding individual 
------------------
1. Ad Fam. IIIo8.4. : "Nihil addidi nisi quod publicani me rogarunt, 
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cum Samum ad me venissent, ut de tuo edicto totidem verbis transferrem 
in meum. ~ligentissime scriptum caput est quod pertinet ad minuendos 
sumptus civitatum •••• n 
Ad Att.VI.1.15. : " ••• alterum, quod sine edicto satis commode transigi 
non potest, de hereditatum possessionibus, de bonis possidendis 
vendendis, magistris faciendis, quae ex edicto et postulari et fieri 
2. 
3. 
4 . 
5. 
6. 
solent." 
Ad Att.VI.1.15. 
Ad Att.VI.2.4. : "omnes suis legibus et iudioiis usae~t~vot~f~v adeptae, 
revixerunt . *' 
Ad Att. VI. 1.15. : u •• EXTRA QUAM SI ITA N'~GOTIUM GESTUM EST UT EO ST.ARI 
NON OPORTEAT EX FIDE BONA. " ,, 
Ad Att.VI.1.15.: "tertium de reliquo iure dicundo d..ypd-fov reliqui. " 
Di.xi me de eo genere mea decreta ad edicta urbana docommodaturum ••• 
cases according to their merits . 
Taxation. 
"This, gentlemen, is the difference in the method of land- taxation 
between Sicily and the other provinces. In the others there has been 
imposed either a fixed tax, called 'tribute' , as for example among the 
Spaniards and Carthaginians, (this could be counted as our reward for 
victory and their punishment for the war) , or there is the system of 
tax-contracts lit out by the censors, as is the case in Asia under the 
Lex Sempronia." 
rvhen he drew up his edict, Cicero was specially concerned with 
the reduction of debts and the checking of any illegal extortion. The 
individual clauses of the edict have not survived, but from what is 
known it seems safe to say that Cicero was determined to lighten the 
burdens of the provincial towns, whilst at the same time allowing the 
publicani and other money-lenders an opportunity to gather what he 
consi dered to be a fair return for the money they had expended. So 
much of Cicero's conduct in Cilicia was influenced by his ideas on this 
subject , by the activities of the publicani,and by the results of these 
activities, that i t is essential to give a brief outline of the method 
of taxation used by Rome in Cilicia before going on to consider the 
treatment received by the various districts of the province. 
In the passage quoted above , Cicero described Asia , and by 51 B.C. 
this meant Asia in its wider sense, as being taxed by a system of 
contracts fixed by the censors in Rome . This 'censoria locatio', 
briefly, worked as follows. As the Roman Republic maintained no tax-
officials of its own, it fell back on the device of using an individual 
(Publicanus) , or later groups of people associated together in a finance 
1. II In Verrem III. 6. 12. : "Inter Siciliam ceterasque provincias, 
iudices, in agrorum vectigalium ratione hoc interest , quod ceteris 
e.ut imposi tum vecti gal est certum, quod stipendiarium dici tur, ut 
Hispanis et plerisque Poenorum quasi victoriae praemium ao poena 
belli, aut censoria locatio constitute est , ut Asiae lege 
Sempronia." 
In Sicily there were a few allied or free towns such as Messana and 
Tauromeniumo The remainder either paid a tithe,(decumanae),or 
both a tithe and a rent , (censoriae)o 
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oompaqy (Societas), to colJect the taxes due from the provinces of Asia. 
Every five years the censors sold out the contract for collecting the 
tax on one-tenth of the produce to the company that offered the best 
price . This price was normally a reasonable one which, whilst providing 
the Roman treasury with its taxes, allowed the publicani scope for 
regaining with profit the sum they had paid down. 
As f ar as Rome was concerned, this was the end of the business. 
It was then the responsibility of the company to ensure that the 
provincials paid a t ithe on their land, the exact amount being left 
very much to the discretion of the interested publicani, whose sole 
object was to reap their profit or interest on the money they had 
speculated in the province. However, as the provincials ability to 
pay was related directly to the quali~ of their harvests, the return 
that the publicani would receive was not a guaranteed one . In a good 
year no doubt everyone was satisfied, but in a bad year there would be 
small returns for the publioani and the beginning of debt , the source 
of further trouble, for the provincials. Tihen the harvests failed 
for several years, even the most severe methods were unable to bring 
in any money, and the tax-farillers would discover that in buying the 
tax-contract they had paid out more than they had recouped from the 
actual taxes. Such a situation arose in 61 B.c .,when, "l'he men who 
took up the tax- contract for Asia from the censors complained in the 
Senate that because of their greed they had blundered and had paid 
too high a price : and they demanded the annulment of the oontraot ~1 
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The people who suffered most were the provincials who were f requently 
unable to meet the demands of the publioani; they often accepted the 
tax-gatherers' offer to waive their immediate claim, even borrowed 
money at exorbitant rates from these same tax-collectors who also acted 
as money-lenders, and then, when they were still unable to pay at t he 
time of the next demand, tasted in full the severity of the publicans' 
wrath. This system was so wasteful, ruinous and unfair that it could 
be said : "Wherever the publicanus goes , there co mon law is of no 
account and freedom for the allies fails ."2 In an eff ort to avoid the 
______________ _. .. 
1. Ad Att . I.17. 9. : "Asiam qui de oensoribus oonduxerunt questi aunt 
in senatu se cupiditate prolapsos nimium magno conduxisse, ut 
induoeretur locatio postulaverunt." 
2. Livy XLV.18 : " •••• ubi publicanus esset, ibi aut ius publicum vanum 
aut libertatem sociis nullam esse." 
claims of the publioani, the towns would speak of complaining t o the 
Senate, and, as a preliminary, would appeal to the governor. This 
action was not always a wise one and could produce very mixed results. 
The most invidious role in this system was filled by the governor 
himself. His duty was merely to supervise the general conduct of 
publicani and provincials alike; he had no part in f ixing the contracts 
and di d not act as official receiver of the taxes . The publicani as 
a r esult proved a frequent source of embarrassment to an honest governor 
for, while they were under his surveillance, they were semi-official 
figures of great potential influence and independent of his normal 
staff. Whilst most governors preferred to give the publicani a free 
hand, a complacent man might allow the extortion of excessive ol illegal 
taxes , and an avaricious one might even join in that extort ion. From 
such a constant and likely cause of f riction, e just and observant 
governor might look forward to future troubles. Any check to their 
activities could prove calamitous as the case of P. Rutilius Rufus 
shows : "P. Rutilius, a man of perfect honesty, while legatus to the 
governor Q. MUcius had protected the people of Asia from the wrongful 
excesses of the publicani. As a result he was hated by the equestrian 
or der, which had control of the courts, was found gui lty of extortion 
and sent i nto erile.tt2 
"And yet to all your good-will and devotion to duty the publ icani 
prove a gr eat problem. tt3 Cicero was well aware of how troublesome the 
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publicani might prove and was no doubt extremely apprehensive , f or a 
serious disagreement could upset all his pl ans f or government and prove 
damaging to his political and personal prospects in Rome . He was 
therefore gratified to learn at the very outset of his office that the 
five- year contracts for the taxes had been fixed before his arrival . 
Any initial trouble was thus avoided, and his relief is clear : "I shall 
satisfy everyone, and I shall do so more easily because the tax-contracts 
have been settled in~ province." 4 Obviously if he had played no part 
in drawing up the contracts, he could not be held responsible for any 
----------------
1. Pro Muraena : XX.42. : "Ipse autem in Gallia ut nostri homines 
despera tas iam pecunias erigerent aequitate diligentiaque perfeci t ." 
2 . Livy Epi t 70 : "P. Rutilius, vir summae innocentiae, quoni am legatus 
Q. Mucii pro. cos . a publicanorum iniuriis Asiam defenderat , invisus 
equestri ordine , penes quam iudicia erant , repetundarum d.amnatus in 
exilium missus est." 
Mter his condemnation Rutilius Rufus retired to Asia to live amongst 
those pr ovincials he was alleged to have robbed. 
3. Ad ;) . ff . I.I.XI. 52. : "Atqui huic tuae voluntati ac diligentiae 
difficul ta tem magnam afferunt publicani. 11 
4. Ad Att. V.13. 1o : " •••• omnibusque satis faciemus et eo f acilius quod 
in nostra provincia confectae sunt pac tiones." c.f. also Ad Att.V. 14. 1. 
injustices to either publicani or provincials, and his only concern 
was to ensure that the collection of the taxes went on in a manner 
that was as seemly and as fair as possible. 
This he seems to have achieved. Notices concerning the 
publicani are few and of a general nature , but what does emerge is a 
picture of a car eful, if moderate , supervision by a governor who wished 
to protect the people of his province without coming into close contact, 
let alone hostility, with a class he professed to distruft • At the 
very outset the tax-collectors were eager to come to the new governor's 
notice, and no doubt introduced themselves and their claims in the hope 
of gaining his favour . 1 The light and friendly mood thus established 
continued throughout the governorship for Cicero wished to f'ollow his 
own advice, and, as far as is known, refused to alienate the publicani. 
In his dealings with them Cicero was all charm : he was careful to 
praise them and show them §espect; and at the same time he saw to it 
that they troubled no- one . 
He maintained a calm atmosphere in monetary affairs by fixing on 
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a date , which he normally made a fairly distant one , by which any debts 
due to the tax-farmers should be paid. If the debts were paid by this 
date , then the rate of interest was in accordance with his own edict; i.e . 
1~. If however the debt was not paid by that date , the rate would be 
in accordance with the indivi dual agreements made between tre cities and 
the publicani . As a result the provincials almost rushed to pay on fair 
terms, while the astounded tax-gatherers took in their dues with 
unprecedented ease. fhey did not even complain at receiving their 
demands at a lower rate provided they were praised and invited out to 
dinner by Cicero at f r equent intervals . 3 Whole communities which had 
paid nothing during the pr esent five year contract not only made good 4 their debts but even paid up for the previous five year period as well; 
as the Cypriot Salaminians said, 5 they were able to do this by paying 
the publioani that money i t was customary for the governor to exact for 
his own gain. Far Cicero of course refused to accept any of the 
-------------------------
1. Ad Att . V . 13. 1 . : ''Ver um tamen deoumani quasi venissem cum imperio • • • • 
se alaores obtulerunt . '' 
2 . Ad Att . VI.1. 16. : "De publioanis quid agam videris quaerere . Habeo 
in delioiis, obsequor, verbis laudo, orno; efficio ne cui molesti 
sint. " 
3 . Ad Att.VI. 1 . 16. : " • •• et publicanis res est gratissima, si illa i am 
habent pleno modio, verborum honorem, invitationem crebram." 
4 . Ad Att . VI.2. 5. : "Populi autem nullo gemitu publicanis, quibus hoc 
ipso lustro nihil solverant, etiam superioris lustri reliqua 
reddiderunt." c . f . also Ad Fam. I I . 13.4. 
5. Ad At t .V. 21. 11. : "Romines non modo non recusare sed e tiam hoo 
di cer e , se a me sol vere • •• 
customary bribes or presents for himself from the towns, and this made 
available a considerable amount of money for other purposes. 
Cicer o was also willing to intervene in the law courts in favour 
of those unfairly oppressed by taxation.l As he could not do this by 
absolving the states from their taxes, it must be presumed that the 
result was achieved by the governor's insistence on a strict observance 
of his edict concerning rates of interest and money contracts . On the 
other hand, the tax-farmers themselves could rely on Cicero's sense of 
justice to show itself as it had done in 61 B.c. , 2 for it appears that 
in at least one case he remitted a contract which was pr oving ruinous 
to the publicanus.3 In all this Cicero acted on grounds of reason, 
and not from favour . 
The tithe proved to be the main source of income for Rome, but 
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it was not the only source . The publicani were also active in collecting 
the customs dues, the pasture tax, and, according to local conditions, 
the rents on mines, quarries, fishing grounds and sal tpans. In 66 B.c. 
Cicero had tes4ified to the large staffs maintained for these places by 
the publican!, but for Cilicia in 51 B.C. there is no direct evidence. 
In addition to these official taxes imposed by Rome , there were 
also such local taxes as those on houses, slaves and columns, very like 
the English window tax in the 18th and early 19th centuries. ff or these 
taxes, which were raised according to local needs, the notices are again 
brief and inconclusive. Cicero speaks of poll taxes imposed ig 
Phrygia to meet the demands made previously by Appius Claudius. Later 
in the year there was the matter of the building work at Appia and Cicero 's 
refusal to allow the magistrates to exact a special tax to cover the 
cost of the work. 6 Cicero also illustrates the provincials' feelings 
on this score when he speaks o~ ' that grievous exaction- the poll tax 
and the door tax•.7 But the most absurd tax of all, had it been 
allowed, would have been the one which Caelius wished to see raised to 
... 
.... . 
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5. 
6. 
7. 
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Ad Fam. XV. 4 . 2. : "Quibus in oppidis cum magni conventus l~ssent , 
multas civitates acerbissimis tributis et gravissimis usuris et 
falso aere alieno liberavi." 
Ad Att.I.17. 9. : Cicero had then supported the remission of the tax 
contracts on grounds of policy rather than fairness. 
Ad Fam. V . 20.3- 4 . 
Pro Lege Manilia 16 : "• •• cum publicani fam.ilias maxima.s, quas in 
saltibus habent, quas in agris , quas in portibus atque in custodiis, 
magno periculo se habere a.rbi trentur?" 
Ad Att .V. 16. 2. : "Imperata ,£lrll(£#-).•tJ. n c . f . Ad Fam. XV. 4 .2o 
Ad Fam. III.7.2 - 3. 
Ad ~1am.III.8. 5 . : 11 ••• et illam acerbissimam exactionem, quam tu non 
ignoras , ca pi tum a tque os tiorum •• •• 11 
pay for the hunting end shipping of' Cilician panthers to Rome so that 
ttey might appear in his aedile games.1 Cicero most sensibly r efused 
to allow the imposition of special taxes for such worthless ends, and 
considered that only the repayment of debt was suff icient cause for 
these exactions. 
Further details are lacking, but, if it is safe to judge from 
Cicero's silence, it seems that during the whole year there was no 
case of extortion by a tax-farmer in Ciliaia. There were of course 
other troubles concerning loans made to the towns, but it seems safe 
to assert that at no time did any serious disagreement arise between 
governor, governed and tax- contractors . Indeed, Cicero oould 
satirically s~ that he was the apple of their eye to the tax-farmers, 
and on looking baok on his year' a duties could claim : "Connnuni ties 
have been saved, and the tax-gatherers have been completely satisfied."2 
Treatment of Provincials 
1. General Conduct. 
One surprising fact emerges from Cicero's dealings 
with the people living in his province. While he frequently mentions 
the condition of the various towna, the state of the citizens, and how 
he is doing much by his own actions to alleviate their distress, he 
never once considers any individual case of misfortune so important, 
any particular legal case so outrageous as to merit mentioning aqy 
provincial by name. Romans, frequently of the worse sort, are ~d 
and discussed, but no provincial is ever thought worthy to be sizlgled 
out as an individual, with a name and a history of his own, whose story 
-------------------
1o Ad Att. VI . 1.21. 
2 . Ad Att. VI.2 . 5. : "Itaque publicanis in oculis sumus." 
Ad Att . VI.3. 3. : "Conservatae civitates, cumulate publicanis satis 
factum ••• •• " 
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could be included in any l etter sent back to Romeo So i t comes about 
that, while Cicer o says nmoh and clearly felt much for the lot of his 
province, he confines himself to discussing the plight of the various 
towns and hi s own acti ons in trying to bring help. 
On his first entry to the pr ovince, Cicero was shocked to see the 
towns in a state of r uin and desol ation; it was all he could do to 
begin the task of healing the wounds left by Appius.1 Many people 
came to him with complaints about Appi us ' conduct , and it was clear that 
many of them could not pay their taxes if exorbitant demands were made, 
either by governor or by tax- gatherer. Cicero therefore set to work, 
and in a comparati vel y short Whil e turned the enthusiastic welcome he 
had received at Ephesus into a joyous and almos t triumphant one in his 
own province . 2 ~ his restrained conduct , by unselfish moderation, 
and by his refusal to all ow any political jobbery, he gained a reputation 
for integrity which, when once establ ished, continued with him and made 
his work much easier throughout the rest of his year of offioe.3 Furthe; 
in arranging his tours through the province , he saw to it that no-one 
was inconvenienced by having to travel long distances to bring a petition 
to him. 4 As a result of this wise administration so early in his 
governorship, the people he was to govern were genuinely pleased to see 
Cicero, and to hi s del ight he found that the all ies were more faithful 
to him than to any of his predeoessors . 5 
Before leaving for Cilici a, Cicero had decided that he would 
govern moderately and avoid the excesses he bad criticised in otherso 
The poverty of his province confir med him in this opinion. Therefore , 
throughout his governorship he refused to indulge in the customary 
claims pract ised by Roman generals. Firstly he instructed his staff 
that they were not to demand from the towns even those sums of money 
allowed by the Lex Julia for the food and travelling expenses of the 
governor ' s party. All that Cicer o would take , although more was 
legally all owed, were beds for the night and a roof over their head; 
he would not accept pay or even so cheap a commodity as firewood. 6 
Often they refused even a roof, and spent the night under canvas when 
--------~-------------
1. Ad Att. V.16.2. : " • • in perdi tam et plane eversam in perpetuum 
provinciam nos venisse ••• " 
70o 
Ad Att.V. 15. 2o: "Appi vulnera non refri co,aed apparent nec ccouli possunt. 
2. Ad Att.V.13o1.; Ad Att .V. 16.3. 
3. Ad Att .V.15. 2. ; Ad Att .V. 21.6. ; Ad Att. VI. 2.4. ; Ad Fam.IIol2.3o 
4 . Ad Fam. I I I . 8.4o 
5. Ad Att .V. 18. 2. : "Sociis multo fidelioribus utimur quam quisquam usus 
est : quibus incredibilis videtur et nostra mansuetude et abstinentia." 
This of course i s Cicero ' s own evaluation on the allies ' loyalty, and 
he was never one to minimise a situation which reflected well on 
himself. 
6. Ad Att .V.16. 3. : "Scito non modo nos foenum aut quod e lege Iulia 
dari solet non acci pere sed ne ligna quidem, nec praeter quattuor 
lectos et tectum quemquam aooipere quidquam, multis locis ne tectum 
quidem et in tabernaculo manere plerumque." 
they were on a journey. It was therefore a just and honourable claim 
that Cicero made when he said that provincial expenses were low and there 
had been no exactions. 1 Only once did a member of the staff forget 
himself so far as to take money for lodgings, and, ev~n thougb entitled 
to it , he was no doubt never allowed to do so again. As might be 
expected of Cicero, he not only declined to take money to cover his 
expenses , but also refused to re~uisition money and billet his troops 
on the townspeople . 3 There were moreover none of tre usual claims 
for statues, pictures, antiques, or money to cover fictitious personal 
expenses; he made no exactions to raise money for fleets that were 
never built , and he did not indulge in public building that would prove 
a burden to the stateso 
As the year of office went on, Cicero found that it was not enough 
merely for him to govern moderately; he had also to repair much of 
what he considered was the damage caused by Appius Claudius. People 
who believed that they had r · ecei ved some wrong were sure of a 
sy~thetic, if impartial, hearing from Cicero who by a mixture of good 
sense and soft words strove to wipe out old injuries and win back for 
Rome and for himself the good- will of the provincials.4 By his mild 
legal decisions and by the annulling of previous decrees he gained the 
respect and obedience of those he was governing, whilst at the same 
time he managed to make himself pleasant and agreeable to individuals 
from every class in the province. 5 
Such conduct of course did not please everyone . The tax-farmers 
and money-lenders, Scaptius in particular, found that the provincials 
were not such an easy prey as formerly, for the new governor stood by 
his resolution not to give military praefectships to Roman businessmen. 
Other men even went so far as to suggest that it was as a result of a 
dir ect clash of temperament with Appius tl'lat Cicero governed as he did; 
the fact of the matter, says Cicero with his tongue in his oheek, is 
that Appius' liberality, characteristic of so great a man, ranged over 
a wider field. 6 Since Cicero could not possibly compete with his 
---------------------------
1. Ad Att. VI.2.4. : " ••• quod omnino nullus in imperio meo sumptus factus 
est - nullum cum dico non loquor ~p~tK~ - nullus , inquam, ne 
terruncius quidem. " 
2. Ad Att . V. 21.5. 
71. 
3. Ad Att.V.21 . 7. : " • •• quae sex mensibus imperi mei nullas meas acoeperat 
litteras~ nunquam hospitem viderat . " 
4 . Ad Att.V. 20.1. : "Ibi morati biduum perillustres fuimus honorificisque 
verbis omnis iniurias revellimus superiores •••• " 
5. Ad Fam. II. 13.4. : "• •• privatis, summis, infimis fueram iucundus." 
6. Ad Fam. IIo13o2• : "Genus institutorum et rationum mearum 
dissimilitudinem non nullam habet cum illius administratione 
provinciae." 
predecessor in this, he had confined his attentions and, being 
unwilling to appear generous with other people's money, had f ixed on 
a line1of conduct which gave him pleasure whatever anyone else thought of ito 
2. Administration of Law. 
Cicero spent the three months from mid February to 
early ~ in hearing legal oases from every district in the western 
half of his province . During this time he must have heard cases from 
distant hamlets as well as from large towns , cases which covered a wide 
range of human disagreement s . Yet facts and details are completely 
lacking. No case was so monstrous as to deserve recording in a note 
to Attious; no trial so scandalous that it could be handed on to that 
lover of gossip, Caelius. 
All that is known i s that Cicero considered he had worked wonders 
i n the province by his decisions. In the long assizes he ensured that 
many states wer e freed from debt , . an~ his judicial conduct was not only 
skilful but also mild and courteous . No one had been insulted, and 
only a very few had tasted strict jus,tice , and even then not so strict 
that they dared to oomplain.3 
Lengt~ though the peri od was that Cicero spent on the law, it 
would have been even longer if he had not ensured that the legal duties 
were evenly distributed betv1een himself and the officials of the 
provincial towns . He deci ded that the people would be happier under 
their own laws, and so i t came about that he allowed the magistrates 
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to enjoy what seems to have been an unusual amount of 4liberty in deciding local oases in accordance with their own boqy of law. The provincials 
responded to such treatment and took fresh heart , whil e Cicero found 
his o~ burden lightened and at the same time avoided a possible cause 
of compl aint and future hostility towards himself. The Greek communities 
which shared in this privilege wer e delightgd at having Greek jurors, and 
believed that they wer e enjoyi ng home ruleo 
1. 
2 . 
4. 
5 . 
----------~---~-~---~--~-~ 
Ad Faro. III.a.a. : "Liberali tas tua, ut hom.inis nobilissimi, latius 
in provincia patuit; nostra si angustior est •••• non debent mirari 
homines, oum et natura semper ad largiendum ex alieno fuerim 
restri otior, •••••• " 
Ad Att .VI. 2.5. : ttiam cetera iuris diotio nee ip:Iperita et clemens cum 
admirabili facilitate ." 
Ad Att . VIo 3. 3. : " •• offensus contumelia nemo, decreto iusto et sevelD 
perpauci, neo tamen quisquam ut queri audeat •• •• " 
Ad AttoVI.2o4o : "•• ; omnes (oivitateshmis legibils et iudiciis usae 1 
o/.~ToVOJJid-v adeptae, revixerunt." 
Ad Att.vJ:.1.15. : "Graeci vero exsultant quod peregrinis iudicibus 11 , 
utuntur •••• Tamen setL.u,.OVOJJirJ..V adeptos putant. 
Clearly Cicero believed that it was his du~ to exercise a 
general supervision only over the activities of the local magistrates, 
and as long as they conducted themselves with due propriety he was 
loath to interfere. The only cases he seems to have insisted on 
trying himself were capital charges, cases concerning the taxes, e:cy 
suits between members of di-fferent towns or communities, and any 
action concerning RoiDEln oi tizens. For the rest he preferred to 
encourage the local magistrates, and by careful non-interference 
made the commnnities responsible for their own legal well-being. 
3. Relations with the Provincial Towns. 
It will be remembered that Cicero arranged his 
tour through the province in order to take in its sweep the greatest 
number of towns. It was however impossible f or him to maintain a 
direct check on each place, and so he was again satisfied to lay down 
general directions and then allow the towns to manage their own 
affairs with a minimum of interference from himself. He refrained 
from making demands on the cities, and, as long as they were not 
running into debts or being vexed by the tax-farmers, they could be 
sure of a quiet life. 
Cicero felt that his proudest boast in his dealings with the 
provincial towna wa~ his claim that he had saved whole comnnmi ties 
from ruinous debts. This was certainly true. As has alreaey been 
discussed, Cicero achieved this result in two main ways. Firstly 
he saw that the continual disagreement with the tax-gatherers as t o the 
amount of tax due and the rate of interest charged on borrowed money 
was a fundamental cause of debt. He therefore supervised all the 
branches of the tax-gatherers' activities and tried to ensure that the 
rate of interest allowed by his edict was not exceeded. Secondly he 
refused to make extortionate demands upon the states for his own 
private gain, and even refused to accept the customary presents from 
the towna. As a result of such r estraint on the part of their governor 
~-~~---~~----------
1. Ad Fam. XV.4.2. : " •••• multas civitates acerbissimis tributia et 
gravissimis usuris et falso aere alieno liberavi. 
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the states were able to clear themselves of outstanding debts and 
recovered a sound financial position once more. 
Moreover, in some towns Cicero discovered tha t heavy debts were 
not always due to the unrelenting exactiona of t he publicani.l He 
carried out an enquiry into the accounts of several cities and, to 
his great disapproval, found that certain local magistrates had used 
their office as a means of gaining money for themselves. Fortunately, 
persuasion was all that was needed to induce the magistrates concerned 
to repay into the various treasuries the money they bad misappropriated. 
In this w~ lost funds were unexpectedly restored. Such an investigation 
must have caused quite a stir, but that the amount of money thus reg•ined 
was considerable is obvious from Cicero's assertion that as a result of 
the repayment the comm1nities paid up ten years' taxea. 
Despite his general polio,y of non-interference, Cicero felt 
obliged to limit the number of deputations normally sent out from the 
province t o visit Rome. It was the common practice for the provincial 
cities to send deputations of their chief citizens to appear before the 
Roman Senate in order to extol the good government and benevolence of 
the retiring governor. MOst governors demanded such deputations, which 
often proved a strain not only on the town's treasury but also on the 
imagination of the delegates who had to speak well of a man they often 
hated. These deputations were so commonplace as to be useless, and so 
numerous that a month of the Senate's time was given over to hearing 
them. Cicero knew from ~ast experience that the deputation frequently 
failed to gain a hearing, and so he issued a decree to check these 
deputa tiona from leaving to praise Appiua. Although maqy bad alrea~ 
been composed at such places as Laodioea, Apa.mea, Bynnada and Philomelium, 
Cicero gave a olear order that i f anyone wished to make the journey to 
Rome at his own expense, or even within the limits of the law, then it 
would be allowed; otherwise he would not countenance it. 3 So it came 
about that, whatever happened in the larger towns, no deputations set 
out from such obscure places as Midaeum and Epictetua. 4 Appiua was 
------------~-~--~------
1. Ad Att.VI.2.5. : "Mira erant in civitatibus i psorum f urta Graecorum, 
quae magistratua sui feoerant. Quaesivi ipse de iis qui annis deoem 
proxiDds magiatratum gesserant. Aperte fatebantur •• oPopuli autem 
nullo gemitu publicanis, quibus hoo ipso lustro nihil solverant, etiam 
superioris lustri reliqua reddiderunt." 
2. Ad F~ III.8.3. : " ••• sed iis legationibus non meminisse ullum tempua 
laudandi aut looum dari ••• " 
3. Ad Fam.III.8o3o : " si autem vellent deolarare in eo offioium suum, 
laudaturum me, si qui suo sumptu functus esset off ici o, concesaurua, 
si legitimo, non permissurum, si infinito." 
4. Ad Fam.III.8o3.:"•••• non Midaeensium testimonio." 
Ad Fam.III.10.6. : "Ad me adire quosdam memini, nimjrum ex Epicteto, 
qui dioerent nimis magnos sumptus legatia decerni." 
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clearly vexed at this, but Cicero who had acted in this matter far the 
benefit of the towns was undismayed. If it is right to judge from the 
tone of Cicero's letters, a good many other towns found it impossible to 
send their usual deputations and the mighty Appius Claudius went without 
what Cicero would have considered ill-deserved praise. 
In two other ua ttera aJ.ready mentioned Cicero acted in an effort 
to prevent money being wasted on trifling objects. He refused to allow 
any new public building in his honour, and even stopped the work at Appia 
tha. t had been begun by his predecessor. Further, the offer of several 
towns to pay for the capture of some panthers for Caeliua came as a 
shock to Cicero who was quick to disallow the offer. 
As Cicero looked back on his dealings with the people and states 
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of his province,he felt able to claim that he had saved whole communities, 
aggrieved no-one by his conduct, and had presented himself as nearly as 
humanly possible as a model governor.1 Certainly he could :reel happy 
at leaving the provincials contented and unburdened by such oppressively 
heav,y debts as when he took up office, and he could be sure that not even 
after his departure would the people cease to praise and remember with 
gratitude this extraordinary man who had failed to r ob them of their 
money. 
Client Kin.ga. 
It was part of Roman policy to encourage in their kingdoms various 
prinoea or local chiefs who held power on the fringes of Rome's overseas 
possessions. These kings were formally recognised by the Senate , indeed 
1. Ad Att.VI.3.3o : ~eliqua plena adhuo et laudis et gratiae, digna 
iia libris quoa tu dilaudas." 
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often had the title of king bestowed upon them by that bocy, and entered 
into some kind of treat,y. Their relations with Rome were of a varied 
character, but basically were founded on pledgea of friendship and good-
will, sometimes without any further very definite promises being exchanged. 
From such an arrangement the Senate, which wished to avoid the direct 
control of unoivilised areas, ensured nominally friendly, often slightly 
dependent, states on its frontiers and so kept a buffer between itself 
and any openly hostile power, such as the Parthians in the east. 
That the client kings were frequently uneasy wearers of their 
crowns is clear from their weakness and sole dependence on Roman help; 
they were common targets for plots from both within and without t he ir 
realma, and often it was only the Senate's unwillingness to acquire 
new land that prevented a client kingdom becoming a new province. In 
return for their position, the kings acted as news agencies for Rome 
and as a result of their advanced position provided a warning of any 
ugly situationa developing along their boundaries. Their main value 
however lay in their position of a small buffer state keeping Rome from 
direct contact with a power that would have to be f aced, fought and, if 
possible, defeated. 
Cicero in gajning a province so far to the east perforce had to 
have dealings with several of these cli ent kinga. There must have beeD 
quite a number o£ local chieftains in the eastern Taurus MOuntains, in 
Amanus, a.nd in northern Syria. These dis tricts, some nominally within 
Rome • s sphere of influence, some just outside it, were extremely 
difficult to conquer and keep in subjugation, and the Senate f ound it 
more convenient to recognise local chiefs, all of whose names are not 
known, than to spend large sUDI.S in reducing so unprofitable an area. 
Cicero mentions only five of the client kings and princes by name : 
Deiotarus of Galatia; Ariobarzanes of Cappadooia; Antioohus of 
Commagene; Tarcondinaotua, a Chieftain in Amanus; Iambliohus, an Arab 
Chief. These five however are useful in providing an illustration of 
the value of the client kings 1 and how also they could be an embarrassment 
to the governora. 
----------------~-~~~-~ 
The :first, and most important, use Cicero made of the eastern 
kings was as an adTance warning system of a Parthian invasion. All, 
except Ariobarzanea who bad other worries, were prompt in inf'ormin1 
Cicero of the likelihood of trouble. Antiochus was the first to send 
newa, presumably because he was nearest to the source of trouble,1 
but he was quickly followed by Taroondimotua and Iamblichua, who all 
asserted that the Parthians had crossed the Euphratea.2 Once the 
hue and cry was oB1 Deiotarus promised to come to Cicero's aid. 
It is interesting to note that the frontier kings, who were 
often suspected of double-dealing, were not trusted individually. 
Antiochus, whom some suggested to be untrustwortby,3 needed the 
oerroboration of Taroondimotus, 'our most loyal ally beyond the 4 Taurua', and Iambliohua, •a man considered well disposed to our state• • 
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In faot only Deiotarwa could be relied upon entirely for 1 1 the remaining 
kings and tyranta laok resolute strength in both reaourcea and good-will. •5 
This aituation was of course one of Rome's own making. The border 
princes were bound to keep on amicable terms with both sides, and as 
they stood to lose rather than gai.Ja by a full scale war would m ve as 
cheerfully informed the Parthiana of Roman troop orossinga as they now 
informed Cicero of Parthian threats. Indeed Iambliohua himself seema 
almost an embryo Parthian, lacking in power and organiaation only to 
prOYe himself' no real friend of RaDe. Anti oohus of Commagene 1 with 
a larger kingdom to loae, was clearly eager to summon Roman forces into 
the area o£ the Euphrates for he not only sent news to Cicero at 
Cybiatra, where the envoya arrived in same state of agitation, but also 
wrote a despatch direct to the Senate in Rome.6 These kings then, 
on the very fringes of the Roman world, were bound to Rome not so much 
by ties of trea~ and friendship as by pure self-interest. It is not 
diffioul t to realise how much an Arab ohief would prefer a vague 
allianoe with Romans who never troUbled him and demanded no tribute 
to the present and powerful rule of harsh Parthiana who would deprive 
him of hia small, but to him precioua, power. In suoh circumstances 
and in dealings with men whose leanings as well as whose persons were 
____________ ... ____ ._ 
1. Ad Fam • .XV .1.2. : "Regis Antioohi CoDDDS.geni legati primi mihi nuntiarunt 
Parthorum magnas oopias Eu})hratem transire coepisse." 
2. Ad Famo 1Jl.1.2o 
3. Ad F&n4 xv.1.2. : " •• cum essent non nulli qui ei regi minorem fidem 
habendam putarent •••• " 
4. Ad Fam. xv.1.2. : " ••• a Tarcondimoto, qui :fidelissimus socius trans 
Taurum amiciasimusque populi Romani eristimatur •• o ab Iamblioho 
phylaroho Arabum, quem homines opinantur bene sentire amicumque esse 
rei publicae nostrae,,,~~o••" 
5. Ad Fa.mo XV .1.6. : "Reliqui reges tyrannique neque opibus sa tis firmi 
nee voluntate sunt." 
6. Ad F~ XV.3.2. : "Publice propter duas causas nihil scripsi, quod et 
ipsum Commagenum legati dioebant ad senatum statim nt.mtios litterasque 
misisse •••• " 
unknown, it is not surpr1.s:mg that Cicero prudently waited for 
confirmation of ~ stor.y before accepting it as truthful.1 
In his dealings with Deiotarua of Galatia, Cicero conducted 
himself in a very different manner for this king was not of the same 
calibre as the rest. He was a powerful and important king, and not 
ao much the governor's client as his friend and adviser, and Cicero waa 
careful to treat him with special respect. In comparing Deiotarus 
with the other princes Cicero says he is completely loyal to Rome. 2 
He certainly showed his loyalty at the time of the Parthian invasion of 
Syria. Once the news of invasion was confirmed, Deiotarus sent 
messengers to Cicero s~g that he would join him in camp with all his 
foroes, and Cicero was extre~~ly grateful for this assistance . In fact 
such help was not needed in the first campaign of 51 B.c. , and Cicero 
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was able to inform Deiotarus that there was no immediate cause for alarm. 
Cicero continued to value the king' s oounael and help, and during the 
early summer of 50 B.C. was no doubt relieved at Deiotarua' promise to 
join him in full force, which would mean the doubling of the Roman 
foroes; as he was to bring 30 squadrons of foot soldiers and 2,000 
cavalrymen, such an offer of help was not to be despised.3 The 
reported size of his a~ serves to illtwtrate the power and resources 
of a king who could ma toh in numbers the arzey Rome thought fit to maintain 
in i 1a long and rugged province of Oilioia. 
There are other interesting, if brief, sidelights on Deiotarus 
and his activities. He paid what amounts to a courtesy call on Cicero 
very early in his governorship, and made such a favourable impression 
that the two Cicero boys were actually entrusted to rs care and allowed 
to go off to spend the summer at the Galatian court. It is also 
mentioned in an incidental way by Cicero that Deiotarus keeps a poverty-
striken Roman, P. Valerius, as his pensioner, and further looked after 
another Roman, P:i.nariua, who bad been taken ill.5 
No doubt the fact that Deiota.rua' son was engaged to the daughter 
----------------1. Ad F~ xv.2.1. : " ••• nuntiique et litterae de bello a Parthis in 
provinciam Syriam illato cotidie fere afferrentur ••• " 
2. Ad Fam. xY .1.6. : "Regis Deiotari et voluntatem et oopias, 
quantaecumque sunt, nostras esse duco." 
The basis of Deiotarus' power lay in the mercenary nature of his 
Ga.latian troops. The Galatiana, who were in origin Celta, had forced 
their w~q into Asia Minor from the north, and in \Ulf'riendly surroundings 
had maintained their position and reputa.tioJl as good fighting men. 
3. Ad Att. VI.1.14. :Habet autem oohortis quadringenarias nostra 
aru. tura XXX, equi tUII CIO CIO • " 
4. Ad Att. V.18.4o : "Cioeronea nostri sunt apud Deiotarum, sed, si opus 
erit, deduoentur Rhodum." 
5. Ad Att. V.21.14. : "P. Valerium negat habere quidquam Deiotarua rex 
eumque ait a se sustentari." 
Ad Att. VI.1.25. : "Pinarium, q.uem mihi commendas, diligentissime 
Deiotarus cura t gravi ter aegrum." 
of Artavasdes, King of Armenia., a hostile power 1 was not quite so 
pleasing to Cicero who was probably well aware of the motives behind 
so diplomatic an engagement.1 And the reasons for this, as well 
a s for Deiotarus' pro-Roman leanings, are not far to seek. The king 
was surrounded on three sides by Roman forces ~ the provinces of 
Asia., Bithynia and Cilicia, and, on the other side to the east, first 
by the weak kingdom of Cappadocia and then by Armenia. If he valued 
his independence, he had to maintain a strong rule inside his ovm 
kingdom and at the same time remain on especially good terms with Rome. 
The example of Mithridate s' fall and the carving up of Asia into Roman 
provinces by Pompey was still too fresh in the memory f or Deiotarus to 
act rashly ~ a manner not acceptable to the Senate. 
Surrounded as he was by Roman possessions, Deiotarus was of 
necessity concerned about any unrest in the kingdom on his eastern 
borders. It is known that be was alarmed at the worsening circumstances 
of this kingdom, and he wrote at least once to .Arioba.rzanes urging him 
to pay off his outstanding debts to various Romans and so stabili~e his 
realm.2 Any Change in Cappa.docia was likely to affect Deiotarus 
adversely. If Arioba.rzanes was deposed, or became so powerless a s to 
be unable to carry on his government, then either the Armenian king 
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would seek to extend his power or, more likely, Ro~ would annex another 
province. In either case Deiota.rus would find his own position weakened. 
If be gained the Armenian as his neighbour, he would have to maintain 
increased numbers of troops on his borders to prevent any invasion. If 
Rome transformed Cappadocia into a province, then be would be completely 
sun-o\Ulded by Roman power and 1 t would only be a matter of t ime before 
his kingdom was swallowed up too. 
Ariobarzanes, the King of Cappadocia, was in many ways the reverse 
of Deiotarus; only in his alliance with Rome is he similar. It is clear 
from a decree of the Senate tha t it was an e s t ablished fact in Rome that 
Ariobarza.nes was in diff iculties, for Cicero was given very clear 
instructions as to how he should act : "In your resolution you decreed 
tha t I should protect King Ariobarzanes, the Pious, Friend of Rome, and 
should safeguard tba t monarch's person and his kingdom, should defend 
both king and kingdom, and you added that the Roman people and Senate 
-~---~------~--------------
1. Ad Att.V.21.2. : " •• • nee dubitat Deiotarus, cuius filio pacta est 
Arta.vasdis filia •• • • " 
The inter-marriages between all these kingdoms is further shown by 
the fact that the Armenian king's sister had married the son of the 
Parthian king. c.f. Ad Fam. XV.3.1. 
2. Ad Att. VI.1.4• : "Deiotarus etiam mihi narravit se ad eum ·legatos 
misisse de re Bruti." 
were greatly concerned about the safety of that king - e decree never 
previously passed by our Senate. I therefore decided that I ought to 
report your decision to t he king and promise him ~ careful protection 
and loyalty.•1 As king of Cappadocia, Ariobarzanes was a most 
important ally of Rome. He filled the role of buffer between Cilicia 
and Armenia, and from Rome' s point of view it was important that he 
remained in power. A civil disturbance within the kingdom would mean 
either an increase in Armenian power or 1 if Ro1m took over, the extension 
of the Roman frontiers to join those of Armenia; in either case the 
Senate would be displeased with the result. It can t hus easily be seen 
why Cappadocia and the weakness of its king was a problem not only to 
Deiotarus but also to Rome, for both feared, and for the same reason, 
any kind of upheaval within that kingdom. 
The fears for Ari~barzanes were well founded, as was quickly 
demonstrated to Cicero. At Cybistra,in September 51, Cicero explained 
the Senate' s decree to Ariobarzanes and offered him assistance in case 
of need. At their first meeting Ariobarzanes expressed his gratitude 
to the Senate and to Cicero but, as he knew of no plots against his 
person, was confident that all was well. 
He returned however on the following day, accompanied by his 
brother,Ariarathes, and several of his late father's advisers. They 
were all in a state of great distress far, as a result of the previous 
day's conference with Cicero, certain men who had previously remained 
silent for fear of their own safety had revealed that there was in 
fact a plot to remove Ariobarzanes and place his brother on the throne. 
This brother, who asserted he intended the king no harm, had been 
approached by the conspirators and urged to aim at the throne. He had 
replied with greater loyalty than sense that he could not accept the 
throne while his brother was alive (Ad Fam. XV.2.6. : Id vivo fratre 
suo accipere non potuisse). When al~ the facts became known, it 
appeared that the plot had been instigated by the Queen Mother, Athenais, 
with the assis tance of the important Chief Priest of Comana. 
----------------~----
1. Ad Fam. XV.2.4. : "Cum enim vestra auotoritas interoessisset ut ego 
regem Ariobarzanem Eusebem et Philorhomaeum tuerer eiusque regis 
salutem et inooluudtatem regnumque defenderem, regi regnoque 
praesidio essem, adiunxissetisque salutem eius regis populo 
sena tuique magnae ourae esse 1 quod nullo umquam de rege decretum 
esset a nostro or dine, existimavi me iudicium vestrum ad regem 
de:ferre debere eique praesidium meum et :fidem et diligentiam 
polliceri •••• " 
2. Ad Fam. 'r/.2.5 - 7. & Ad Fam. XY .4.6. 
so. 
Cicero, as in duty bound, gave the king all the help he believed 
necessary. He ensured that Athenais was kept in check by the promotion 
of two men, Metras and Athenaeus, to be advisers to the king, and he 
further secured the prompt departure of the priest from the kingdom.1 
Apart from this, the help Cicero could give consisted chiefly of advice 
and moral support, for he could not help the king in his debts and he 
needed all his cohorts for the imninent struggle with the Parthians. 
Thus was averted the very calamit.y the Senate had feared, and Cicero, 
after suggesting to the king tha t be should punish only those who were 
most guilty, felt tha t Ariobarzanes could continue in full and dignified 
possession of his throne. 
If Cicero's worries had stopped there, all would have been well. 
But Ariobarzanes proved a constant source of concern, so much so that 
more than once Cicero thought of resigning his enforced guardianship 
and leaving that ill-starred king to his fate. 2 Ariobarzanes was 
deeply involved in debts to both Brutus and Pompey and, despite the 
fact tha t he had wealthy friends, could not possibly pay his creditors 
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in full. Cicero did manage to get the king to promise at Cybistra to 
pay Brutus the money he owed, but agents f'rom Pompey began to dun the 
king after the governor had left and for a while Brutus received nothing. 
It was hardly surprising that Ariobarzanes was in f inancial dif'ficulties 
for he had no treasury and no regular tribute; his only income came 
from the imposition of taxes, which Cicero states were raised in the 
Appius Claudius manner : " Indeed I believe there is nothing more 
ravaged than that kingdom, nothing more poverty-str~en than the king. "3 
One set of interviews with Ariobarzanes was sufficient for Cicero 
who avoided, possibly deliberately, another meeting with him. Letters 
were exchanged in which Cicero urged the king to pay his debts, and 
finally both Pompey and Brutus received at least part of what they 
considered their due. Even so the sums were fantastically large for 
so short a period : "The conclusion is this. In proportion to the amount 
of money lent, Brutus has been better treated than Pompey. About 100 
1. Ad Fam. XV .4.6. : "Metram et eum quem tu mihi diligenter commendaras, 
Athenaeum, importunitate Athenaidis exsilio multatos, in maxima apud 
regem auctoritate gratiaque oonstitui •••• perfeci ut e r egno ille 
(sacerdos) discederet." 
The divinity worshipped at Comana seems to have been some Mother 
goddess figure who personified the fertility of Nature. The priest-
hood was a most wealtQy and influential one, and the Chief Priest was 
second man in the kingdomo 
2. Ad Att. V.18.4. ; & Ad Att.VI.1.4 : "Itaque aut tutela oogito me 
abdicare aut, ut pro Glabrione Scaevola, fenus et impendium recusare." 
3. Ad Att.VI.1.4. : "Et meheroule ego ita iudico, nihil illo regno 
spolia~, nihil rege egentius." 
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talents have been found this year for Brutus; for Pompey about 200 talents 
have been promised in six months. "1 It is small wonder that Ariobar~anes 
was a poor man. 
On the whole Cicero found the client kings a positive advantage 
during his governorship. The lesser princes fulfilled their du~ by 
providing accurate news of Parthian movements while Deiotarus, who 
constantly demonstrated his loyalty to Rome by offering troops and 
advice in a crisis, gained Cicero's lasting regard and, a few years 
later, was defended by him when charged with having tried to poison 
Caesar. Even with Ariobarzanes, Cicero felt he had achieved some 
success and could say : "It is thanks to me that Ariobarzanes lives, 
and reigns a king."2 Certainly he was sufficiently interested in 
that king and his own official guardianship over him to feel gratuitously 
insulted when Bibulus refused to acknowlegge the title of king and referred 
to him as 'The Son of King Ariobarzanes' •3 
Romans in Cilioia. 
Together with those men who came into the provinces on official 
business from Rome there came also a good IIl8.lzy private individuals whose 
interest in the countr,y was a purely mercantile one. The Graochan 
legislation had opened up Asia to Roman businessmen, and from that time 
onwards they had been very active in the eastern provinces, in the role 
of either tax-ga therer or private investor. The position of the tax-
gatherers has alreaqy been outlined, and nawthere remains the role of 
the private businessman to be considered. 
Trade with Cilicia presumably increased from 102 B.C. onwards, but 
--~~----------------
1. Ad Att. VI.3.5. : "Summa haec est : pro ratione peouniae liberaliua 
est Brutus tractatus quam Pompeius. Bruto curata hoc anno taJ.enta 
oirciter C, Po~io in sex mensibus pramissa OC." 
2. J.d Att.V.20.6. : "Ariobarzanes opera mea vivit, regnat." 
3. Ad Fam II.17.7. 
at first it must have provided a somewhat precarious livelihood since 
the activities of the pirates , who hated the Romans especially, would 
prove no small risk to profitable coremerce . However, once Po~y had 
successfully suppressed the pirates and later opened up further areas 
for Roman and Italian traders, commerce revived and Roman businessmen, 
who were easily the most weal tb1 in the area, found the east a profitable 
place for their money speoulatioRB. They were helped by the RoiD.8ll tax 
system which proved advantageous to them as it drained from the provinces 
money and resources Which only the Roman private capitalist could 
replace.1 
These men who supplied the money for business can be divided into 
two groups. One section consisted of such men as bankers and the 
merchants who traded in the products of the area. They formed a fairly 
resident oommunity,for while they were frequently men of considerable 
resources they did not feel sufficiently secure to allow their concerns 
to be I'l.Dl without their direct supervision . The smaller resident trader, 
who in Cilicia was no doubt attracted by such natural resources as flax, 
saff'ron, grain, grapes and wine, obviously had to be at band to bey and 
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sell his goods. The second group comprised financiers and money-lenders 
who normally controlled their interests from Italy. These non-residents 
in Cilicia, who dealt mainly in loans to towns and individual. provincials, 
were f'requently men of high position in Rome who chose to keep their own · 
identi~ a secret and used lesser figures as their agents in an effort 
to find secure and favourable investments. 
Relationships with the traders and investors were a difficult 
problem for the governor. His loyalties would most easily lie with 
his fellow nationals and the members o~ his own Roman class, though 
it should be remembered that there were also many Greek traders. In 
consequence it was all too easy for a corrupt or weak governor to allow 
the speculators a tree hand, while for a reasonably honest and sincere 
man it was very hard to find the nice balance between offending his 
fellow Romans, with whom he would have to live on his return to Italy 1 
and protecting the provincials. 
--------------
1. The Roman businessman, whether merchant or financier, had spread his 
interests into every part of Asia and had becooe weal thy by cornering 
much of the trade in the natural products of the province and bl\ 
sharing in the collection or financing of the tams. The provincials 
were now working to enrich a olass they both feared and loathed. The 
violence of their hatred, and the number of the Roman businessmen, is 
shown by the IJW.ssaore carried out at Mithridates' command when he 
began the revolt against Rome . Plutarch alleges that 1501000 Romans 
were killed, while Appian says that the motive was hatred for the 
Ranans not fear of Mi thridatss• , 1 
Plut. Sulla XXlV .4 :(rev W., I.V~J(r'TbV T~v p~tr,~twv ~~J.'.. 6' Kd.lTIV"Tt 
I ( t, ~ ../'l,)R I 'p I L"' fJuptd..o~ ,?f'ft! f''t T~.Jv c;v tr 'al~ wrfJ'~" J(tL~t'(l?"~c.. 
1rd.pllCS'IC,U4.6¥.YT4. .. - - ) 
"l .. 1\ C'ft\ , I \ ,A I ) Appian Mi th. 23. : c,., 1<6'- "ci-"' G'Tcl.. O?Aov £VlV£'To Trw trl~v ou 
,L ' M ,.. t' I "' ... , \ ' '' , ~ o I-I 'lc ' , ' ,To~ fAt "'f' o•TtN tJ•~AOV ? f'N' rwf&•~v To•cto£ l.S J.u'TOu~ 
E. ryJ..<S"J.~tN.t. . 
There were many such businessmen in Cllicia and as might be 
expected of him, Cicero conducted himself in a re~son~ble manner which 
allow~d. the Romans ~o ~ecure a fair return for their outlay without 
despo~ling the prov1nc1als. However he is so careful in his letters 
to oonf'ine himself to generaJ.isa tion that it is difficult to build 
up ~yth~ng l~e a ~1 picture of what were the trading activities 
dur~ng CJ.cero s part:t.cular year in office. It is clear that the Romans 
~bus engaged ~ business were so numerous that it was worthftile for 
CJ.cero to orgam.se a levy and conscript them into his artqy; even 
in Qyprus, where their number was small, they were suff iciently in 
evidence to need a judge to decide aqy disputea.2 The range of their 
activities is unknown, but some of these men were traders, or at least 
speculators, in corn,for Cicero had to induoe them to release stored 
grain to feed the provincials whose harvests had failed. 5 
Among the smaller financiers and migrant businessmen, about whom 
there is more information, there was one P. Sittius, who held a bond, 
presumably for a loan to some town or individual, and Caelius was very 
anxious that Cicero should be well aware of how much the matter concerned 
him. He frequently reminds Cicero that he wishes him to help Sit tiua, 
thus possibly revealing that he was the real creditor and that Sittius 
was only an agentA 4 Among the many other letters of coiDIDenda.tion in 
business aff airs, there is mention of a Roman knight,M. Feridius, 
"who is in Cilicia on business of his own, " who wishes certain lands 
to be exempted from taxation.6 Perhaps he was both a money-lender 
and a landownty; another landowner in Cilioia appears t8 have been 
A. Trebonius. M. Fadius too is frequently mentioned, though no 
details of his business interests are given. But as he came from 
Syria (Ad Fam. XV.14.) into Cilicia, it may well be conjectured that 
he was either collecting money due to him or was on a tour of 
supervision of his estates. The case of Fadius, who discovered tha t 
his brother in Italy was trying to sell a jointly-owned villa, also 
serves to point out that the Roman speculator was not entirely free f rom 
home worries. There was also the businessman Atilius who could :feel 
1. Ad Att. V .18.2. : "Dilectus habetur civium Romanorum." 
2. Ad Att. V .21.6. : " Q• Volusium •• misi in Cyprum •• ne cives Romani pauoi 
qui illic negotiantur ius sibi dictum negarent." 
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3. Ad Att.V.21.8. : " ••• perf'eci ut et Graeci et oives Romani qui frumantum 
compresserant magnum numerum populis pollicerentur." 
4. Ad Fam. VIII.2.2.; VIII.10 ; Ad Faro. VIII.4.5. : "Saepius te admoneo 
de syngrapha Sittiana (Cupio enim te intellegere eam rem ad me valde 
pertinere.)" · 
5. Ad Fam. XIII.9; 55; 55; 56; 61; 62; 64; 65. 
So Ad Fam. VIII.9.4. : "M. Feridium, equitem Romanum. ••• qui ad suwn 
negotium istuc venit, tibi commendo ••• Agros quos fruotuarios habent 
civitates vult tuo beneficia •••• immunis esse. 
7. Ad Faro. I. 5.1. , 
8. Ad F~ XV.14.1. (Oct. 51 B.C.) -Ad Fam. II.14; IX.25; XIII.59 (Feb.50 B.C. ; 
grateful for Cioere's coJDJDendation which had saved him in some 
business difficult.Y or other in Bitbynia.1 
Not even those who formed the closest members of a governor's 
staf"f were entirely disinterested in provincial business concerns. 
Cicero's own legatus, M. Anneius1 had some urgent dispute with the 
people of Sardis in Lydia. The nature of the dispute remains a 
Il\Y&tery, but it is a fairly safe assumption that it was one concerned 
with money, for it was sufficiently ~tant to gain Anneiua a three 
month leave of absence from Cilioia. This case of M. Anneius farms 
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a link between the often insignificant surviving details which are 
concerned with the Roman businessmen in the provinces and those who 
remained aloof in Rome. He represents the case of the Roman who 
normally stayed in Ita~ and emplo.yed someone else to dun the provincials 
for him. As such he points the way to the most fully documented 
example of a negotiator in Cilioia, the case of M. Soaptius.3 
Amongst those Who turned out to welcome the new governor at 
Ephesus in Ju~ 51 B.C. there came a deputation from Salamis in Cyprus. 
The members stated that Appius Claudius had given a praefeoture, together 
with a troop of oavalr,y, to a certain money-lender , ~ Soaptius, who 
had used his forces to starve out the members of the Salaminian Senate 
whom he had besieged in their senate-house, and as a result of this 
treatment five senators had died of starvation.4 Cicero, on hearing 
this, gave orders tha t the cavalry were to leave Cyprus at once and, 
following his own rule about not giving office to businessmen, refused 
to renew Scaptius' praefecture. There the matter rested until, in 
Januar,y 50 B.c., Cicero had more time to settle the dispute . 
He bad in the meantime received from M. Brutus a memorandum to the 
following effect : "The people of Salamis owe money to two friends of 
mine, M. Scaptius and P. Matinius"J and Brutus asked that Cicero should 
help them to recover the debt.5 Cicero, whilst willing to satisfY 
Brutus, was not disposed to ignore his own edict which allowed 121' as 
the m&xiiDUJI. rate of interest. Soaptius was trying to exact the scandalous 
_____________ ,_ _____ __ 
1. Ad Fam. XIII.62. 
2. Ad Fam. XIII.55.1. : "Eum cum Sardianis habere oontroversiall sois .... " 
3. Ad Att. V.21.10 - 13; VI.1.5 - 7; VI.2.7 - 9. 
4. Ad Att. VI.1.6. : ~erat enim praefeotus Appio, et quidem habuerat 
turmas equi tum, qui bus inclusum in curia sena tum Salamine obsederat 
ut fame senatores quinque morerentur." 
5. Ad Att.VI.1.5. : "Quin etiam libellum ipsius habeo in quo est, 
'Salarmni pecuniam debent M. Scaptio et P. Matinio, fam:iliaribus 
meis' "• 
rate of 4S}b. The two interested parties met the governor at Tarsus 
in January, and tried to come to terms. Scaptius, to Cicero's horror, 
demanded the full 48.%, and produced a senatorial decree of 56 B.C. 
ordering the governor of Cilioia to give ju~ement in accordance with 
the terms of the bond, which stipulated 48,%. Cicero, after some 
searching, found two decrees of the same year referring to this bond 
of Scaptius, the one produced by Soaptius and another whiCh stated 
that the agreement should be valid at law, but should not enjoy any 
special position.2 Cicero therefore said that, while the loan was 
a legal one, the rate of interest was not, and so refused to allow 
~~ 'far it was an impossible sum•.Z 
The matter might have ended there, had not Scaptius thrust into 
Cicero • s ha.nd a letter from Brutus which made everything at once much 
clearer and yet more dif'ficul t. The l etter revealed that Brutus was 
the man behind the whole business ; he was the real money-lender. 
Thereupon Cicero, Soaptius and the Salaminians tried to fix an agreed 
total to the debt, but this attempt proved a failure when Scaptius 
wanted 200 talents while the Salaminians made the total only 106. The 
accounts were checked and, on Cicero's reckoning, the Salaminians' total 
proved the correct one. They wished to pay, but Scaptius led Cicero 
aside once more and asked that the matter should be allowed to rest to 
a later date. 
Cicero himself calls the request 'impudent', and indeed it was, 
but i t was one which brought the affair to a crisis. There were ID&I:\1 
things to be weighed in the balance berore Cicero reached his decision. 
By refusing to allow the matter t o r est,he would make a certain ene~ 
of Brutus, and possibly other men concerned in similar loans, which 
might lead to unjmagined results. By acceding to the request,he 
would be conniving at t he future ruin of the Salaminians, for i t was 
certain that no subsequent governor would show such qualms when dealing 
with provincial debts. To decide was to displease, and some sympathy 
is due to the man who was faced with so thorny a problem. In the end 
Cicero gave way. The mtter was to remain undecided, although in his 
-----~----~-----------
1. Ad Att. V.21.11. : " ••• ille ex syngrapha postulabat quaternas." 
2. Ad Att.V.21.12. 
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3. Ad Att. VI.2.7. : "Fieri non poterat nee, si posset, ego pati possem." 
heart Cicero must have known he had merely delayed the verdict against 
the Salami.nia.ns. Scaptius went off to collect money owed him elsewhere, 
and the poor S&lamjnians were not even able to deposit the 106 talents 
in the temple treasury, thus saving themselves f'rom pe.ying furthe r 
interest on that amount.1 This was a time when Cicero could no 
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longer be all things to all men as he had hoped. By his decision, indeed 
by his lack of it, he alienated both parties in the dispute and satisfied 
no-one. 
A Sca.ptius figures in another weak and quibbling decision rrade by 
Cicero at about this time. The oase again concerned Brutus' agents, 
but on this occasion in Cappadocia. The agent mentioned is most 
probably that same Scaptius, and not a different one, as the man who 
had previously caused trouble in Cyprus.2 The name is most certainly 
the same, and he was acting as agent for the same man, Brutus, who held 
Ariobarzanes as his debtor. It seems most probable that Soa.ptius, 
having failed to persuade Cicero to force the Salaminians to pay their 
debts and having lost his cavalry in Cyprus, had no immediate reason 
for returning to that island. He therefore oonoentrated his attention 
on his master• s other main debtor, Ariobarzanes, and spent the early 
summer months in collecting money in Cappadooia. For indeed there was 
a Scaptiws in Cappadocia at this time,~ and, as already shown, some 
money was paid over by Ariobarzanes to an agent of Brutus during this 
period. 
However 1 whether this Scaptius is one and the same man or not, the 
main point remains. Oioero did give a praefeoture to a Scaptiu.s and to 
a Gavius, both at Brutus' request. He did this despite his proud 
statement that he refused many praefectures to men engaged on business. 4 
But Cicero's conscience seems to have been somewhat elastic in this 
matter. In his eagerness to satisfy Brutus, he was willing to forget 
his official guardianship over Ariobarzanes and gave a praefeoture to 
Scaptius who was to be allowed to exercise his office in that kingdom. 
The technical grounds for ignoring his edict in this oase were that the 
praefectures were to be held outside Cilioia, and therefore the activities 
---~--~----~---~-------
1. Ad Att. Vri.1. 7. : "Addo etiam illud quod vereor tibi ipsi ut probem : 
oonsistere usura debuit. Deponere valebant; impetravi a Salaminis 
ut ~iler..ent." 
2. ~ell (Correspondence of Cicero : Vol. I I I; page 191) believes they 
are two distinct individuals. This view however does not explain 
~ Cicero in the space of a few lines refers to two different men 
of the same name, both agents of Brutus and both engaged in the same 
business, without making a:n..y attempt to distinguish between them. 
~. Ad Att. VI.3.5. : "Soaptius qui in Cappadocia tuit." 
4. Ad Att. VI.3.5. : "• •• praefectus non est, quod ego nemini tribui 
negotiatori ••• o" 
of these agents were not Cicero's immediate concern.1 Legally no doubt 
the decision was in order, but morally it was a deplorable one; and 
while it is somewhat gratifying to learn that Scaptius did not use his 
office, it does little to excuse Cicero in thi8 shameful reversal of 
his policy. 2 
Yet once more some sympathy is aue to Cioero, for he found himself 
in a most Wlenviable position. Brutus, who bad possibly made the 
original loan to the Salamj mans when he visited Cyprus with his uncle 
Cato in 58 B.c., was not a man to be scorned. There is ample evidence 
that Cicero was inundated with letters from Rome urging him to comply 
with Brutus • requests. Brutus himself wrote to Cicero in an offensive 
tone, Caelius had offered advice , and Atticus had urged his friend to 
allow Scaptius a small troop of cavalry, about 50 strong : "No more than 
50, you se:y. Why Spartacus had far fewer at first. "3 Clearly 
pressure was being put on Cicero• s friends at Rome to make them persuade 
Cicero to follow a more tolerant approach to provincial finance . This 
pressure was finally successful in part, far Cicero, who was conscious 
of his exposed position in Cilicia• was eager to satisfy Brutus as far 
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as he could. Indeed the whole of the Scaptius affair illustrates the 
inabili~ of the governor, because of political motives and undercurrents, 
to deal adequately with unscrupulous businessmen and prevent completely 
the pillaging of the provincials. 
Brutus was not alone however as the highl3 respected Roman who hai 
interests in rather tmSavoury financial concerns. Pompey was another. --
In one definite instance Cicero, in coDJDending a man named Cluvius, lets 
it slip that Cluvius is in fact only an agent who is working for PoiDJleY• 
When this fact is added to the evidence of Pompey's loans to Ariobarzanes, 
the probable conclusion is inesoapa.ble. There is clear proof tha t 
Pompey was concerned in financial ma ttera in Asia and in Cappadocia, and 
his loans were probably on a wider scale than is generally imagined. Many 
of the letters of commendation written by Cicero may in fact be letters 
supporting Pompey's agents in all the provinces of the east, for Panpey 
--~~----------~~---
1. Ad Att. VI.1.4. : "Ego tamem qua.s per te Bruto promiseram praefecturas 
M. Scaptio, L. Gavio qui in regno rem Bruti procurabant, d.etuli. Neo 
enim in provincia mea negotiabantur." 
2. Ad Att.vr.~.5. : "Is a me tribunatum cum acoepisset, quem ego ex Bruti 
litteris ei detulissem, postea scripsit ad me se uti nolle eo 
tribunatu. 11 
3. Ad Att. VI.2.8. : "Non amplius, inquis, quinquaginta. Cum Spa.rtaco 
minus multi primo fuerunt." 
4. Ad Fam. XIII.56.3. : "Bis de rebus eo magis laboro, quod agitur res 
Cn. Pompei etia.m ..... .. 
was especially admired by Cicero who would be willing to do whatever 
he could for the great man. Certainly Pompey's agents seem to have 
been as widespread as those of Brutus : "After I left, Ariobarsanes 
was pressed by scores of Pompey's agents. •1 It appears that Pompey 
had captured the east on one occasion, and from then on held it 
captive in its debta. 
Enough has been said to show the wide compass of Roman business 
interests in Cilicia. The main danger cama not from tbe small trader 
but from the money-lender who had entered into dubious and hazardous 
contracts with poverty-striken communi ties. The weal thy and respected 
men of Rome are figures but dimly perceived through a veil of seoreoy, 
the fUll extent of whose activities was probably a DtYstery to the Romans 
themselves. It is also obvious that a change of governor could easily 
upset the profits to be mde in this way. Cicero, whatever his action 
towards Saaptius, refused to tolerate arty. extortion within his own 
province, ana in general must be given credit for fair, if discreet 
dealings with the financiers' agents. Pompey and Brutus far their 
part had probably not met such difficulties in the previous governorship, 
when they had had a reliable agent in that most unlikely person, Appius 
Claudius himself, who was a close connection by marriage to them both.2 
Appius Claudius. 
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This oonsidera tion of Cicero' a relations with Ron:ans in his provinoo 
would not be complete without a mention of one mn who, although be did 
not meet Cicero at this time, greatly influenced the new governor's 
policy and whose presence and authority pervaded Cilicia. This uan waa 
Appius Claudius, the previous governor. When it is remembered that it 
was customary for the incoming and outgoing governors to meet and preserve 
_ ... __ ...... ~-------------
1. At Att. VI.1.3. : • ••• post a Pompei proourato.ribus sesoentis premi 
ooeptus est." 
2. Ad Fam.III.4.2. : "·... - duo eni.Da duarum aetatum plurim&. facio, en. 
Pompeium filiae tuae socerum et M. Brutum generum tuum - •••••• 11 
at least a public semblance of rmanimity and friendship, it is surpr~s1ng 
to find tha t Appius and Cicero engaged in a violent dispute that arose 
as a result of Cicero succeeding to the governorship~ 
Their quarrel, as shown in the letters they exchanged,1 followed 
this course. Correspondence begins with Cioeto stating how unexpected 
has been this sudden call to duty in Cilicia, though he is oonsoled by 
the thought that be could not take over from anyone more willing to 
hand on the province as free from all difficulties as possible. Their 
friendship is such that Appius will see to Cicero's advantage.2 This 
mood of flattery, smooth generalisation and hopef ul manoeuvre continued 
right up to Cicero's entry into the province : "I hope that 11\V regard 
for you and my eagerness to be of service are already well !mown to 
you from many J&st actions; I shall however make it especially clear 
in matters in which I can give the most obvious proofs that your good 
na..ue and position are very dear to 11\V heart. ":S To this poll te talk 
Appius acidly replied that, while suoh friendly sentiments were very 
pleasing, they were unnecessar,y since alreaqy on record.4 
One reason far Cicero's pleasure was that Appius had expressed 
his intention of staying on in Cilicia in order to meet his successor. 
This pleasure quickly turned to anger however once Cicero was in the 
province and Appius, instead of hastening to meet him to offer the 
customary greetings and then leave for Italy, in fact pretended to be 
unsure of where and when his successor was to arrive. . As Cicero 
entered the western part of the province, Appius set out eastwards for 
Tarsus and in defiance of' custom carried on the judicial duties of 
governor there. Cicero, making a pretence of trying to help Appius 
observe the Carnelian Law (which stipulated that the retiring governor 
must leave within 30 days of his successor's arrival), wrote expressing 
his gratitude that Appius had relieved him of some duties even t hough5 he was rather distressed at losing the support of some of his troops. 
Appius was however unperturbed at the acrimonious tone of Cicero's 
letter and presumably continued to profess his own confusion as to where 
---~-------- .... -........ ---~----------
90. 
1. Ad F~ III.2. (March 51 B.C.); 3. (~ 51); 4. (June 51); 5.(July 51); 
6. (August 51); 8. (October 51); 7. (February 50); 9. (Mar~April50); 
10. (May 50); 11. (June 50); 12· (August 50). 
2. Ad Fam.III.2.1. : " ••• haec una oonsolatio occurrebat, quod neque tibi 
amioior quam ego sum quisquam posset succedere neque ego ab ullo 
provinciam accipere qui fnallet eam quam maxime mihi aptam 
explioa tamque tradere." 
3. Ad Fam. III.4.1. : "Meum studium erga te et of f icium t ametsi multis 
iam rebus spero tibi esse cognitum, tamen in iis maxime deolarabo1 
quibus plurimum significare potuero tua.m mihi e:rist imationem et 
digni ta tem carissimam esse. " 
4. Ad Fam. III.5.1. 
5. Ad Fam. III.6.5. 
Cicero was, a pretence that was not difficult to maintain in view of 
Cicero's rapid marCh across Pamphylia and Lycaonia. 
Cicero in turn said that he had no idea of where Appius and his 
troops were, and on t he only occasion on which they came near to each 
other, at !conium in August, there was an air of tragi-comedy as the 
two men just missed each other. Appius, the silent and aloof 1 hastened 
along in the night and early morning and made no attempt to halt at the 
camp he mus t have known Cicero was visiting. Cicero in turn, by now 
the worried general advancing to meet a Parthian invasion, left his 
ar~ and hastened after Appius, only to arrive, almost panting and 
certainly undignified, to be told that the opportuni~ was lost,for 
Appius had gone by. 
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This incident led to a good deal of bitter feeling as both men 
chose to be insulted by i t, and it seems that over the next few months 
Appius and Cicero were only too willing to feel aggr.ieved by any reported 
word or action of the other. Both paid a good deal of attention to 
stories handed on to them by their legati and f riends. Appius' complaint 
was that Cicero by looks and by silence had shown that he was opposed to 
Appius; 1 he had prevented delegations going to Rome to sing Appius' 
praises; 2 he had tried to disparage Appius; 3 he bad held up the 
building work at Appia;4 he had arrogantly r efused to meet him;5 in 
short he had governed in a manner quite unlike that of Appius. In reply 
Cicero pointed out that he too had heard stories of Appius' oonduot;6 
he remindQd Appius of holding court at Tarsus after his arrival;? he 
pointed out that it was Appius who failed to wait for Cicero and be 
greeted in the proper manner;B he stated that he at any rate was not 
willing to govern at other people's expense.9 Once this astounding 
charge and counter-charge was finished, Cicero quickly urged his own 
good nature and wishes : "To return to 11\Y point : I want you to believe 
that I 8.Dl not only your friend, but your very good friend." 10 
The tone of this heated correspondence changed early in 50 B.c., and 
--~------~---~---
1. Ad Fam. III.8.2. : " •• nisi me vultu et taciturnitate signifioasse tibi 
non esse amdoum •••• " 
2. Ad Fam. III.8.3 - 5. 
3. Ad Fam. III.a.s. : "Ego sl. l.Il provincia de tua fa.ma detrahere umqua.m 
cogitassem1 non ad generum tuum neque ad libertum tuum Brundisi, 
neque ad praefectum fabrum Corcyrae •• • • rettulissem." 
4. Ad Fam. III.7.2. 5. Ad Fam. III.7.5o 
s. Ad Fam. III.a.s. : "An mihi de te nihil esse dictum umquam putas?" 
7. Ad Fam. III.8.6. B. Ad Fam. III.7o4- 5. 9. Ad Fam.III.a. s . 
10. Ad Fam. III.7.6. : "Sed, ut ad rem redeam, me tibi non amicum modo, 
verum etiam amicisa imum existimes velim." 
it seems tha t Appius made efforts to calm Cicero. The manner of the 
letters becomes extremely polished, charming and urbane. Cicero 
admits a touch of temper (subiratus) in his previous notes, but 
presumes that Appius has changed on learning how loyal Cicero bas beeno 
Once news of Appius' iapeaohment reached Cilicia, Cicero was 
able to express his concern in elaborate, if at times laboured, notes.1 
Naw all was forgiven, and Cicero, who claimed he had always maintained 
Appiws' prestige, promised to give him the help he had requested; in 
this he was followi.Dg Atticus' advice to end the dispute. When Appius 
was acquitted of the charge, Cicero cou1d show further delight at the 
salvation of his friend and boasted, now that there was no danger of 
his being called upon to do so, of how be would have conducted Appius' 
defence and how he would have ridiculed the prosecution.a After this 
Cicero felt himself so much back in favour that be oould joke about 
some choleric passages in his previous letters and say that, if they 
were badly written, then they were certainly not written by him. 
Nor:al relations were restored, and by the midsummer of 50 B.C. Appius 
wrote, apparently in a sincere manner, with congratulations on Tullia's 
marriage to Dolabella. 
TP~ was a completely astounding episode that does little credit 
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to either of the participants. In order to explain the oourse of events, 
it may be useful to consider briefly the past relations of the two men. 
Appiua had his full share of the Claudian arrogance 1 and there is 
considerable evidence as to his regular squabbles and quarrels not only 
with strangers but even with his brother Clodius.3 He seems to have 
been endowed with a quick temper and an almost congenital inabilit,y 
to remain on good terms with people for any length of time.4 Certainly 
he had good cause for quarrel with Cicero long before 51 B.c. First 
of all there had been Cicero's exile, which was the direct r esult of the 
political activities of Appius' brother Clodiua, about whom Cicero was 
consistently rude and uncompromising. Appius was of cour se influenced 
by this and# whilst not openly siding wit h his brother against Cicero, 
alone of all his ooll aagues opposed Cicero's return.5 This disappointment __________________ ..... __ .. 
1. Ad Fam. III.10. & 11. 
2. Ad Fam. III.11· 2. : "Tuorum autem honorum oursus cui suspectus umquam 
fuit? Me miserum, qui non adfuerim! quos ego risus exoitasse~ • 
3. Ad Fam. VIII.12.1. Ad Att. IX.1. 
4. Lucan V .157. 
5. Pro Seat. XL : "De praetoribus unus alienus;" 
and quarrel was finally healed in partt and by 54 B.c. Cicero could talk 
of : nThat gallant and distinguished consul, Appius Claudius, who 1s1 
I trust, bound to me by ties of a loyal and lasting reconoiliation."1 
The old wounds were re-opened however at the time of Clodius 1 murder, 
and Cicero• s defence of Milo, even though undelivered, was too notorious 
to allow of any close friendship between him and Appius. 
If relations in Rome were strained, what further cause of friction 
was there in Cilicia? Appius had been very eager to take a province, 
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and had been prewred to go out to Cilicia wi. thout the formal ratification 
of a Lex Curiata.2 He took up his governorship early in 53 B.c., and 
was quite possibly loold.ng forward to three full years of off iceo 
Certainly, if Cicero is to be believed, Appius was of an avaricious 
nature as a result of poverty in his youth, and used the period of his 
command to acquire money for himself as well as in the furtherance of the 
business activities of his son-in-law Brutus. For if' Appius was looking 
after Brutus' affairs, it is obvious he was also looking after his own. 
If this is the case, there seems to be a reason for Appius• 
unwillingness to leave his province before the last moment allowed by 
the law and for his refusal to meet Cic~ro.3 He had hoped for three 
years in Cilicia, and was no doubt put out by the arrival of an old 
eneJliY six months before he had expected. As a resul. t he behaved as 
though Cicero were the usurper, and deliberately organised his successor's 
entry at the west of" the province rather than the south, and then played 
a game of hide and seek with him. 
Even the reconciliation in the early months of 50 B.c. was more 
apparent than real. Appius on being prosecuted by Dolabella had made 
a good initial reply by entering Rome, thus laying down his imperium 
and his claim for a triumph, but he still needed all tm support be 
could get a.nd from every quarter. Whereas he had :previously enc ouraged 
his friends to criticise Cicero openly, he now had to r ecover lost 
ground and gain the good-will of his successor in order to :prevent fmY 
_ _.._ __ .._ ____ ..... _____ ,... ________ 
1. Pro Scauro XIV .31. : ttru..c ego Appium Claudium consulem fortissimum 
atque ornatissimum virum mecumque, ut spero, fideli in gratiam reditu 
firmoque ooniunotum nulle loco, iudices, vituperabo." c.f. also Ad 
Fam. I.9.4. : "Certiorem te per litteras scribis esse factum, me cum 
Caesare et cumAppio esse in gratia •••••••••• " 
2. Ad Fam. I.9.25. : " •••• p.raesertim cum sine suspicione tuae 
cupiditatis non possis illius cupiditatem refutare." 
3. As was pointed out in Ad Fam. III.6.6., Appius was obliged by the 
Lex Cornelia to leave Cilicia within 30 days of Cicero's arrival. 
Since Cicero arrived on July 31st, Appius had to be gone by August 
30th, and this fact explains Appius• ha ste to move on during the 
early morning of August 30th. Despite his 1 cheek' (si mehercules 
Appi os haberem : Ad Fam. V .10.a.2.) he probably wished to avoid 
openly meet ing his successor after the date by which he should have 
been gone from the province. 
uncomplimentary comments or reports leaving Cilicia. His fear of 
hostile delegations became as great as his desire for friendly ones 
had previously been. Cicero, who, as Caelius said, did not hate 
Appius, 1 was bombarded by advice from Rome which urged him to accept 
all hopes of a return to normal relations with Appius. He played the 
part asked of him and assured Appius of his support. The reconciliation 
letters contain some of the most elaborate and polished writing of all 
the letters that survive from this year's governorship, and yet despite, 
almost because of, their careful style they are false and empt.y. The 
fine phrases of friendship have a hollow ring to them, and even in their 
seemingly open manner they can hide a double meaningo 
Two examples, one from each of the two contestants, will suffice. 
Cicero, all charm and consideration, expresses a hope that he will 
shortly hear of Appius receiving his well-deserved triumph, a hope 
which, as he knew from a note of Caelius, would be particularly galling 
to a man who had already lost all hope of a triumph by entering Rome.2 
Appius had to wait a short while before getting in so telling a reply, 
but his chance came when Tullia married Dolabella, Appius' recent and 
unsuccessful aoeuser. Appius, all friendship and bonhomie , expresses 
his good wishes far· what seemed likely to prove the short-lived marriage 
of Tullia with one · of the most unsuitable men in Rome. In giving his 
good wishes be uses a deliberately ambiguous phrase in 'prospere 
evenire 1 ; ~ that is, he hopes it turns out better than he fears . 
The letters of'~er sufficient evidence to show that it was Appius 
who set the pace in the quarrel he had forced upon Cicero. Yet it ie 
equal~ evident from their ~evious relationships that Cicero had no 
real liking or respect far Appius, and he was wholeheartedly opposed to 
his methods of provincial government . It is probable tb.a t there was 
a great deal of truth in Appius' allegations of critical looks and 
ominous silences by Cicero whenever Appius' name was mentioned, and 
there is Cieero's own testimony for the revoking o~ several Claudian 
decisions . Cicero however would not have allowed the dispute to blaze 
------------------
1. Ad Fam. VIII.6. 1. : Scio tibi eum non esse odio". 
2. Ad Fam. III.9.2. : " ••• tamen maximam laetitiam cepi ex tuis litteris 
de spe mini.me dubia et plane explora.ta triumphi tui •••• " 
3. Ad Faro. III.12.2. 
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so openly or so fier cely i f Appius bad not forced this upon him, for 
he was well aware how open to injury he was whilst marooned in Cilicia. 
Thus when it became politic to make up their quaiTel, Cicero was 
prepared to be r econciled with AppiU!3 as be had been once before . It 
was however a diplomatic rather than a personal friendship that they 
resumed, i f indeed this was not what ' amicus' and ' amici tia' had come 
to mean in t he late Republic. 
~-----------~~-------------
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PROVINCIAL JEFENCE 
The Governor's Position. 
Even when her overseas possessions and commitments had grown on 
a tremendous scale, Rome surprisingly refused to aoknowredge the fact 
that_ a citizen ar~, which had with difficulty saved Italy from 
HBnDAbal, was totally ill-fitted to defending an ever-increasing 
empire around the Mediterranean. Along with this refusal came an 
unwillingness to appoint generals of acknowledged ability to take 
command for lengthy periods over Rome's armies in troubled provinces 
and at dangerous frontiers. The Senate still insisted in the 
majority of' cases on appointing its generals :from th~ number of those 
who had held public office in RoiM . While such a system was 
necessary in a small state, it became ludicrous as Roman power became 
more extensive geographically, and at a time of crisis repeatedly 
proved itself embarrassing and hazardous. The reason for the Senate's 
delay lay in its fear of creating a standing arxqy with regular 
professional commanders who might prove dangerous in combination if 
they decided to turn against their masters. Also added to this there 
was the inherent jealousy of' an oligarchy towards any of its number who 
gained an exceptional position or a distinct honour. 
In giving a description of the Roman army during the second 
century B.c.,1 Polybius states that four legions were raised each 
year in Italy, and indeed it seems that many Roman men must have 
served their full period of sixteen years in the legions,for Rome was 
seldom at peace. Military service was not continuous however, nor 
did the soldier remain in the same legion for the whole of his military 
life. Ligustinus, a common soldier portrayed by Livy, gives some idea 
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of his life in the Roman arii\Y in the middle of the second century • He 
bad served in Macedonia, in Spain, and twice in Aetolia, but even though 
he served well and faithfully in each campaign he was apparently discharged 
after the successful conclusion of the war, for he speaks of how he had 
to volunteer far service for a third time; he had seen twenty-two years 
under arms, and was still an active soldier when over fift,y . 2 Ligustinus' 
fears of a premature retirement would not have been entirely calmed even 
-------~-----~--
1. Polybius VI.19 - 42. 
2. Livy XLII.M.S. : "Tertio iterum voluntarius miles f actus sum." 
34.11.: ~iginti duo stipendia annua in exeroitu emerita 
habeo, et maior armis sum quinquaginta." 
after Marius' re-organisation of the ~· Even though the length of 
service was extended and its basis broadened to encourage the growth of 
the professional soldier, the numbers serving in the legions were not 
fixed. In times of crisis the number of legions was increased, but 
once peace was restored discontented soldiers were frequently forced back 
into an uncertain civilian life as the legions were disbanded. 
In such circumstances the provinces were bound to be ill-defended, 
not because of aqy laok of ability or spirit on the part of the Roman 
legionary, but through an almost wilful disregard of elementary 
precautions by the Senate. As long as the Senate insisted on disbanding 
legions as soon as a campaign was over, especially in ill-pacified areas, 
there was alw~s the danger of a revolt from discontented groups and an 
initial defeat or two for Rome until her forces were organised and 
reinforcements sent out} Mi thrid.ates had alreaay shown up this glaring 
weakness in Asia by overru~ning the Roman province and killing many 
thousands of Romans there. The Senate moreover not only left the 
prQvinoes weakly defended but even risked whatever forces were there 
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by placing them rmder the command of the provincial governor. This 
combining of all functions, executive, administrative, legal and milit•ry, 
in the one person of the governor was to lay a heavy burden on men who 
could seldom fill more than one or two roles satisfactorily, though it 
says much for the ability and adaptability of most Roman governors in 
militar.y matters that resounding disasters were so few. 
Besides his command over whatever legions were stationed in his 
province, the governor held powers to call up reserve troops and levy 
further squadrons from any Romans living in the province or engaged on 
business there. He might further call upon the provincials to supply 
any of their specialised troops he thought fit to use, and in a maritime 
province would draw upon the provincials 1 ships to supply him with a 
fleet in case of need.2 In theory this aid available from the allied 
forces seems of positive value., but much depended on the quality of the 
troops enlisted and, even more important , on the skilful use a governor 
made o'f them. 
Cicero, who in July 51 B.C. looked but a poor prospect for a future 
--------------.. ---~·---------
1. Plutarch : Sulla XXIV.4. :(T~v ~~> £'V9uM'O" T~" Ao.6't'Aiwv l(cf.\ &t.K4.:rrtv1'£ I~ C I ~ ~ ' ,.,,.,. I ~ ::J r: ,Jw ~ 
fUfhl.o•s :Jflf't fJit{ T'WV (V cr"lcl I '-'ff'l-1 UV /(.TtJ.tr ,, ~Vet. 
1Tc ftl.tr K tud.crCif..v"r¥. _. -~ 
2. If the provincials 1 ships proved insufficient or unsuitable 1 the 
governor might also call upon them to contribute money for a navy. 
Pro Flaoco XII.27. : MSed si hoc crimen est, aut in eo est quod non 
licuerit imperare, aut in eo quod non opus fuerit navibus, aut in eo 
quod nulla hoc praetore olassis navigarit. Lieuisse ut intellegas, 
cognosoe quid me consule sen a tus deoreveri t, oum quidem nihil a 
superioribus continuorum annorum dearetis discesserit.u 
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general, succeeded to Cilioia at a time when events both within and 
without his province seemed to be leading to a crisis. Within the 
province his troops were discontented, and from the east there was the 
promise of' a Parthian attack. The 1a tter tbrea t was by far the more 
serious, for only two years earlier in 53 B.c. there had been the 
disastrous defeat of Crassus at Carrhae, and it was only to be expected 
that the Parthians would be eager to follow up their earlier success 
by invading and plundering Roman terri tory in order to repay Crassus' 
attack. It might have been expected that if the Rorran Senate was 
alive to the danger, it would, despite the unpopularity of a Parthian 
war, have made preparations by strengthening its forces in all the 
eastern provinces to ward off any attack, or indeed to make an effort 
to regain the standards lost at Carrhae. But no such activity had been 
going on. Cicero, who had good cause for alarm, states that the 
Senate as a whole was well aware that Cilioia needed reinforcements, 1 yet could do nothing in the face of opposition from the consul Sulpioius. 
Since be had gained no further troops, Cicero was desperately 
concerned at any suggestion of reducing the number of troops he was to 
receive from Appius : •I had understood from your letter tba t you had 
discharged a good many of your soldiers. But that same Fabius explained 
to me that, while you had thought of doing so, at the t].m:, he left you 
the number o£ your troops was rmdiminished. If that is so, I shall be 
very pleased if you will reduce as little as possible those scanty 
forces you oommand."2 It seems in fact to be the oase that Appius 
did not after all dismiss any of his troops, f or if he had, it would 
certainly have formed the grounds for a complaint in that heated exchange 
of correspondence between Appius and Cicero. 
The legions were not up to full strength however when Cicero took 
over, ~d he fairly frequently mentions how thin his troops were on the 
ground. It is impossible to say just what was the numerical strength 
of the arley' that he took over frcm Appius in August, but by late September, 
with the five mutinous cohorts returned to the fold, fifty cavalrymen back 
from Cyprus and a troop of horse returned from Appius, plus those levies 
held at Iooniwn, Cicero's provincie.l arnw was made up of 12,000 infantry 
----~-------~---~~------------
1. Ad Fam. III.3.1. : " ••• sed universo senatui venerant in mentem, 
praesidia firmi.ore opus esse ad istam provinciam. Censebant enim 
omnes fere ut in Italia supplementum meis et Bibuli legionibus 
scriberetur. Id oum Sulpicius consul passurum se negaret •••• " 
2. Ad Fam. III.s.2. : ~x iis litteris ••• sic intellexeram, permultos 
a te Bdlites esse dimissos, sed mihi Fabius idem demonstravit te id 
oogitasse facere, sed, cum ipse a te disoederet, integrum militum numerum 
fuiese. Id si ita est, pergratum mihi feceris si istas eriguas 
copias quas habuisti quam minime irominueris •••••••• " 
3. Ad Att. V.15.1. : " •••• et cum exeroitum noster ~cus habeat tantum, 
me nomen habere duarum legionum exilium?" c.f. also Ad .Att. V.18.1.; 
Ad Fam. XV .1.4. 
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and 2,000 cavalry. These numbers are of' com-se only an approximation 
arrived at by combining two comments from Cicero's letters. In Att. 
V.18.2. (written September 20th 51 B.C.) be says that Deiotarus' arrival 
with all his forces will doubl e the Roman arD\Y : quem (exerci tum) nos 
Deiotari adventu cum suis omnibus oopiis duplioaturi eramus. In Att. 
VI.1.14. (written February 20th 50 B.C.) Deiota.rus, who is caning with 
all his forces, is said to have 30 squadrons of 400 men and 2,000 
cavalry& habet autim oobortis quadringena.rias nostra armatura XXX, 
equitum CIO CIO • Cicero's early anxieties caused by the weak strength 
of his arl'I\Y would be in no way relieved by the mutiey of the five cohorts 
just before his arrival in either June ar July. Fortunately however 
the mutiny did not spread to the rest of the arnu, and for the remainder 
of his year's governorship Cicero was able to rely upon a body of troops 
which, despite its small size for so large a province, was very loyal in 
its service. 
If the Senate would not trust its generals with large forces, it 
darEdnot trust the provincials who were practically disarmed. The 
provincials' good faith was always suspect, and it would indeed have 
been utter folly to impose the Roman system of taxation with all its 
excesses on a well armed community which might decide to use force to 
gain some respite from the tax-gather erd attentions. Even though he 
believed that he was the object of more real respect and loyalt.y than 
any of his predecessors, Cicero thought little of the support they might 
give him. He admits that the Galatian, Pisidian and Lycian auxiliary 
forces are the Dllin strength of his arJit1, but as far as is known he made 
no attempt to ensure that a Cilician fleet, which the Cilicians with 
their pirate ancestry should have been able to supply and sail, was 
maintained in readiness. Cicero's whole attention was directed to the 
Parthians, who would not attack by sea, and so he paid no regard to 
raising a fleet for this woold have proved a fUrther demand on the 
cities' resources. The r est of the allies ha.d to be dismissed with 
"Because of the harsh and unjust nature of our rule the auxiliary forces 
of our allies are so weak that they cannot help us much. Or if not 
weak, they are so estranged that it seems unwise either to expect anything 
of them or to entrust anything to thea. "2 
1. 
2. 
Plutarch : Cioero 36. £tTd.. ICA.rU"•l ""' c.,y TI..>V t'1rd.f IWV 11\11<1 , \1 l<tJ.&. 7 ---\-;---,-~-, "" , ~ " K \ I \ 
\ ' \ "' 1 ,II ~ C: \ I C I C ' C. •\I \ I 
r-7'f6.TOV 
1 
07r/UT'~V f'UfiWV l(cU 01(1' IAI WV 1 111"1t£~V c:»£ o• cT/1 11\t &.r.>~ c£t~Kocr•~v- .. ~ . . 600 lry than c· 1 . f Prutarch here g1ves C1cero more cava men 1oero c a1ma or 
himself. 
It should be noted that these figures represent the fully augmented 
legions and auxiliaries, and can give no clue to the actual strength 
of the 'exilium legionum' of August . In fact, when the Brll\Y of the 
allied king Deiotarus is added to the Roman troops, a combined total 
of 28,000 men is no small force for a Roman governor to have at his 
disposal. 
Ad Fam. XV.1.5.:"Nam sociorum auxilia propter acerbitatem atque iniurias 
imperi nostri aut ita imbecilla aunt ut non multum nos iuvare possint, au1 
ita aliena ta a nobis ut neque exspectandum ab iis neque commi ttendum 
tis quidquam esse videatur." . . 
Cicero is here using the rhetorical arts of the law court 1n a spec1al 
plea to gain reinforcements for what he considered weak legions. 
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As far as mill ta.ry matters are concerned Cicero's lot was apparently 
an unenviable one. A man of little mill tary experience, he was 
unwillingly put in charge of a province which was dangerously close to 
the Parthians and poorly guarded by two undermanned, if finally loyal, 
legions. The sole consolation he could draw from so glo~ a prospect 
was that since he was advised and supported by officers of no 
inconsiderable experience in Quintus and Pomptinus, both of whom had 
seen service in Gaul, be might with luck get through his year's duty 
without any disgrace to his good name. 
The Parthians. 
"There is no news of the Parthians. For the re st, may the gods 
assist us.•1 To this devout prayer not only Cicero but all his fellow 
governors of the eastern provinces as well as the government in Rome 
would add amen. Of all the likely sources of trouble in Asia, the 
Parthians were at this moment of time the most dangerous. Any mill tary 
plans made for the area had to take into account the posaibili ty of an 
invasion from across the Euphrates frontier, an invasion which could 
rob Rome of' its provinces in Syria and Cilioia and disrupt the whole 
econozqy of the east. Cicero' a fears of a Parthian invasion therefore 
were no idle ones, for if' any serious war broke out,he was destined to 
fim himself facing t hose hordes which had all too recently proved that 
Raman might was not invincible. 
The Part~an menace was one which had grown since the f inal over-
throw of Mi. thrida tes in 63 B. c. , for with Pompey's sett lement of the 
east the power of Rome and Parthia was brought into dangerous 
prorimi ty as the Parthians became Mi thrida tes' natural suooessors as 
Rome's main enemies in this area. The Pompeian settlement eff ectively 
brought about a common frontier : the creation of the province of Syria 
and the extension of Cilicia, together with the assistance given to the 
King of Armenia, widened Roman influence to the very limits of Parthian 
territory. By the treaty, which laid down that the Euphrates wa::; to be 
the Partho-Roman frontier, the Parthians were allowed sovereignty in 
Mesopotamia, but as Armenia, at this time under Roman influence, was 
1. Ad Att. V.11~4. 
iuventt " 
------------------
"De Parthis erat silentium. Quod superest, di 
allowed to lay claim to part of norther~ Mesopotamda, the effect of 
this part of the agreement was largely nullified and was to bring the 
two powers into violent op:posi tion. Thus it can be seen that, with 
Roman terri tory or influence in the client kingdoms stretching from 
Armenia to Syria, the common frontier created the promise of future 
trouble • Furthermore 1 when it is remembered that Rome also tried 
to extend its influence eastwards by taking into a client relationship 
such places as Edessa, which was in nominal ly Parthian territory, the 
promise of trouble became a certainty. 
The Senate fea.red the Parthian&, and with good cau.se, but it 
failed to realise how difficult it would prove to defeat and hold down 
so war like a people . The best hope for Rome lay in a strong arD\1 
stationed in regular garrisons on the frontier in order to m&intain 
the Euphrates as a convenient line of defence beyond which the 
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Parthians might be confined. But, as already shown, this policy of 
creating a standing a~ was not acceptable to the Romans of the Republic, 
and so the Roman forces in the east were kept to a dangerous minimum. 
It would need some movement on the part of the Parthians to so stir 
Roman anxieties that troops were prepared in order to complete the 
conquest of the east. 
This movement came when the Parthians turned against Armenia and 
sought to end its influence in Mesopotamia . The invasion of Armenia 
was seen as an attack on Rome, and it appeared to Crassus, the wealtey 
triwnvir1 that the opporttmity had come for rivalling the military 
exploits of his fellows, Caesar and Pompey. He took the province of 
Syria as his command, gathered a substantial arD\Y' 1 which was swelled 
perhaps by draining troops from the other eastern provinces,1 marched 
forth to punish the Parthians, but, in a campaign which was a series 
of blunders, was tricked by his Arab guide and allowed himself to be 
drawn into a Parthian ambush at Carrhae in 53 B.c. Here his 
infantry were no match for the expert and nwnerous Parthian cavalry. 
Crassus was killed, an.d rather more than 30, 000 Romans lost their lives 
or were captured. The defeat was damaging to..r both Rome ' s resotn'ces 
and reputation. and imDediately resulted in the return of Armenia to 
the Parthian sphere of influence and exposed Cilicia to attack from the 
------------~~-~~-~------
1. In 68 B.C. Ma.rcius Rex had commanded three legions in the then smaller 
province of Cilicia (Sallust Hist. V.14M) 1 whilst in 51 B.c. Cicero in 
the larger province had only two depleted ones (Ad Att. V.15.1.). It 
may be wondered if the reduction in the armed forces was due entirely 
to the ending of the Mi thridatio Wars, for it might well be that 
Crassus drew troops for his a.rll\Y from those neighbouring provinces 
whioh would be safeguarded when, as he hoped, he ended the Parthian 
threat. There is an example of this transfer of troops to be found 
in the action of the Senate in 51 B.c., when they asked for a legion 
each from Pompey and Caesar to go to the threatening Parthian War . 
If this was done in 51 B.C., might it not also have been done in 53 
B.C.? 
north through the poorly defended kingdom of Cappadocia. It was only 
to qe expec ted that the Parthians would try to follow up their previous 
success, and Cicero, who had been ordered to protect Ar iobarzanes and 
Cappadoci.a, could f eel that he was succeeding Appius in what was 
potentially a most dangerous zone. 
This then was no imaginar,y danger tha t Cicero foresaw. It was 
comf'orti.ng at first to believe that the Parthians were at peace,l but 
later the· worry caus~ by a report tba t they bad cut up some Roman 
cavalry must have been increased by Caelius' ominous forecast that : "If 
the Parthian makes any move, I know the struggle will be no small one. "2 
By the end of August 51 B.c. the danger appeared to be a present 
one. Reports were daily arr iving of Parthian troop movements, of the 
massing or forces on the banks of the Euphrates, and of a threatened 
attack on Cappadooia by the Armeniana.s In such a crisis Oilioia was 
placed in real peril, for two scanty legions could hardly repel a 
simultane ous invasion from both north and east, while even within the 
province the wilder elements had t aken up arms in the hope of joining 
in the distnrbance of Roman power.4 Cicero must have been doubly 
thankful for the guidance and the very presence of his two principal 
legati• Quintus and Pomptinua, who probably planned and eff ected the 
execution of all the military manoeuvres of this period. For his 
part, Cicero deserves praise for lds resolution and determinat ion at 
this time. Once it became clear that he would have to marshal his 
forces to the defence of Cilicia, he made all speed to j oin his arl!\Y 
and further organised the levying of reserve troops amongst the Romans 
living in his provinoe.5 It cannot be denied that during the opening 
months of his governorship his whole attention was given to t he gathering 
of troops and the strengthening of Cilicia to faoe what might prove to 
be a most serious invasion. 
By September 20th, after his military tour through Lyoaonia, I sauria 
and Cappadocia, Cicero pitched camp at Oybistra; his reason f or so doing 
---------~--~--~------
1. Ad Att. V.14.1• : " •• primum otium Parthioum •••• " 
2. Ad Att. V.16.4. : "De Partho silentium est, sed tamen conoisos equites 
nostros a barbaris nuntiabant ii qui veniebant." 
Ad Fam. VIII.5.1. (From Caelius) ; "Nunc si Parthus movet aliquid, 
soio non medioorem fore oontentionem." 
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3. Ad Fam. XV .3.1. : "Cum a d me legati ••• nuntiassent regis Parthorum filium. o 
ad Euphratem cum maximis Parthorum oopiis mul tarumque praeterea gentium 
magna manu venisse Euphra temque iam transire coepis se dioique .Armenium 
regem in Cappadociam impetum esse facturum ••• " 
4. Ad Fam. XV .1.3. : "Et ob eam oausam et ut oppri.merentur ii qui ex 
Cilicum gente in armis essent ••• " 
It may not be too fanciful to suppose that those Ci licians who so eagerly 
responded to a Parthian invasion were the relics of t he pira tea who 
wished to see a return to the pre-Roman days of booty and plunder. 
5. Ad Att. V .18.2. : "Dilectus habetur civium Romanorum." 
103. 
was his suspJ.cJ.on that any Parthian attack: on Cilicia would come through 
Cappadooia, as this was the weakest link in the line of defenoe .1 Whilst 
in camp he was able to review, somewhat pessimistically, the recent 
events. To date there is no news of Bibulus' arrival in Syria, but it 
seems that Cassius, Orassua • quaestor who had survived Oarrhae and was 
now governing Syria, is in the town of Antioch with all his forces. He 
may even be bloolalded there 1 f' or the Parthian prince Orod.e s is reported 
to have crossed the Euphrates and to have oooupied Cyrrhestioa, a 
district of Syria which bordered on Oilicia. Winter may well prove 
Cicero• s greatest ally 1 though perhaps by then the Parthians will already 
be in Cilicia; Spring the following year might see Pompey's re~ to 
the east and the absolution of' Cicero from his responsibilities. 
Towards the end of September it became clear tba t no such invasion 
was in fact planned through Cappadocia and, when reports came in tba t the 
Roman cavalry had cut up so:rre Parthian troops which had crossed into 
Cilicia from Syria., 3 Cicero moved on towards the Taurus Mo\Ultains . But 
first he issued this warning to the Senate in Rome : "The situation is 
now such that unless you promptly send out to these provinces an a~ of 
the size you normally despatch to the greatest of wars, there is a danger 
of losing all those provinces on whiCh the revenues of Rome depend."4 
With this desperate and seemingly heartfelt plea,Cicero marched eas twards 
to face the unknown, resolved if necessary to meet an honourable death. 
"Parthians? I don't think there were any. There were some Arabs, 
with Parthian equipment, but they are said to have gone back. Reports 
say there is not a single eneJJtY in Syria. tt5 Incredible as it may 
seem, these words were written by Cicero only a few days after the previous 
eloquent appeal to the Ranan Senate. Events were suddenly changed, and 
the Parthian menace bad become a figment of the imagine. tion. Syria was 
at peace : Cilicia was safe : the Roman revenue was assured. 
This sudden reverse is however too good to be true, and when tho 
facts are examined more closely a rather different picture to the one 
presented by Cicero emerges. The alarm raised by the client kings had 
1. 
3. 
5. 
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Ad Fam. XV . 2.1. : "Erat enim magna suspicio Parthos, si ex Syria egredi 
atque irrumpere in meam provinoiam conarentur, iter eos per Cappadooiam, 
quod ea maxime pateret, esse f'acturos." 
Ad Att. V.18.1. : "Ea (hiems) si venerit nee illi ante in meam 
provinciam transierint, unum vereor, ne senatus propter urbanarum rerum 
metum Pompeium nolit dimittere." 
Ad Fam. XV.4.7. : "Interea cognovi ••• magnumque eorum equitatum, qui in 
Cilicia.m transisset, ab equitum meorum turmis et aoohorte praetoria, 
quae erat Epiphaneae praesidi causa, ocoidione oocisum." 
Ad Famo XV .1.5. : "Hoc autem tempore res sese sic habet ut, nisi exercitum 
tantum quantum ad maximum bellum mittere soletis mature in has provincias 
miseritis, summum periculum sit ne amittendae sint onmes eae provinciae 
quibus veotigalia populi Romani oontinentur." 
Ad Fam. III.8.10. : "De Parthis quod quaeris, fuisse nullos puto. Arabes 
qui fuerunt admixto Parthico ornatu dicuntur omoes revertisse; hostem 
esse in Syria negant ullum." 
not been an empty one. The Partbians had certainly crossed the 
Euphrates and quite successfully overrWl the northern part of Syria, 
finally reaching Antioch where they were met by Cassius. For a while 
the result had been in some doubt, but in the end Cass ius, who acted 
with fair sld.ll, had forced the eneJl!Y to retire from Antioch, though 
not from Cyrrhestica, where, says Cicero, they spent the winter. The 
Roman victory was assured before Bibulus ' arrival in the province •1 
The r eal glory for halting the Parthian invasion must go to 
Cassius whose part in the affair Cicero consistently minimises. Onoe 
the danger from the Parthians was over, Cicero tried simultaneously to 
criticise Cassius, inflate his own achievement, ignore Bibulus, and say 
tha t there had really be en little to fear from tha. t particular invasion : 
"Meanwhile - for you realise there are such words as 'panic' and 'idle 
rumours of war' - the rumour of tqy approach put heart into Cassius who 
was besieged in Antioch and inspired terror in the Parthians. Cassius 
followed them up as they retreated from the town and scored a victor.y."2 
The f act is that Cicero had acted very creditably in this whole business 
up to the point where a mixture of disappointment at not having beaten 
the Parthians himself and of r esentment with the man who had, forced 
him to belittle the not trifling achievement of repulsing a serious 
Parthian invasion. 
U 1 as Cicero SSJE!I Cassius claimed he bad ended the Parthian War, 3 
then it was a s omewhat ex.aggera ted claim. The Parthian War could only 
be ended by the defeat o~ the Parthian forces , their expulsion from 
104. 
Roman territor,y and their c ontainment beyond the Euphrates . This he had 
not achieved. The Pa:rthians spent the winter in Cyrrhestioa and, as the 
s~r months approached, Cicero again became concerned for the safety 
of his province. He hoped that his fears were idle ones, but everything 
frightened him. Preparations were however made once more to meet the 
threat : unfortunately Pomptinus had left for Italy, but with Anneius' 
recall from Asia and with the help of Deiotarus' troops from Galatia, 
Cicero hoped he could hold out until Pompey arrived, for Pompey cleaxly 
expected to get the oommand.4 
1. 
3. 
4. 
~--------------------------
Ad Att. V .21o2• : "Reoesserant illi quidem ab Antioohia ante Bibuli 
adventum, sed nullo nostro £~')1"'P1~•Tt.. • Hodie (February 50) vero 
hiemant in Cyrrhestioa, maxilllUJllque bellum impendet." 
Ad Att. V.20.3. : "Interim - scis enim dici quaedamlT"ttVIK.a.' , dici 
item .,W. I(£V~ ,.~ trc~tpou - rumore adventus nostri et Cassio, qui 
Antiochia tenebatur, animus accessit et Farthis timor inieotus est. 
Itaque eos cedentis ab oppido Ca.ssius insecutus rem bene gessi t." 
Ad Att.V.21.2. : " •• litteras ••• quibus per se scribit confeotum esse 
Parthicum bellum." 
Ad Att.VI.1.14. : "Eri t ad sustentandum quoad Pompeius veniat, qui 
litteris, quas ad me mittit, significat suum negotium illud fore." 
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The months continued to slip by and Cicero, having been alarmed 
once, was not over-eager to rush eastwards to meet a second attack, real 
or imaginary. He had lost his main mi.li tary adviser, and his policy 
became one of waiting for the arrival of the last day in July and his 
own happy release from office.1 This statement of his policy is not 
meant as a criticism of his action, nor is it meant to imply that he 
relaxed his guard, for he continued to show tba. t he was as alert as 
before. He kept his troops, which were augmented by strong allied 
reinforcements, in a state of watchful readiness,2 and, whilst hoping 
for a few months of peace, he took the elementar.y precaution of marchjng 
slowly eastwards to join the camp on the river Pyramus by June 50 B.C. 
Once in camp he prudently waited to see what danger threatened. 
It appears that he received frequent messages from Bibulus' legati that 
Syria was once more at war, but when Bibulus himself wrote it was always 
about any other subject and the Parthians were never mentioned. 3 
Bibulus, who had no liking at all for Cicero, also pursued a policy of 
masterly inactivity,and as a result is criticised as the man,'who never 
set foot outside the ci~ gate as long as there was an ene~ on the Roman 
side of the Euphrates•.4 No major invasion materis.lised, and by July 
it was clear to Cicero that the threat was over, for the monent at 
least, and Orodes' long-awaited, long-rumoured invasion would not take 
place during his governorship. His policy of waiting and watching had 
been the correct one, and in a new peaceful atmosphere he disbanded all 
the strong garrisons he had got reaqy.5 
Later, when reviewing the Parthian menace and comparing it to the 
threat then hanging over the Republic, Cicero could say that it was some 
god who saved Rome in Cilicia from the Parthian invasion.6 This pious 
view was not altogether accurate, for it was no god who organised the 
Roman legions, who levied troops, who watched the march of events, and 
turned himself to meet a dangerous foe. It was a man who, though perhaps 
ill-sui ted to, and certainly Ul-liking of, his task, was wise enough to 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
---------~---~-~--------------
Ad Fam. II.17.1.; Ad Att. VI.5.5. 
Ad Att. VI.5.3. : • ••• tamen esse officium meum putavi exeroitum habere 
quam proxime hostem quoad mihi praeesse provinciae per senatus 
consultum lioeret. 
Ad Att.VI.5.3. : "Cum enim arderet Syria bello •••• sea, quo ego maxime 
deleotabar, Bibulus molestus mihi non erat : de onmibus rebus 
scribebat ad me potius." 
Ad Att. VII.2.6. : "· •• nunc illum, qui pedem porta quoad hostis cis 
Eupbratem :fuit non extulerit ••• •" · 
Ad Fam. II.17 .3. : "Itaque onmia praesidia, q\Ule magna et firma 
paraveram, commotus hominum non dubio sermone dimisi." 
Ad Att. VII.1.2. 
take advice from his legati, a man who showed himself surprisin~ly 
co~tent, if not over-modest, in his militar,y accomplishments. 
Amanus. 
Even though the threat of a Parthian War never developed into 
actual fighting, Cicero did not make all his military preparations 
and excursions in vain. As a direct result of the sudden ending 
of the first Parthian scare in early October 51 B.C., he was able 
to turn his attention to another hostile group of mountaineers who, 
if not as dangerous as the Parthians, were at any rate a nuisance, 
living as they did on the borders of Cilicia and Syria. 
These were the inhabitants of the Amanus mountains, a wild, 
brigand people who had refused to submit to foreign domination from 
any source. Cicero describes them as old enemies of Rome, and says 
they were actually looking forward to the Parthian invasion and no 
doubt hoping to join in the confusion and pillaging consequent upon 
any Roman defeat.2 In this lay the immediate excuse far attacking 
them. No doubt relying on Pomptinus' and Quintus' advice to find use 
for the army he had prepared lest inactivity once more lead to ill-
discipline, Cicero decided to perform a task he believed was of the 
greatest importance to both Syria and Cilicia; he resolved to crush 
these wild mountaineers who inhabited the common boundary line of the 
Amanus. 
With fair military insight, he feigned a withdrawal from his 
position at the foot of Amanus, and on October 12th pitched his new camp 
at Epiphanea. As evening closed in, he set out with his lightly-
equipped troops and during the night covered so much ground that as 
day was breaking he was alreaey making his way up into the mountains. 
It seems that the mountaineers were taken by surprise, but even so 
1. 
2. 
The Parthian withdrawal must have been very pleasing to a good many 
others besides Cicero. Caelius (Ad Fam. VIII. 10.2.) reports on 
how the news of the Parthian invasion was received in Rome. Some 
wanted Pompey to go out, others Caesar; so~m proposed the consuls, 
but they were unwilling if they were 1a ter to be recalled. In fact 
there was a decided disinclination to accept a province. 
Ad Fam. XV.4.8. : " ••• et perpetuam hostem ex eo monte tollere •••• " 
10.: " ••• et Parthorum adventum aoerrime exspectarent." 
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offered a stout resistance to the attaok of the Roman a~ which was 
divided under the command of all four legati and of Cicero himaelf, 
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th~ it was rrhaps Pomptinus who conmenced the attack and bore most 
of l. ts burden. Clearly the whole of the Roman power in Cilicia was 
used to eradicate this foe. It therefore s~s much for the determination 
of the mountaineers that they resisted for ten hours, but by the late 
afternoon Erana, the capital of Amanus, Sepyra and Conmoris had been taken, 
many of the ene~ had fallen, and several forts had been captured or 
burned.2 The mountaineers were quelled; maqy were killed or captured, 
the rest were soattered.3 The next few days were spent in a leisurely 
completion of the task they had begun, in destroying the remaining 
villages and strongholds, and in the plundering of the lands within the 
boundaries of Cilioia. 
This whole episode was a very gratifying one to Cicero who felt 
that he was treading in the steps of history. For after this glorious 
and rapid victor,y he was not only hailed as Imperator by his troops, but 
he actually camped at the Arae Alexandri, near Issus, which was the very 
spot on which Alexander had camped against Darius. But even Cicero 
saw the irony of such a. situation and jokingly has to admit that Alexander 
was his superior as a general. 4 
The winter bad not yet set in, and Cicero, flushed by his recent 
success and glorying in his new-found title, was eager to gain further 
renown. He therefore turned his attention to a town named Pindenissus, 
situated on a high and strongly defended position somewhere in the 
northern Amanus range. The town was inhabited by Free Cilicians, men 
who, as their nam, implies, owed no allegiance to Rome and who had never 
endured the rule of foreign kings.5 They had looked forward to the 
Parthian invasion1 and bad received fugitives from the other parts of 
Amanus after the attaclc on Erana. Cicero therefore considered it 
necessary to fulfil his policy of reducing these mountain people : "I 
thought it important for the prestige of the Republic to cheok their 
boldness, in order to break more easily the spirit of those others who 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
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Ad Att. V.20.3. : "Castella munitissima. nocturne Pomptini adventu, 
nostro matutino cepimus, incendimus : imperatores appelle.ti su.mws." 
Ad Fam. XV .4.8. : "Eranam autem, quae fuit non vioi instar sed 
urbis, quod era t Amani caput, i temque Sepyram et Commorim, acri ter 
et diu repugnantis, Pomptino illam partem Amani tenente, ex anteluoano 
tempore usque ad horam diei decimam, magna multitudine hostium oocisa, 
. " cepl.DlUS•••••• 
Ad Fam. II.10.3. : ~ti occisi, capti; reliqui dissipati." 
Ad Att. V.20.3. : "Castra pauoos dies habuimus ea ipsa, quae contra 
Dareum habuerat apud Issum Alexander, imperator baud paullo melior quam 
aut tu aut ego." 
Ad Fam. XV .4.10. : "Con£ectis his rebus ad oppidum Eleutherocilicum 
Pindenissum exercitum abduxi : quod cum esset altissimo et munitissimo 
loco ab iisque incoleretar qui ne regibus quidem umquam paruissent •• " 
are opposed to our rule . "1 
Ho~ever, Pindenissus seems to have been forewarne d by the 
~struc~:~.on o~ t~e ?ther towns a.nd by the news brought by the f'ugi tives 
1t re?e:tved W1thin 1ts gates. It was prepared for a long siege, 
and C:tcero found that this second campaign was not so much to his 
l:ild.ng as the first. The inhabitants were keen fighting men, and 
were not the sort to surrender af'ter a single day's fighting . The 
element of surprise that had won the day at Erana was ncm lost and 
it proved necessar.y to blockade the town : "They were fierce w~iors 
and in ever.y way reacy to offer their defence. I surrounded tbem 
with a stockade and entrenchment, with massive earthworks, mantlets, 
a tall tower, a large battery of catapults, and many bowmen. I 
settled the business after muoh toil and preparation1 after many 
of 11\Y men had been wounded, but with the ariey" safe. "~ Fifty-seven 
bitter days taught Cicero how difficult it can be to r educe a 
mountain stronghold, and when the people of Pindenissus did at last 
surrender on the 17th Deoemher 51 B.C.! it was not until their town 
had be en reduced to ruins around them. 
The surrender or Pindenissus induced its neighbouring town of 
Tebara to offer hostages to Cicero who, after allowing his soldiers 
to take all the spoil except the captives, imnediately handed over 
the cQIIIIDBnd of the arD\}' to Quintus, who was left to arrange for the 
quartering of the troops for the winter in those places but recently 
captured and ill-pacified. The sale of the captives raised 12,000, 000 
sesteroes. 
Onoe back at Tarsus it seems that Cicero sent an official 
despatch to the Senate in which he related his military activities, 
and in particular reported his success at Erana and Pindenissus. He 
no doubt made freat use of the title of lmperator bestowed upon him 
by his troops. As he was entitled to do, he asked for a supplicatio, 
which he received despite the pedantic opposition of Cato who much 
preferred to advance the claims of his son-in-law Bibulua. Tho 
supplioatio was however only an appetizer, as it were, before the nain 
-----~--------------~---~ 
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1. Ad F~ XVo4.10. : " ••• ad existimationem imperi pertinere arbitratus 
sum comprimere eorum audaciam, quo facilius etiam ceterorum animi, qui 
alieni essent ab imperio nostro, frangerentur.• 
2 . 
4. 
Ad Att. V .20.5. : "Feri homines et acres et omnibus rebus ad 
defendendu.m parati. Cinximus vallo et fossa, aggere maximo, vineis, 
tUITe al tis sima, magna tormentorum oopia, mul tis sagi ttariis : magno 
labore, apparatu, multis sauoiis nostris, incolumi exercitu negotium 
oonfeoimus." c.f. also Ad Fam. XV.4.10. 
Ad Fam. XV .4.10. : "• •• ut, a:nnibus partibus urbis disturbatis aut 
inoensis, compulsi in potestatem meam pervenirent." 
The actual despatch is lost, but Cicero's intentions in this matter 
are clear from:- . " 
Ad Fam. xv.4.11. : " •.• side iis rebus ad senatum relatum s1to 
Ad .Fam. II.7.3. : " •• unis litteris totius aestatis res gestas ad 
senatum perscriberem." c.f. also Ad Fam. III.9.4; Ad Att. VI.1. 9. 
course of a triumph of whioh Cicero was cheated in all probabilit,y 
only by the outbreak of the civil war in January 49 B.C., :immediately 
on his return to Rome. 
Certainly Cicero had achieved enough to win the reward of a 
triumph : he held full imperium; he had been in command of his arii\Y 
on the day of the victory; he had defeated foreign enemies. Moreover, 
in the troubled circumstances of January 49 B.C., the Senate would wish 
to ensure the continued support of Cicero, 'novus homo' though he was, 
by allowing him a new honour. Yet even Cicero, whilst claiming to 
have done well 1 would admit he was not a great general. A triumph 
for what was perhaps an unnecessary victory over robbers and brigands 
would fina.l.ly have been an unsatisfactory one :"'The people of 
Pindenissus?' 1 you wlll say. 'Who the deuce are they? I never heard 
the name. 1 What could I do about that? Could I turn Cilioia into 
an Aetolia or a Macedonia?" 1 
1. 
----~-----------~--~~~ 
Ad Att. v.20. 1. : " 'Qui, mal~ isti Pindenissitae? qui sunt? 1 
inquies : 'nomen audivi numquam.. 1 Quid ego faoiam? num potui 
Cilioiam Aetoliam aut Maoedoniam reddere?" 
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EPILOGUE 
"Are you satisfied with the present moral standards? Satisfied 
that our governors shall govern as they do? Satisfied that our allies 
should for the future be treated as you see that in recent times they 
have been treated?"1 
Faults Inherent in the Provincial System. 
As the Roman Republic expanded its overseas te,rritories, it 
matched the piecemeal acquisition of provinces with a patchwork method 
of administering them. Theories of government which had been sound 
and workable for a small state became cumbersome and outdated in a 
large and seemingly expanding empire. Yet the Senate obstiDately 
clung to approved and traditional methods1 and, fearing a diminution 
of its own power, refused to make timely changes in the provinces, as 
well as in other spheres 1 before events led to the final crisis of the 
Republic. Cicero's governorship illustrates many of the shortcomings 
in the provincial systea1 and while these have become apparent during 
the preceding pages it will be advisable to restate them briefly. In 
that way it will be possible to discover to what extent Cicero was 
confined by the system, and haw far he managed to rise above it. 
Within the Senate there was a fundamental antipatey towards the 
growth of the ~ovinces, and a persistent distrust of too great 
ability in those who governed them. In oonseqwn08 the Senate as 
a body remained ignorant of the lands under its control, and paid 
little more than lip-service to the welfare of the provincials. It 
considered its overseas territories as lands apart, and continued to 
treat each province when acquired as a separate department. No 
overall provincial policy was formulated, and no strong control was 
exercised from Rome over those officials sent out to govern; such a 
central administration was not to come until the Empire. This 
departmental approach often bore heavily on men not suited to their 
tasks, and in matters of common interest to several provinces, as for 
.. ---------------------
1. II In Verrem III.89. 208. 
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example in the conduct of the Parthian war, it repeatedly proved 
unsatisfactory o The Senate, after appointing its governors and 
providing far their expenses, allowed them an almost unlimited 
freedom to govern according to their own principles and desires . 
Beyond eX]eoting infrequent official despatches, the Senators 
preferred to remain untroubled by provincial worries. 
The very method of appointing the governor and his staff 
lies open to critioisDk Not all city magistrates had the temperament 
or the ability to become aaministrators of a province, and it was 
patently unwise to leave the important decision on their appointment 
to be resolved by lot . The absence of permanent officials caused 
quite unnecessary brdships, and the perhaps yearly change of governor 
would result in a considerable upheaval, for ideas and methods varied 
widely when a Cicero succeeded an Appius, and vice versa. A lack of 
continuity in both theory and practice of gavernnent was bound to have 
an unsettling effect on the provincials who were obliged to reorientate 
their attitude to the governor every year or two. By refusing to see 
anything but danger in the appointment of an experienced governor and 
his staff for long periods, the SeDB.te deprived itself of the opportunity 
of stabilising its overseas government and, as Cicero said, of obtaining 
colllpirative calm in precisely those areas on which it relied for its 
revenues. 
Arising from the Senate's distruet and many governors' intolerance, 
there came another defect which time alone could cure but which the later 
Republic could have done more to eradicate. This was to be found in the 
sharp division of status between Roman and provincial. The latter had 
no liking for the Romans, and in return were regarded with suspicion as . 
liars and sullen f oes. In such an atmosphere of mutual distrust there 
was no hope for the growth of common feelings and purposes which might 
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have created a sense of unity between Roxoo and her provinces. Individual 
generals in the later Repub~c were fond of bestowing the Roman citizenship 
on favoured individuals1 but whole conmnmities were not encouraged to aim 
so high and had to be content with their inferior status of ally • Even as 
allies they were not t o be trusted~ and it was considered poli tio to 
disarm them. Little care however was taken to ensure that adequate 
----~~-~--------~---~-~----~---
garrisons were placed in the provinces to protect those who were not 
allowed to protect themselves. 
Of all the defects imposed by the provincial administration 
perhaps the most burdenso~m and crippling because it extended into 
ever,y part of the province without respite was the system of taxation. 
This system was almost universally condemned except by those members of 
the equestrian order who profited from it. Condemned in Rome, detested 
in the provinces, it c9ntinued to cause sharp hatreds between governing 
and governed, and did more perhaps than any other single factor to 
discredit the Republican provincial administration. 
In all this the role of the governor was the vi tal one. Too muoh 
was left to his discretion, and it depended on his character and 
integrity whether the undoubted defects developed into major faults or 
were confined to reasonable proportions. If the governor went out to 
his province determined to enrich himself and accommodate his friends, 
then the provincials were powerless to prevent him. But by determined 
and careful administration a moderate man could try to ensure the 
happiness of his province and the satisfaction of all Roman interests. 
Cicero's Governorship. 
Cicero was unlike the majorit,y of his fellow governors in that 
he was an unwilling holder of his office. It had never been his 
intention to take a province 1 and he might therefore have been expected 
to skimp his duties, and even be excused for doing so. Such a line 
of" action however was foreign to his nature and1 unwelcome though the 
task was, he did square up to his responsibilities. Once his initial 
reluctance was over he applied himself' to his provincial duties, and 
while he was never to becoxoo enthusiastic far provincial lif'e he did 
at least learn to bear with its disadvantages. In son:e W83S his year of 
office saw quite remarkable progress, and his achievements are notewortey 
even in matters which might have been considered beyond him. There were 
of course several mistakes and failurea, about which Cicero is quite 
~-------~--------------~ 
understandably reticent, but they are surprisingly few in a man who 
cared so little for his work. In fact, it can be said that Cicero 
conducted himself creditably in spite of the provincial systeDh 
As far as the day to day administration of the province goes, 
Cicero was quite right in olaimjng that his governorship was a 
resoundirlg success. It seems safe to assert tba t never before bad 
Cilicie. experienced such moderate government. Even when the accounts 
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of his actions are stripped of exaggeration am Cioeroni.n over-statement, 
it is clear that in his daily conduct, in his supervision of the provincials, 
in restraining his staf:f1 in administering justice, in dealing with all 
classes of provincial sooiet,y, Cicero acted fairly and honourably. While 
he made no startling innovations and no permanent ohangea, he insisted 
on governing his province in accordance with the most restrained and most 
just code of law he could use, and refrained from using his own position 
to harass the provincials. Even though he knew he was acting correct~, 
he often felt isolated, as most governors must have done at soe time 
during their governorship. His letters and despatches reveal how 
conscious he was of his distance from Rome, and his isolation from 
immediate help and advice. The whole year shows how self-reliant and 
self-critical a governor had to be, and in this may lie some reason for 
the normal low standard of provincial government. 
The lack of a civil service, whilst inconvenient, does not appear 
to have been an overwhelming burden. As Cicero frequently reminded 
friends in Rome, his staf:f behaved in an exemplary manner in executing 
their duties. He does in fact seem to have been fortWlate, or well 
advised, in his choice of immediate advisers. The four legati, even 
the shadowy M. Anneius and L. Tullius, deserve some credit for the 
excellence of tbe year's proceedings, and with a less conscientious 
staff Cicero might have found his difficulties greatly multiplied. 
Moreover, by farming out his duties to the magistrates of the various 
cities and by allowing an almost unprecedented degree of self-government, 
he lightened his own administrative work and at the same time won the 
favour of the provincials. In short, the efficiency and fairness of the 
administration did much to help the governorship. 
Perhaps the most amazing because the most unexpected success of 
Cicero's governorship is to be found in his military campaigns. Cicero 
------------------------
himself would rate Amanus and the destruction of Erana and Pindenissus 
as his supreme aohievement, and it was in this that he placed his hope 
for a triumph. A more detached view however would give him credit 
rather for hia organisation of his weak and disunited forces in order 
to face the serious threat of a Parthian invasion. That he never had 
to fight them is not important. He made very creditable preparations 
to secure the safety of his province in a time of definite peril, and 
whilst he was terrified at the prospect of war he mobilised his troops 
in the w~ expected of a sensible man. He oan be criticised for his 
laok of communication with_ Cassius and Bibulus, who of all men should 
have known what danger was threatening and where. This however is a 
case where the departmental approach proved too strong, and prevented 
united action. It was also an illustration of how dangerous was the 
Senate's military policy when it preferred to make do with a Cicero 
and a Bibulus rather than use one of its accredited generals. 
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The victory at Amanus, which Cicero regarded as the highlight of his 
year, is not so important in an overall estimate. It is true that the 
brigand& were an insult to Roman might 1 but it may be questioned how 
useful and how essential was their suppression. They did not constitute 
~ real menace, and if their crime was their hostili~ and opposition 
towards Roman authority, they were not alone in ito Cicero's policy 
of destroying mountain villages and selling their inhabitants runs 
contrary to the tenor of the rest of his governorship, and, when compared 
to Pompey's more practical colonisation of the pirates,Lquite~utile. By ~ 
this victory Cicero achieved little, and proved nothing beyond h~s own 
desire for a militar,y reputation and a triumph. If his military 
achievements had to be judged on Amanus alone, they would have appeared 
successful in themselves but without lasting benefit to Rome. 
In the matter of taxation and the control of the tax-farmers, in 
whioh Cicero had foreseen great difficulty, he believed he had scored a 
great success. There is his own testimoqy of how he protected the towns 
whilst allowing the publicani to gather their dues, and he tries to paint 
a picture of universal agreement and satisfaction. Only in the Scaptius 
affair and in the incident with Ga.vius does he recount any trouble. Yet 
it may be doubted if Cicero is telling the whole of the truth as even he 
saw it; quite obviously he is relaying only that information which is 
-----------------
bene'ficial to his reputation, and conceals what is not. He was perhaps 
hoodwinked more than he realised by the tax-gatherers, who appeared to 
follow the governor's wishes while in :fact they went about their 
business in as thorough a way as usual,but with less apparent violence. 
They were sufficiently expert to achieve their own end, which was after 
all the making of a profit from the taxes. Even in the outrageous 
affair of Scaptius and Salamis, Cicero was not sufficiently decisive and 
severe, and in more innooent-seeming oases he was presumably even less 
inquisitive as to ways and means. 
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On 'the whole it would appear that Cioero prevented any great 
illegalities or coercion by the tax-gatherers. He was however favourably 
disposed to them in their work, and in what was a prosperous year for 
the provincials they gathered in the taxes with unprecedented ease~ 
Cicero tried to a void becoming deeply involved with them, for ha was 
conscious of the mightier and more influential figures who were back:i.ng 
them. It may well be that the details of the Scaptius case would never 
have been coumitted to paper, if Brutus had not tried to enlist the aid 
o'f A tticus and Caelius 1 whom Cicero wished to have informed of the true 
facts. Pompey's loans, which seem to have been on a wider scale than 
Brutus • 1 are not half as well documented, presumably because Pompey was 
willing to bide his time. 
Cicero's relationship with the tax-gatherers is the most difficult 
part of his governorship to assess. His political philosop~ aimed at 
securing a mutual agreement between the senatorial class and the equites, 
and he was not so foolhardy as to risk giving offence to anyone from 
either group because of any sentimental ideas on the taxes. He wished 
to be fair to the provincials, but it cannot be doubted that the 
Salaminians, who really lost in the case against Scaptius, were not the 
only members of the province to receive less than their due from Cicero. 
If the tax-farmers were satisfied, as Cicero said they were, then some 
hardship must have continued under Cicero as under Appius. 
This ultimate disregard for the just claims of the Salami nians 
springs directly from Cicero's mental attitude towards the provincials. 
Perhaps quite naturally 1 as a Roman he regarded them as inferior and, while 
he was sympathetic towards their ~sfortunes, he refused to see them as 
~------------~----~ 
people who might yet prove a valuable support to Rome. In the mass, 
provincials were r egarded as unsavoury 1 and even in his r e mark tha t he 
is on friendly terms with many of them there is a very marked air of 
condescension. This attitude of course was bound t o exist. The 
province had been acquired as a result of a series of campaigns, and 
the people were treated as a hostile and lesser breed of men. In 
this matter Cicero, like most of his fell ows 1 failed t o come to terma 
with the problem of treating the provincials a s people who might have 
certain rights, who might in time become more closely associated with 
Rome and be taken into its citizenship. 
Because of his lack of' interest in and enthusiasm for provincial 
life, as opposed to his wish to govern fairly, Cicero failed to produce 
any long-term results from his governorship. His own experience seems 
to have suggested no alterations that could be made in provincial 
administration, and it must be suspected that had he r e turned to an 
untroubled Senate, he would have made no proposals for the better 
regulation of the provinces in general or of Cilicia in particular. He 
could see the faults , but,beyond correcting their obvious and extravagant 
results~ he made no attempt to find a cure far them. 
++++++++++++ 
It is interesting to see that as Cicero's governorship drew to 
its close the letters he wrote home began to reflect his feelings on 
the year of office . His original fears of Cilicia were vanishing, and 
as he had looked forward in anguish he now looked back in pleasure . He 
felt his governorship had been a success, and intended to announce the 
fact:-
"So tar the rest is fUll of honour and glory, and wortqy of those 
volumes which you praise. Cities have been saved; the tax-farmers 
have been completely satisfied; no-one has suffered ill-trea tment; few 
have t asted strict justice, and even then not so s t rict that anyone dare 
complain; a campaign has been f ought deserving of a trilmlph. "1 
--------------------~-
1. Ad Att. VI.:s.s. : "Reliqua plena adhuo et laudis et gratiae, digna 
iis libris quos tu dilaudas . Conservatae civitates, cumulate 
publicanis satis factum, offensus contumelia nemo, decreto iusto et 
severo perpauoi, nee tamen quisquam ut queri audeat~ res gestae 
dignae triumpho •• • •• " 
U6. 
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As always, Cicero presented himself" in too most favourable light, 
and could now conveniently forget the less happy moments of the 
governorship. For him there had been no indecisi on in the case of 
the Cypriot Salaminians, no building work at Appia, no Parthian threat. 
The difficulties had been surmounted, and everything had worked out 
well. He could rejoice in the thought t hat he was nnlik:ely ever to have 
to govern a province again. And tha t was indeed a cause for rejoicing, 
because his views on provincial goverruoont bad not changed : "Hold to 
the oity, yes the city, Rufus, and live in i t s splendour. All foreign 
service is mean and pal try for those whose work can gain renown in Rome -
this is a view I have held from~ y outh up."1 
For Cicero the conclusion was obvious. The governorship had been 
an unexpected and absolute success : "Well then, it was worthwhile; I 
did not lmow mysel f, nor realise what I could achieve in this line. I 
am deservedly 'puffed up', for this is splendid. "2 
Cicero's exaggerated opinion of his own achievements as a 
provincial governor, and his blindness to the f ailures, must not be 
allowed to conceal the obvious fact that his governorship when considered 
as a whole was a success. He must be given full credit for two virtues 
rare in the Roman governor, a humane and impartial approach to t he 
provi~cials coupled with a genuine desire to rule f airly f or the good of 
the province and for all its members. He may also be prais ed f or a 
positive improvement in all parts of the administra t i on, for the tight 
control he maintained over his own s taff and all t hose entrusted with any 
authority. Des pite his unwillingness to become governor, he did in the 
event govern well. By avoiding the excesses wh:i.ch marred the rule of 
so many others, he brought to C~lieia a year of moderation whieh r estored 
s ome measure of prosperity to the cities and gave the provincials an 
opportunity to recover from the previous mal-administration. 
Cicero had lived up to those principles laid down in his a dvice to 
Quintus and in the speeches :from the law c ourts; he had ensured the 
greatest possible happiness for the governed.:s By his govern orship 
1, Ad Fam. !!.12.2. : "Urbem, urbem, mi Ru:fe, cole et in i s ta luce vive. 
2. 
Omnia peregrinatio - quod ego ab adulescentia i udicavi - obsoura et 
sordida est iis quorum industria Romae potest illustris esse." 
Ad Att. v.20 6. : "Quid quaeris? Fuit tanti : me i pse non noram nee 
satis sciebam. quid in hoc gene:re facere possem : reote Trt.c}utrl~fcA'­
nihil est praecle.rius. •• 
Ad Q.F. 1.1. VIII.24. : "Ac mihi quidem videntur hue omnia esse 
referenda iis, qui praesunt aliis, ut ii, qui erunt eorum in imperio, 
sint quam beatissimi ••••• " 
. 
• 
he had at last replied to the questions he had posed in 70 B.C. : no, 
he was not satisfied to see the provinces governed as they had been; 
no, he was not willing to stand by while the provincials were robbed 
of their possessions. He had therefore brought a restrained outlook 
to Cilioian affairs, and, provided always that his actions did not 
offend anyone in Rome, he had tried to protect the interests of the 
provincials. It was perhaps his main achievement to insist that the 
province was administered according to the law and not according to 
the whims of those who governed; the words which Propertius was to 
address to a later governor of Asia, urging him to restore Roman ways 
and Roman justioe,1 might well have been applied to Cicero:-
et vetera oblitis iura refer sociis. 
--~--~--------------------
1. Propertius I. VIo20. 
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